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Abstract 
This dissertation develops the concept of ‘post-capitalist struggles’. This concept 
highlights how a post-capitalist future is a recurring moment within the capitalist present and can 
be developed through struggles that express the latent powers found within what Marx called 
‘the collective worker’. Using a comparative and historical framework, I examine four case 
studies in Latin America: Venezuela’s socialist enterprises, Argentina’s recuperated factories, the 
Chilean student movement and the Brazilian transit movement. In expressing new values and 
practices, such as collective management, solidarity and participatory democracy, and their 
ability to develop the political capacities to formulate clear demands and strategies through the 
state, these four cases can indeed be considered examples of post-capitalist struggles. However, 
as mere glimpses of the future, these struggles display number of contradictions and ambiguities, 
particularly in relation to democratic practice and political organization. This is most marked in 
struggles that originate in the sphere of capitalist reproduction. 
A comparative analysis of the four cases also reveals the possibilities and limits of Latin 
America’s ‘pink tide’. These are found in what I call the ‘neostructuralist bargain’. Through this 
bargain, vulnerable sectors of the population become the target of small economic reforms that 
evidence a departure from the neoliberal orthodoxy of previous decades. However, in exchange, 
horizons beyond liberal democracy are temporarily closed off and the institutions of liberal 
democracy acquire a renewed legitimacy. The exception to this is the case of Venezuela, whose 
Chavista government goes beyond the boundaries of neostructuralism. This is evident in the 
Venezuelan government’s support of new institutions that express the values of participatory 
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democracy. However, in all cases new political challenges come to the surface, particularly with 
the rise of the region’s right wing.  
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Introduction 
On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union and as British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher (1979-1990) proclaimed that there is no alternative to neoliberal capitalism, Latin 
America witnessed one of its most significant political events in a generation. In February of 
1989, thousands of poor people in Caracas, Venezuela's capital city, staged a popular rebellion 
against the structural adjustment program imposed by the International Monetary Fund and then 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1970 and 1989-1993). This event, known as el Caracazo, 
which culminated in the deaths of thousands of people as a result of police repression, became 
one of the first mass uprisings against neoliberalism in the region. 
Soon, others would follow. In Mexico, the Zapatistas became central figures in the 
struggle against the North American Free Trade Agreement and the neoliberal policies associated 
with it. Organizing themselves through caracoles (snails) and the Juntas de Buen Gobierno 
(Good Governance Councils), the Zapatistas sought to create political spaces that maximize 
participation and minimize hierarchy (Dinerstein et al., 2013). “Líderes fuertes crean pueblos 
débiles” (strong leaders make a weak people), Emiliano Zapata's famous principle, popularized 
by the Zapatistas in the 1990s, perhaps best captures their philosophy. 
Not long after the emergence of the Zapatistas, in 2001, Argentinians flooded the streets 
in protest of the structural adjustment programs that had brought the country to the brink of 
collapse. People organized themselves through popular assemblies in hundreds of neighborhoods 
across the country, creating barter clubs and even local currencies. In addition, under the banner 
of ‘ocupar, resistir, producir’ (occupy, resist, produce), workers began to take over bankrupted 
private businesses, turning them into self managed cooperatives, while the unemployed joined 
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organizaciones piqueteras (picketing organizations), helping to establish the country's solidarity 
economy (Dinerstein, 2013; Sitrin, 2006, 2011; Moreno, 2011). 
Meanwhile, between 2000 and 2005, Bolivian workers and indigenous communities 
mobilized in the millions against the privatization of gas and water in the country. Known as the 
gas and water wars, these popular struggles became some of the biggest and most important in 
the country's history. The mobilizations were organized through new political bodies, including 
la Coordinadora (the Coordinator), a relatively loose network of resistance that brought together 
indigenous organizations, radical unionists, and neighbourhood councils (García Linera, 2001; 
Oliveira and Lewis, 2005; Spronk, 2007; Webber, 2011). 
A second wave of rebellions emerged in the region following the 2008 global economic 
crisis. As other movements unfolded elsewhere (Occupy, Indignados, Arab Spring, etc), in 2011, 
Chilean students flooded the streets and campuses in demand for free education and political 
reform. Using highly creative tactics, such as flash mobs and kiss-a-thons, students quickly 
captured the imagination of wide sectors of the Chilean population and the international media. 
Two years later, Brazil witnessed its biggest demonstrations in a generation, as students and 
workers mobilized for free public transit, occupying government buildings and triggering a 
general strike in the process. 
In addition to posing a challenge to neoliberal policies in the region, what links these and 
similar movements is that they often displayed skepticism toward traditional forms of left 
organization such as political parties and labour unions. Consequently, people often chose to 
organize themselves through assemblies or relatively de-centered networks, be it at workplaces, 
communities or the streets. The more recent rebellions also incorporated the use of the internet 
and social media to create new forums for political participation. Although often tentative, 
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contradictory and fleeting, these mobilizations took meaningful attempts to redefine traditional 
forms of leadership and representation, pointing to a democracy that is more participatory, fluid 
and direct than what is offered by the institutions of liberal democracy.     
By the late 1990s, many of these struggles became channeled into the electoral arena, 
bringing to office a wave of new left and centre-left governments. Indeed, despite recent right 
wing victories in the region, to date, the majority of Latin American governments can be said to 
belong to this new left. Collectively known as the region's ‘pink tide’, these new governments 
began to pursue new policies that in a variety of ways challenged the neoliberal orthodoxy of 
previous decades. For many on the left, the pink tide brought renewed hope to the region. Indeed, 
at the first World Social Forum in Brazil in 2001, a new slogan was born: “another world is 
possible.” Not long after, in Bolivia and Venezuela, the idea of a ‘21st century socialism’ 
sparked the imagination of millions. 
The new political and economic direction pursued by the pink tide is understood by 
Fernando Leiva (2008) as comprising a new phase of development, which he calls 
‘neostructuralism’. According to Leiva, neostructuralism attempts to combine the export-
oriented approach inherited from the neoliberal period with new policies of equity and 
democratic governance. In this highly contradictory and volatile model, the priority is to achieve 
growth through alliances with transnational capital, while policies of equity and participation are 
fostered to maintain legitimacy and social cohesion. The concept of neostructuralism therefore 
allows us to see Latin America's pink tide as neither a clear expression of post-neoliberal 
governance (Harnecker, 2010; García Linera, 2011; Sader, 2013b) or merely a new form of 
neoliberalism (Webber, 2011; Ospina and Lalander, 2012). 
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With the aim of better understanding the possibilities and challenges to social change 
expressed by social movements in the context of the pink tide, this dissertation analyzes four 
case studies. In Argentina, I examined the Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores (Worker 
Recuperated Enterprises, or ERTs). These are worker cooperatives formed out of abandoned and 
bankrupted businesses that emerged following the country’s 2001 political and economic crisis. 
Under the center-left governments of Presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and later, Cristina 
Kirchner (2007-2015), the Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores (Worker Recuperated 
Businesses or ERTs) grew steadily, now comprised of over 300 workplaces while employing 
close to 15,000 workers. Although a tiny fraction of the Argentinian economy, the ERT sector 
has nevertheless captured national and international attention for its ability to create jobs while 
maintaining a high degree of social responsibility. The ERT movement has also proven to be the 
most long lasting of the various movements to emerge from the 2001 crisis, that is, despite it 
being largely ignored by the centre-left Kirchner governments. 
In Venezuela, I examined the Empresas de Propiedad Social (Social Property 
Enterprises, or SPEs). SPEs are state owned, non-profit enterprises managed by their workers, 
local communities and the state. As such, they share characteristics of both worker cooperatives 
and public sector enterprises. Their goal is to provide affordable consumer goods or services to 
communities in need. More broadly, SPEs have become central to the Chavista government’s 
vision of ‘21st century socialism’, which is attempting to improve Venezuela's domestic 
productive capacities while maintaining a strong commitment toward the needs of workers and 
marginalized communities. . In other words, in contrast to the ERT movement in Argentina, 
SPUs are directly connected to the state. 
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In Chile, I looked at the student movement that emerged in 2011. That year, hundreds of 
thousands of students and supporting communities orchestrated mass demonstrations throughout 
the country in demand for free education and political reform. The demonstrations were notable 
for their high degree of tactical creativity, distinct organizational form, and ability to unite large 
part of the population against the right wing government of President Sebastián Piñera (2010-
2014). In addition, the student movement began a process of political re-articulation of the 
country's left, both within and outside its traditional institutions and organizations. This, in turn, 
led to the creation of new anti-capitalist formations, as well as the center left Nueva Mayoría 
(New Majority) coalition led by the current President of Chile Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 
2014-2018). 
Finally, in Brazil, I examined the Movimento Passe Livre (free transit movement), which 
flooded the country's streets in 2013. Like in Chile, the movement featured highly creative 
tactics and forms of organization that went beyond the country's traditional left, including the 
occupation of numerous government buildings and the drafting of new popular transit laws. 
However, unlike in Chile, the movement took place in the context of a left-wing government, 
Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party, or PT), bringing into question its capacity to deliver 
on its progressive mandate. In addition, the movement took place in the context of an ascending 
right wing, which achieved significant electoral victories at the national and state levels during 
the 2014 elections and successfully impeached PT leader and former President, Dilma Rousseff 
(2011-2016), in 2016. 
In order to illustrate how these four case studies fit within their specific political contexts, 
we can place them within the following matrix. The first axis divides the case studies into two: 
those that take place primarily at the point of production and those that take place primarily in 
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the sphere of reproduction. The second axis divides them further by whether the movement is 
primarily operating through the state or civil society. These divisions are of course not absolute, 
as overlap often exists between them. Nevertheless, these dimensions do capture real differences 
between the cases. 
Using these four dimensions, we can now place each case within the matrix (Table 1). 
Argentina’s ERTs are unambiguously a workplace movement and its connections to civil society 
are relatively stronger than those to the state. Venezuela’s SPUs are also a workplace movement 
but, in contrast to ERTs, they are directly connected to the state. Chile’s student movement 
makes demands squarely within the sphere of reproduction and does so by holding the state 
directly accountable.1 Brazil’s transit movement also demands change within the sphere of 
reproduction but, in contrast to Chile, it remains relatively more ambiguous about its relationship 
to the state.2 
Table 1: Analytical Matrix 
 Production Reproduction 
State Venezuela: State-supported 
workplace movement 
Chile: Education reform 
focused on the state 
Civil Society Argentina: Worker/community 
movement 
Brazil: Transit reform more 
ambiguous about state 
 
As we will see through the four case studies, the pink tide complicates the status of social 
movements, sometimes coopting or putting limits on them, while at times also opening up new 
spaces for them and partially meeting their demands. This complex relationship between 
movements and left government reflects what I call the ‘neostructuralist bargain’. In this bargain, 
                                                
1 In a capitalist society most students are part of the working class and historically tend to associate 
themeselves to the political left. This is the case also in Chile. Nevertheless, the Chilean student population is also 
comprised of a relatively smaller number of elite students that typically attend private universities.  
2 In Brazil, public transit is used overwhelmingly by the working class. 
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vulnerable sections of the population acquire real material gains, but horizons beyond liberal 
democracy are temporarily closed off. This is in contrast to the neoliberal period in which a 
commitment to fiscal orthodoxy (low deficits and inflation stabilization) translated to major 
defeats and a loss of organizational capacities for the working class in Latin America and beyond 
(Saad-Filho et al., 2007; Glyn, 2006).  
The neostructuralist bargain therefore reflects the historically specific balance of class 
forces in Latin America, and its expression through state policy and institutions. 3 In addition, it 
gives the pink tide an important opportunity to extend neostructuralism’s ‘shelf-life’ by adapting 
key policies to changing circumstances on the ground (Leiva, 2008). However, as we will see, 
the neostructuralist bargain by no means guarantees neostructuralism’s long-term success, 
particularly in the context of weakening global economic conditions and increasing 
organizational capacities of right wing forces. 
Importantly, although working within the limits and opportunities presented by the pink 
tide, these four movements, I emphasize, also go beyond them. In contrast to struggles that focus 
solely on defending or improving the position of a particular group, workplace or community 
against capital, the movements I examine also feature the active construction of new social 
relations. Specifically, these movements express the latent powers of what Karl Marx (1976a) 
calls ‘the collective worker’, the capacity for the working class to develop meaningful forms of 
cooperation and democracy against the alienation and fragmentation of value relations within 
capitalism. In other words, by experimenting with new forms of democratic participation, these 
movements prefigure a post-capitalist future within the capitalist present. As such, we can think 
                                                
3 It is therefore not to be understood as a formal bargain in which various parties negotiate agreements at 
the bargaining table.  
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of these movements not merely as forms of anti-capitalist struggles but as ‘post-capitalist 
struggles’. 
To say that a post-capitalist future can begin to be built within the capitalist present 
therefore takes the position that capitalism does not follow a closed, pre-determined logic, but is 
rather an inherently contested system that at times can even be partially superseded. Indeed, as 
Michael Lebowitz (2003) argues, we need to understand capitalism as being comprised of not 
only the side of capital but also that of the workers. Although part of an organic whole, each side 
pursues its own interests against the other. To reproduce itself, capital must dispossess, fragment 
and exploit workers at both the point of production (the workplace) and the sphere of 
reproduction. On the other side, workers seek to fulfill their own needs by confronting capital 
and winning concessions that improve their conditions as wage workers. However, at times, the 
working class can go beyond winning concessions, struggling to create new circuits of non-wage 
labour through which they can develop a range of new collective capacities, what Lebowitz 
(2006a) calls ‘human development’. This means that developing a post-capitalist society does 
not have to wait for ‘after the revolution’, but can begin to be built in the now (Lebowitz, 2006a). 
The concept of post-capitalist struggles therefore challenges the two main forms of left 
strategy in 20th century. The first was the dual power approach developed by Vladimir Lenin in 
the context of the Soviet revolution, which consisted of developing popular forces outside and 
against the state. In Latin America, Cuba is most exemplary of this model. The second was the 
social democratic model first applied in Europe during the postwar period, which sought to 
acquire power within the capitalist state via the institutions of liberal democracy. In Latin 
America, the current Frente Amplio (Broad Front) government in Uruguay comes closest to this.  
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Despite the differences between the social democratic and revolutionary approaches, as 
Nicos Poulantzas (2000) argues, these two strategies shared a common root problem that 
ultimately led to their failure, namely the exclusion of the masses from the process of social 
transformation. In the case of the revolutionary path, it was the vanguard that was empowered to 
make the political decisions for the working class, while the social democratic model empowered 
bureaucrats and technocrats, another kind of vanguard. In other words, in both cases, there 
existed a deficit of participation by workers and communities themselves. 
Taking into account the deficiencies of vanguardism in both its forms, the concept of 
post-capitalist struggles emphasizes the importance of participatory learning. Specifically, it 
recognizes that overcoming the fragmentation and alienation of capitalism is not an automatic 
process or a gift from above, but one that requires that workers and communities themselves 
learn new capacities and values. This means rejecting what Paulo Freire (1970) calls the 
‘banking’ model of education in which an elite vanguard simply deposits revolutionary 
knowledge into the oppressed. As Freire (1970) argues, a truly transformative pedagogy, or 
‘conscientização’, would involve a leadership that works ‘with’ rather than ‘for’ the oppressed.  
However, conscientização is necessarily a messy and contradictory process that features 
advances as well as retreats. This is because, as Freire (1970) argues, the oppressed, reflecting 
their own objective conditions, are divided, inauthentic beings that fear their own freedom. 
Consequently, the struggle to overcome the oppression and alienation inherent to capital opens 
the doors to liberation, but also partial reforms, and even new forms of domination by capital. 
This means that, although the concept of post-capitalist struggles captures particular empirical 
realities, these realities are in the process of construction and therefore in flux. 
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Further complicating the struggle for human development is that, just as a post-capitalist 
future can surface within the present, so can capital's violent past. Although, capital's origins can 
be traced back to the process of primitive accumulation found in 16th century England (Brenner, 
1986), these origins are also continuously re-lived in the present and throughout the globe. 
Indeed, as Marx (1976a) makes clear, primitive accumulation is a non-linear process that takes 
place in different times and places. In Latin America, primitive accumulation has been made 
possible in recent decades through neoliberal policies that pursue what David Harvey (2003, 
2010) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. These policies include the now well-known formula 
of privatization, deregulation, outsourcing and labour market flexibilization featured in structural 
adjustment programs. 
As we will see in the case studies in the following Chapters, policies of dispossession 
have a twofold effect. On the one hand, dispossession creates the conditions from which the 
dispossessed become a strategically important agent in the construction of a post-capitalist 
society. On the other hand, dispossession deepens the fragmentation and alienation of the 
working class, blocking the emancipatory characteristics of the collective worker from coming 
fully to the surface, and reigniting cycles of capitalist accumulation at specific conjunctures. 
These two aspects of dispossession reveal a key contradiction of capitalist development, namely 
that its future negation depends on the recurring assertion of its origins, a paradox that makes 
social transformation both imminently possible, yet enormously challenging.  
To see both the origins and the future of capitalism as recurring moments within its 
present poses a challenge to much classical sociological and development theory in which 
progress has been largely understood in a linear manner (Bhambra, 2014). Most notably, 
modernization theory and its variants outlines neatly defined stages of development that all 
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countries must go through until reaching ‘the end of history’, meaning Western liberal 
democracy (Rostow, 1960; Fukuyama, 1992). In this view, not only are western capitalist nations 
considered the pinnacle of development, the dispossession they inflicted on the global south is 
largely erased from view. At the other end of the political spectrum, some interpretations of 
Marxism shared this linear understanding of progress. However, this time, the end point was not 
capitalist liberal democracy but communist society. As Massimo De Angelis (2007) tells us, in 
order to reach communism, traditional Marxism believed in the application of stages of 
development that included primitive accumulation, forced collectivization and state-led 
accumulation (p. 5). 
The approach to understanding capitalist temporality I am here proposing should not be 
confused with postmodernism. In an attempt to challenge linear accounts of development, 
postmodernism relies on notions of time that are purely social, rejecting all sense of linearity to 
historical development. The result are notions of timelessness and non-directionality (Castells, 
2010; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) that overlook the linear characteristics of the human body and 
the intrinsic connection humans have to labour, a problem also evident in some strains of 
Marxism (Postone, 1996, 2004). At the core of my approach is an understanding of time that is 
dialectical, meaning both social and linear. From this perspective, the human body and labour 
become central to the understanding of development in capitalism, revealing that the temporal 
boundaries of capitalism are not fixed, but rather shift with the shifting balance of class forces, 
and the degree to which the working class has developed the capacities for meaningful 
democracy and cooperation. 
The concept of post-capitalist struggles overlaps with many of the ideas presented in the 
last two decades by two strains within Marxist theory. First, within autonomism, John Holloway 
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(2010) and De Angelis (2007) argue that alternatives to capitalism can be developed through new 
practices ‘outside’ alienated labour. These can be developed within capitalism's ‘cracks’ or 
through ‘value struggles’ that articulate a new ‘space time commons’. Similarly, Sara Motta 
(2011) highlights the importance of what she calls ‘prefigurative epistemologies in everyday 
life’, that is, the alternative perspectives and new subjectivities generated through the process of 
active struggle. 
 From the analytical Marxist tradition, the Real Utopias framework developed by Erik 
Olin Wright (2010) understands capital as a contested system that exists alongside two others: 
civil society and the state. 4  In this framework, these three spheres of society coexist in an 
ecosystem and the goal is to democratize all three by developing a wide range of new institutions 
such as cooperatives and participatory budgeting. For Wright these institutions embody the 
ideals of a better world in the imperfect conditions of the present, and are part of a menu of 
strategic options through which a post-capitalist society can be developed. 
Although the concept of post-capitalist struggles overlaps with Autonomism and the Real 
Utopias framework in that it emphasizes the contested character of capitalism and allows us to 
see how new practices and social relations can be developed within capitalism, a number of key 
areas of contrast exist. First, although stemming from different sources, both autonomism and the 
Real Utopias framework adhere to a problematic strategic pluralism. Holloway provides the most 
exaggerated version, arguing that alternatives to capitalism can be developed by a variety of 
subjects and actions just about anywhere at any time and with little need to establish connections 
or unity. 
The problem with the strategic pluralism of autonomism and the Real Utopias is that it 
risks reproducing the fragmentary tendencies inherent to capital which systematically prevent the 
                                                
4 See also Fung and Wright (2001, 2003). 
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collective worker from developing more fully in the first place. Creating multiple cracks on an 
ice sheet, Holloway's metaphor for anti-capitalist strategy, therefore fails to recognize that capital 
actually thrives on separation. In other words, thought of as an ice sheet, capital is already 
cracked and indeed this is its great strength. 
Holloway's lack of emphasis on the need for cohesion and unity for overcoming 
capitalism is not accidental. It is based on a particular understanding of value theory, which 
makes a simplistic and rigid separation between alienated and non-alienated labour. For him, 
everything inside the capitalist labour process is alienated (value), while anything outside it is 
not alienated (use value). The problem here is twofold. First, it romanticizes an ‘outside’ to value 
in which contradictions no longer exist. Second, it largely ignores that even within the capitalist 
labour process there exists already a contradiction between use value and value. Failure to 
recognize the importance of this contradiction is why ultimately Holloway cannot see the 
emancipatory potential latent inside the capitalist labour process (the collective worker). Hence, 
while developing new practices outside of the capitalist labour process is important, overcoming 
alienated labour will require engaging with the contradictions inside it as well. 
The strategic pluralism of the Real Utopias framework has a different but equally 
problematic source. In this framework, the value relation is rejected as the central organizing 
principle in capitalist society. In this framework, capital is understood to coexist alongside two 
other distinct systems, namely civil society and the state. These three systems coexist and 
interact in an ‘ecosystem’ rather than being part of an organic whole. The result of this multi 
system approach is that, to different degrees, labour and the labour process, with all its 
contradictions and potentialities, loses its centrality in strategies for overcoming capitalism. 
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In addition, both frameworks tend to understate the need for political struggle in the 
development of a post-capitalist society. This is most marked in Holloway's notion of ‘anti-
politics’, which rejects the use of political parties and the state in the process of social change. 
This is a highly functionalist view of the state, which rules out a priori that the state could play a 
role in the development of a post-capitalist future. Indeed, for Holloway, the state appears as an 
impenetrable fortress within which class struggles don't exist. For the Real Utopias framework, 
the state is a relevant institution, but is nevertheless understood as one of three distinct systems 
in society through which transformations may or may not pass. 
However, as Poulantzas (2000) argues, the state is nothing less than the condensation of 
the balance of class forces, albeit normally tilted in favor of capital. In addition, it expresses and 
reinforces the capitalist division between mental and manual labour. This means that the state is 
a strategic field of class struggle through which further divisions or new forms of unity and 
cohesion can be developed or blocked. Furthermore, as Lebowitz argues, because capital will use 
the state to thwart any challenge against it, capturing state power becomes essential in the 
struggle for a new society. In other words, any experiments in human development will need the 
state to actively nurture them so as to prevent capital from overwhelming them (2006a, 68). Post-
capitalist struggles are therefore those that aim to achieve transformations or at least reforms at 
the level of the state through political struggle. 
To some extent, the concept of post-capitalist struggles therefore resembles Poulantzas's 
(2000) so-called ‘democratic road to socialism’. At its core, this road features an alliance 
between a left government and social movements. In this alliance representative and direct 
democracy would be combined with the aim of transforming the state over a relatively long 
transitional period toward a socialist society. However, as we will see, the concept of post-
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capitalist struggles helps us go beyond Poulantzas (2000). Rather than an alliance between 
government and movement, what is needed is a new fusion between them, one in which the 
division between worker and politician is overcome.  
Developing a new fusion between government and movement means prioritizing the 
development of democratic capacities in working class organizations and extending these into 
the development of new political parties that redefine traditional forms of leadership and 
representation. It also means that any transition to a new society, although certainly long and 
arduous, will be accompanied by short bursts of struggle that push beyond the existing moment. 
How exactly this can be done and what challenges this entails in the context of 21st century 
Latin American politics is the focus of this dissertation. 
Chapter Outline 
In the first Chapter, I develop the concept of post-capitalist struggles. I do this while 
building on the work of Lebowitz. Against liberal and postmodern understandings of capitalist 
development, I develop a dialectical perspective of capitalist development. This perspective 
requires that we look at both the origins of capitalism (primitive accumulation) and a future post-
capitalist society (collective worker) as recurring aspects of the capitalist present. This means 
that we need to look at time as both absolute and social, an approach that puts the human body 
and labour at the center of theories of capitalist development, and reveals the importance of 
dispossession and the dispossessed therein. This approach therefore differs from recent 
frameworks for theorizing a post-capitalist future, namely autonomism and analytical Marxism, 
which adhere to a problematic understanding of labour and value. I conclude this Chapter by 
highlighting the importance of the state, political struggle and popular education in strategies for 
building a post-capitalist future. In this new ‘democratic road to socialism’, I suggest the need 
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for a fusion between political party and social movement, one through which new forms of 
leadership and representation can be articulated.   
In Chapter 2, I provide historical and comparative background to the four case studies. I 
focus on three historical phases of development in the region, namely Import Substitution 
Industrialization, neoliberalism and neostructuralism. Through a comparative analysis, I outline 
what I deem to be the key political economic features of each country that condition the 
development of each of the movements outlined. In Argentina, it is the collapse of the Peronist 
bargain in 2001 and the continuation of labour precarity under the Kirchner governments that set 
the stage for the ERT movement’s demands and ambitions for new cooperative forms of labour. 
In Venezuela, it is the state’s legacy of oil-dependent development projects from above that 
underpin the Bolivarian state’s attempt to create more endogenous forms of development through 
new workplace experiments. In Chile, it is Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution, which entrenched 
neoliberalism within the state, that became decisive in the struggle for free education. Finally, in 
Brazil, it is the gains made by labour under the PT coupled with the continuation of neoliberal 
policies in the context of the 2008 economic crisis that set the stage for the free transit 
movement. 
In Chapters 3–6, I examine four different cases in Latin America, two in the sphere of 
production and two in the sphere of reproduction: The ERT movement (Argentina), the Social 
Property Enterprises (Venezuela), the free education movement (Chile) and the free transit 
movement (Brazil). As examples of post-capitalist struggles, the four case studies demonstrate 
that as workers and communities learn new values, knowledge and skills, such as collective 
management, consensus building, active participation and inclusivity, they begin to express the 
emancipatory powers of democracy and cooperation normally found latent within the collective 
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worker. As this thesis will show, this was accomplished through the development of new 
political spaces that challenge the limits of the existing liberal democratic institutions. However, 
these case studies also display key differences as well as specific tensions and contradictions 
relating to both their site of origin (production, reproduction, state, civil society), and the national 
political and economic context. 
In Chapter 7, I engage with debates about Latin America's pink tide in the context of 
recent right wing victories. I attempt to explain the rise of the right by highlighting the 
contradictions inherent in what I call ‘neostructuralist bargain’. I also identify the key 
weaknesses and challenges experienced by movements that contributed to the surge of the right. 
I discuss the case studies while engaging in a comparative analysis. In doing so, I identify key 
processes of strategic importance for the further development of post-capitalist struggles in the 
context of a ‘new democratic road to socialism’. These include the development of linkages 
between the spheres of production and reproduction, a productive blend between representative 
and direct democracy, and the formation of new political parties or alliances capable of making 
progressive incursions into existing state structures. 
Lastly, in the conclusion, I provide a brief summary of my key arguments. I also 
highlight potential areas for further research, notably emerging new struggles in the context of 
the region’s new right, as well as the ongoing education reforms in Chile. 
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Chapter 1: Post-capitalist Struggles and Human Development 
As Marx argued over 150 years ago, capitalism is a class-divided and exploitative 
system. This makes capitalism inherently conflictual. Class struggles range widely in character: 
from labour unions struggling for higher wages and better working conditions, to social 
movements demanding better public services, to communities fighting against various forms of 
discrimination. Indeed, the list is nearly endless, reflecting the myriad of ways that capital 
imposes itself on the working class. However, most of the time, struggles against capital tend to 
focus on improving or defending one's position within the system, or challenging one specific 
aspect of it. As a result, although these types of struggles might improve the lives of a particular 
group or section of the working class, the conditions of oppression and exploitation that gave rise 
to those struggles in the first place continue to be reproduced. In other words, most struggles 
against capital are not able to articulate an alternative to the system. 
However, another type of struggle is also evident within capitalism. At times, workers 
and communities not only organize themselves against some aspect of the system, but also begin 
to create new social relations that point beyond it. I call these types of struggles ‘post-capitalist’. 
As we will see, by emphasizing new relations based on deeper forms of democracy and 
cooperation, post-capitalist struggles ‘prefigure’ a future post-capitalist society within the 
capitalist present. To say that post-capitalist struggles are pre-figurative means two things. First 
is that these struggles can give us important clues about both the possibilities and challenges of 
organizing society on a basis other than capitalism. Second is that, because they are not yet fully 
developed alternatives to capitalism, these struggles reproduce aspects of the old society, albeit 
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often in new forms. In other words, post-capitalist struggles are neither perfect utopias that exist 
outside capitalism, nor simply new forms of capitalist organization functional to the system. 
The concept of post-capitalist struggles emerges from and builds on the work of 
Lebowitz. In Beyond Capital, Lebowitz (2003) argues that Marx's Capital Volume 1 (1976a) is 
fundamentally one-sided, unable to account for its fundamental premise, the working class. 
Lebowitz’s starting point for reconstructing the work of Marx is the removal of his ‘critical 
assumption’, namely that within capitalism the subsistence needs of workers is fixed. For 
Lebowitz, this assumption was crucial for allowing Marx to reveal the nature of exploitation as 
the difference between necessary and surplus labour. However, holding this assumption gives the 
impression that labour power is reproduced simply as a consequence of capital, leading to highly 
functionalist accounts of worker agency. Challenging this view, Lebowitz (2003) argues that the 
production of labour power must be conceptualized as taking place through a circuit that, 
although mediated by capital, is nevertheless not identical to it. This is the circuit of wage-labour 
through which the worker produces himself by consuming use values. Importantly, this process 
also involves ‘purposeful activity’ through which the worker attempts to meet his own needs for 
development (p. 68). 
Having established the existence of a circuit of wage labour, Lebowitz shows us how our 
assumptions about how capitalism develops need to change. For example, it is commonly 
understood among Marxists that as productivity increases the value of labour decreases. This is 
because increasing productivity means the socially necessary labour time required to meet 
workers' subsistence needs also decreases and hence workers' wages can also decrease. However, 
as Lebowitz (2003) tells us, this would only be true if capitalists succeed at lowering wages. If 
workers struggle to maintain or increase their wages, increased productivity would actually 
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benefit workers, as their wages would now be able to acquire a larger number of use values in 
the market. Productivity therefore becomes a highly contentious and political factor. But why 
would workers struggle in the first place? As mentioned above, the needs of workers in 
capitalism are not fixed and therefore, Lebowitz argues, there is a constant gap between workers' 
‘social needs’, meaning all those material needs that could be met given the available wealth, and 
the needs workers are actually allowed to meet through the market. This material gap, for 
Lebowitz, is one of the factors driving struggle. 
However, Lebowitz’s (2003) argument does not end here. Having identified a circuit of 
wage labour that stands as the negation of capital's circuit, he proceeds to argue that there is one 
last distinction to be made, namely that between wage-labour and non-wage labour. The 
necessity for this distinction, Lebowitz argues, arises from the fact that “wage labour is merely 
an abstraction” which “exists only insofar as a living human being enters into this relation” 
(2003, p. 140). In other words humans are not only wage-labourers, but also much more. The 
existence of non-wage labour as an aspect of capitalism's organic whole means that workers can 
go beyond simply reducing the ‘material gap’ inherent in capitalism. As Lebowitz contends, the 
reality of non-wage labour can allow for space through which workers can engage in circuits of 
production or reproduction that foster ‘human development’. Importantly, unlike the better 
known models of human development outlined by Amartya Sen (2000) and Martha Nussbaum 
(2000), for Lebowitz, human development refers to forms of capacity building that move beyond 
the fragmentation and division of capitalist social relations by strengthening the powers of what 
Marx referred to as the collective worker. This means that developing a post-capitalist society 
doesn't have to wait for ‘after the revolution’, but can begin to be built in the now (Lebowitz, 
2006a). 
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From here, Lebowitz (2010) conceptualizes a new transition to socialism, or ‘21st century 
socialism’, as a triangle that includes social ownership of the means of production, social 
production organized by workers, and production for social needs and purposes. Firstly, social 
ownership of the means of production ensures that communal, social productivity is directed to 
the free development of all rather than to satisfy the private goals of capitalists, groups of 
producers, or state bureaucrats. Secondly, social production organized by workers allows them to 
develop their capacities by combining thinking and doing in the workplace in such a way as to 
produce not only things, but also themselves as self-conscious collective producers. Thirdly, 
satisfaction of social needs and purposes is the necessary goal of productive activity in the new 
society because it shifts the focus from self-interest and selfishness toward an orientation to the 
needs of others and relations of solidarity. 
Importantly, underlying Lebowitz's concept of human development and 21st century 
socialism is an assumption about capitalist temporal dynamics, namely that a future post-
capitalist society can emerge in the capitalist present. However, this idea is not explicitly pursued 
by Lebowitz and indeed poses a challenge to most understandings of capitalist development. As 
Gurminder K. Bhambra (2014) argues, in classical sociological and development theory, 
progress has been largely understood using a linear approach in which advanced capitalist 
countries are at the forefront of world history. From this perspective, ‘underdeveloped’ countries 
in the ‘global south’ are undergoing a process of ‘catch up’ in relation to Europe and the United 
States. This approach is perhaps most evident in modernization theory, outlining neatly defined 
stages of development that all countries must supposedly go through (Rostow, 1960). In this 
view, not only are western capitalist nations considered the pinnacle of political and economic 
development, the dispossession they inflicted on the global south as part of their development is 
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largely erased from view. In other words, as Bhambra (2014) argues, modernization theory drew 
on the particular experience of western modernization and, from this, "established a global frame 
within which all societies could be placed" (p. 21). 
At the other end of the political spectrum, some interpretations of Marxism, particularly 
those supportive of the former Soviet Union, shared this linear understanding of progress and 
development. However, this time, the end point was not capitalist liberal democracy but 
communist society. As Ronaldo Munck (2015) notes, like modernization theory, this is an 
evolutionist and teleological model of development that sees history as pre-determined (pp. 427-
428). Furthermore, as De Angelis (2007) tells us, in order to reach communism, traditional 
Marxism believed in the application of stages of development that included primitive 
accumulation, forced collectivization and state-led accumulation (p. 5). However, with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, an alternative to capitalist modernity no longer appeared 
possible or desirable, ushering a new era of triumphalism for pro-capitalist modernizers. Soon, 
Francis Fukuyama's (1990) thesis of ‘the end of history’ and Margaret Thatcher's proclamation 
that ‘there is no alternative’ would become the unofficial slogans of neoliberal modernization for 
decades to come. 
Against modernization theory and orthodox Marxism, postmodernism claims to offer an 
alternative. It argues that time, as a universal category, is actually non-existent, and that all we 
can talk about are multiple lines with little or no temporal directionality. The category of class, 
which implies collective interests that operate within a broader social structure, is therefore 
rejected. However, the postmodernist approach is also problematic, as it fails to capture the 
persistence of struggles by workers and diverse communities facing the forces of global capital. 
In addition, postmodern theory attempts to solve the problem of linearity, not by getting rid of 
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the straight-line, but by simply adding more of them and rejecting their temporality. In contrast 
to the above-mentioned perspectives, in the following sections, I argue that we need to 
understand capitalist development dialectically, meaning we need to see its origins and future as 
aspects of the present. As we will see, this approach reveals the importance of dispossession, in 
its various forms, as the process through which both capitalism's past and future assert 
themselves. This, in turn, makes the dispossessed strategically important in the struggle for a 
post-capitalist future. 
In addition, a dialectical understanding of capitalist development requires that we look at 
time as social, meaning it is an expression of the social relations in a given historical period. 
Looking at time in this manner means that abstract categories such as humanity or society are not 
very useful in our understanding of history. Marx's approach was rather to begin with how a 
given society concretely reproduces itself. His assumption was that people's capacity to change 
themselves and their circumstances through labour is ultimately what makes us humans. In the 
context of capitalism, this approach led Marx to believe that time was conditioned by the specific 
class division between workers and capitalists and that this created particular tendencies and 
counter tendencies that structured capitalist temporality. Hence, for Marx, the future was not pre-
determined, but neither was it a set of infinite possibilities. 
However, to say that time is social doesn't mean we have to throw out a notion of time 
that is objective and absolute, meaning it exists outside of human agency as part of the physical 
world. In other words, while particular social relations in a given historical context give rise to 
particular temporalities and developmental patterns, these nevertheless exist intertwined with 
absolute time. The physical and objective character of absolute time manifests most obviously 
(although not exclusively) in the decay of the human body, which relentlessly moves from birth 
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to death. This movement may be modified quantitatively across different historical periods (i.e. 
life expectancies may change), but the end is a foregone conclusion. In other words, there really 
is a predictable linearity in the movement from past to present to future. To understand this 
dialectical relationship between social and linear time in the context of capitalist development, I 
rely on two key concepts developed by Marx: primitive accumulation and the collective worker.  
The Past in the Present: Primitive Accumulation 
Central to Marx's argument is that capitalism is a historically specific mode of 
production. For Marx (1976a), the origins of capitalism must therefore be traced to the process of 
primitive accumulation, namely “an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode 
of production but its point of departure” (p. 873). In outlining the processes behind primitive 
accumulation, Marx seeks to dispel the myth of liberal political economy that explains 
accumulation in capitalism as a result of hard work, frugality and intelligence in a few people, 
and laziness and lack of discipline in the masses who now find themselves with “nothing to sell 
except their own skins” (p. 873). 
As Marx shows, in contrast to liberal mythology, primitive accumulation consists of 
conquest, enslavement, robbery and murder (p. 874). This is a process, which led to the creation 
of, on the one hand, capitalists who possess money and the means of production and, on the 
other, workers who possess only their labour power. In short, primitive accumulation “is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” (p. 875). 
It is important to highlight how much emphasis Marx puts on the violent nature of primitive 
accumulation. Hence, in a well-known passage, he refers to this history as “written in the annals 
of mankind in letters of blood and fire” (p. 875). Nevertheless, it is crucial to also recognize that 
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violent ones. For example, he emphasizes state policies, such as increasing public debt, over- 
taxation, protectionism and commercial wars, as “powerful levers of primitive accumulation” (p. 
919). This means that primitive accumulation can traverse the circuits of both production and 
reproduction, and that various sections of the working class can become target of dispossession.                
Also crucial to Marx's argument is that the process of primitive accumulation is global 
and nonlinear, assuming “different aspects and different countries, and runs through its various 
phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical epochs” (p. 877). This is an 
important passage which makes it clear that, although capitalism has a definite ‘departure points’ 
in absolute time, primitive accumulation also operates in social time. This is a crucial point 
sometimes overlooked within one of the most influential currents within Marxism today, namely 
Political Marxism. Most notably, Robert Brenner (1986), one of the founders of Political 
Marxism, argues that the origins of capitalism can be found in 16th century rural England, where 
class struggle between lords and serfs ultimately resulted in the dispossession of the peasantry 
from the land. This initial dispossession is, for Brenner, the process out of which a labour market 
was established and a social division of labour eventually developed. 
Although Brenner's work successfully breaks from what he refers to as ‘Smithian’ 
accounts of the origins of capitalism, in which markets and the social division of labour are 
naturalized and treated ahistorically, he ends up creating an extremely narrow account of the 
development of capitalism. In this account, primitive accumulation, rather than being a process 
that takes place in ‘different countries’, through ‘different orders of succession’, and at ‘different 
historical epochs’, it is a singular event that happened in a particular time and place. According 
to Brenner, his approach also breaks from the neoSmithian tendencies of the early Marx, 
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particularly the Communist Manifesto (1994), and is compatible with Marx’s writings in Capital 
Volume 1 (1976a), in particular the section on primitive accumulation. 
However, Brenner's focus on trying to find an original departing point for capitalism 
doesn't square with Marx's more complex approach which treats primitive accumulation as 
existing in both absolute and social time. Brenner’s approach rather lends itself well to thinking 
about primitive accumulation as something that happened once in the past and can never happen 
again. In other words, Brenner sees primitive accumulation at the level of absolute time only, 
giving capitalism a narrow linear dynamic. Consequently, in Brenner, as James Morris Blaut 
(1996) argues in his polemic against him, capitalism appears as an entity that arrives complete 
and entire as though it were a god descending from Olympus to govern human affairs (p. 363). 
That for Brenner god descends exclusively in rural England is why Blaut also rightly accuses 
him of eurocentrism.  
However, as Marx makes clear, when it comes to primitive accumulation and the 
development of capitalism, eurocentrism is not an option: 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement an 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the 
beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into 
a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which 
characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic 
proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. (p. 915) 
What is important to understand is that for Marx colonialism in the New World was interrelated 
to the development of capitalism in Europe. As he put it, the colonial process “systematically 
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combined together at the end of the 17th century England” (p. 915). The dialectical relationship 
between new world and old in the development of capitalism is elegantly captured in this 
passage: “in fact the veiled slavery of the wage labourers in Europe needed the unqualified 
slavery of the New World as its pedestal” (p. 925).  
In short, neat distinctions between new and old, past and present are simply not adequate 
to an understanding of capitalism based on Marx. From this point of view, we should understand 
Brenner's eurocentrism as emanating not from some particular attachment to England, but as the 
logical outcome of holding on to a purely absolute view of time in which England was first to 
transition to capitalism. Alternatively, what is needed is an understanding of primitive 
accumulation that simultaneously holds on to an understanding of time that is absolute, meaning 
that we acknowledge dispossession as a historical set of events in the past (colonialism, 
enclosures, etc.) without which there would be no present capitalism, and an equally necessary 
ongoing social process in which the past is constantly relived in the present, although in different 
forms. One example of this approach is the work of E.P. Thompson. 
In his classic piece, Time, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism (1967), Thompson 
argues that central to the transition to capitalism in England was the reconfiguration of time 
away from natural and task oriented rhythms to ‘clock time’. With capitalism, time becomes 
money (it is spent rather than passed), and those who are employed experience a distinction 
between their employer’s time and their own (p. 61). Not surprisingly, Thompson continues, the 
clock becomes a new and essential artifact and clock making becomes a new rapidly growing 
industry that allows for the greater synchronization of labour (p. 69). However, the application of 
clock time in the labour process was not easy. As Thompson tells us, it had to be imposed by 
capitalists as well as institutions such as schools and churches. The result was a ‘contest over 
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time’, one eventually won by capital, as workers learned to accept the categories of their 
employers and fought back within these (p. 86). 
With the expansion of capital into the developing world, Thompson concludes, new 
contests over time are imminent. In other words, for Thompson, the transition to capitalism was 
not a singular event in the past, but a process that can be relived in new forms. However, here is 
where Thompson takes a problematic turn. As the industrialized world acquires more leisure 
time, he tells us, it might be possible to rediscover the modes of experience of the past and build 
a ‘new synthesis’ that points beyond capitalism. Why the industrialized world only? Although 
Thompson makes an impressive argument for why time should be understood as social and 
conditioned by class, in the end he slips into a familiar Marxist argument. In this linear and 
Eurocentric narrative, it is the development of the productive forces, which allows for the 
possibility of building a new society with increased leisure time. However, this narrative puts a 
premium on the linear dimension of the development of capitalism in absolute time, a narrative 
in which the West developed first and therefore will be first to reach a new society.  
More recently, different Marxist approaches have attempted to fully break from a linear 
model of capitalist development. Most notably, Harvey (2005, 2011) argues that capital needs to 
constantly incorporate into the market areas of life previously existing outside of it, a process he 
calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’. As Harvey argues, accumulation by dispossession 
becomes a way to getting over the barriers to profitable investment that capital faces in the 
neoliberal period. Importantly, it takes on a variety of forms, including the now classic neoliberal 
tactics of privatization, deregulation, and labour market flexibilization. At the geographical level 
this includes structural adjustment programs in the developing world coupled with an inflow of 
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highly volatile financial capital in search for quick profits. Particularly vulnerable to this type of 
financial activity are real estate markets in ‘global cities’.  
Harvey refers to this type of international financial speculation as ‘temporal spatial fixes’ 
through which contradictions in the core capitalist countries (particularly the US) are displaced 
into the global south. Importantly, as Harvey argues, this doesn't resolve the contradictions but 
simply moves them around. Consequently, new fixes have to be found over and over again. For 
Harvey, this explains the proliferation of crises around the world (Southeast Asia, Russia, 
Argentina, etc.) throughout the neoliberal phase. This has important implications. For Harvey, it 
means that struggles should center on the creation of new cities in both the global north and 
south. Gone therefore is the focus on the linear dimension of primitive accumulation, which 
places the industrialized world as leading the race to a new society. 
De Angelis (2007) makes an even more pointed argument about how we should 
understand primitive accumulation. He criticizes traditional Marxist theory for framing debates 
about enclosures within a linear model of capitalist development, an approach that creates a 
problematic division between history and theory within Marxist scholarship. Alternatively, the 
author proposes looking at primitive accumulation in a non-linear manner. As he puts it: “A 
careful examination of Marx's definition of primitive accumulation allows us to argue that 
although enclosures, or primitive accumulation, define a question of genealogy, for capital the 
problem of genealogy presents itself continuously” (p. 136). In other words, primitive 
accumulation cannot be reduced to a genealogical question of the past. Thus, like Harvey, De 
Angelis considers neoliberal policies, such as free-trade agreements and privatization, to be 
prime examples of modern-day enclosures.  
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As is evident, both De Angelis and Harvey are following Marx's understanding of 
primitive accumulation as a dialectical process that can recur in different places and times, 
although in different forms. In other words, in both authors, there's an understanding that time is 
not simply an absolute category, but also a social one. More to the point, their work reveals that a 
central feature of how time operates in capitalism is that the origins of capitalism come back to 
haunt us in the present. However, De Angelis takes this logic further. For him, understanding 
primitive accumulation in a dialectical manner also helps us understand the forces that try to 
counter it for what they really are, namely "budding alternatives to capital" (p. 135). In other 
words, for De Angelis, not only is the past a recurring theme within the present, so is an 
alternative future. This is the topic I now turn to. 
The Future in the Present: The Collective Worker 
A recurrent theme in liberal political economy and mainstream development theory is the 
belief that capitalist society is on an inevitable path toward democracy and cooperation. In 
contrast to this linear perspective, Marx argued that, in capitalism, cooperation exists in constant 
tension with its opposite, competition, giving the system specific tendencies and counter 
tendencies. From this perspective, the future is therefore neither pre-determined, as liberal 
theories like to argue, nor completely unpredictable as suggested by postmodern theory. 
Moreover, as with the past, the future is not simply an event in absolute time, but a social 
category, which makes it an aspect of the present. 
On the one hand, Marx tells us, capital produces a systematic division of labour whereby 
workers become increasingly ‘one-sided’. Rather than producing the commodity as a whole 
through a variety of highly skilled labour, workers become ever more specialized, producing 
increasingly fewer aspects of one single commodity. In addition, a sharp division is created 
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between intellectual and manual labour, with managers, scientists, and other experts on one side, 
and manual workers on the other (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1985). Capital Volume 1 (Marx, 
1976a) also fosters and takes advantage of racial, gender and other divisions that exist within the 
working class, increasing what Lebowitz calls the ‘x factor’, the degree of separation between 
workers (2006). 
 Indeed, Lebowitz (2003) suggests these divisions become a "necessary condition for the 
existence of capital" (p. 122). Hence, rather than being a space where workers can freely share 
their skills and abilities, the workplace becomes a space of competition and fragmentation. 
Poulantzas (2000), in particular, captured this powerfully with the concept of ‘individualization’, 
the fragmentation and atomization in the labour process whereby the worker, as Marx (1976a) 
put it in Capital Volume 1, becomes a mere “appendage of the machine” (p. 799). So much so 
that, as labour is "progressively rationalized and mechanized,” Georg Lukács (1968) went so far 
as to suggest that "his activity becomes less and less active and more and more contemplative" 
(p. 89). 
However, another feature of capital is that it systematically brings workers together who 
in their partiality and specialization must nevertheless rely on one another to produce the product 
as a whole. Without this kind of cooperation, successfully producing any single commodity 
would be impossible, highlighting the inherent tension that exists between use-value and 
exchange value in the capitalist labour process (Sawchuk, 2006).5 Marx (1976a) captures both 
these aspects of production in capitalism when he tells us that "the commodity, from being the 
individual product of an independent craftsmen, becomes the social product of a union of 
craftsmen, each of whom performs one, and only one, of the constituent partial operations” (p. 
                                                
5 As Peter Sawchuk argues, this tension is also expressed in the labour process as de-skilling/up-skilling, 
enchanment/alienation (pp. 606-607). 
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457). This particular relationship between cooperation and fragmentation in the capitalist labour 
process constitutes what Marx called the ‘collective worker’, an entity in which workers become 
special organs of a single working organism that only acts as a whole, and therefore can operate 
only by the direct cooperation of workers (p. 466).  
With the collective worker comes radical efficiency, as previously separate forms of 
labour are brought together and individual operations are simplified. Furthermore, as large 
numbers of workers are brought together the advantages of ‘simple cooperation’ are also 
systematically unleashed. These advantages consist of the qualitative leap in productivity that 
exists when combining a certain amount of workers to perform a particular task that would be 
impossible to accomplish otherwise, that is, even if a larger quantity of individual labours was 
employed. In other words, certain tasks, such as harvesting, for example, are possible only when 
a certain amount of labour is combined at once. The advantages of cooperation are also evident 
in other types of tasks. In Marx's words, “the twelve masons, in their collective working day of 
144 hours, make much more progress with their building than one mason could make working 
for 12 days, or 144 hours” (p. 445). This means that, as productivity increases, the labour time 
necessary for the production of use values decreases.  
For Marx, the collective worker foreshadowed two things. First, it allowed for the 
possibility of a future society that systematically created free time. In other words, as labour time 
became more and more efficient, less of it would be needed to satisfy collective material needs. 
This means workers could use that newfound free time to pursue their need for self-development 
through any number of activities, such as education, physical activity and culture (Lebowitz, 
2006, pp. 19-20). Second, and just as important, the collective worker also foreshadowed new 
forms of labour, specifically, cooperative forms of labour that would allow for the full 
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development of workers. This second point therefore asserts that labour is a fundamental human 
activity that would have to continue even in a post-capitalist society, albeit in new forms. In 
short, in contrast to capitalism, in which time and labour appear as "socially necessary labour 
time,” in a post-capitalist society, time would become the space for human development 
(Lebowitz, 2006 p. 19).  
However, for the most part, this new future society remains merely a potentiality. As 
such, Ernst Bloch (1986) thought of it as the ‘Not-Yet-Conscious’: 
The Not-Yet-Conscious is thus solely the preconscious of what is to come, the 
psychological birthplace of the New. And it keeps itself preconscious above all 
because in fact there is within it a content of consciousness which has not yet 
become wholly manifest, and is still dawning from the future. Possibly even 
content that is only just objectively emerging in the world; as in all productive 
states which are giving birth to what has never been there. The forward dream is 
disposed toward this, and Not-Yet-Conscious, the mode of consciousness of 
something coming closer, is charged with it; here the subject scents no musty 
cellar, but morning air. (p. 116) 
In contrast to Bloch (1986), for whom capitalism merely created the potential for a better future, 
in liberalism, capitalism was itself the best possible destination. For example, marveling at the 
efficiency of pin-making factories in England, Adam Smith (2007) came to see capitalism as the 
only possible system capable of meeting people's supposed ever-increasing material needs, even 
of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy: 
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It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed 
society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the 
people. (p. 16) 
Hence, the fragmentation and self-interest expressed in the capitalist social division of 
labour became glorified by liberal political economy. As Smith (2007) famously tells us, it is not 
to the benevolence of the butcher or brewer that we should look, but rather their self-interest (p. 
20). Indeed, as Robert Heilbroner (1992) tells us, although Smith was not optimistic about the 
long-term survival of capitalism, he thought that it would first develop into "a Society of Perfect 
Liberty whose most striking characteristic was a general increase in well-being for everyone" (p. 
96). The contemporary version of this is seen in the work of Fukuyama (1992). For him, the 
‘Promised Land’ was reached with the victory of liberal democracy over Communism in the late 
1980s. Unlike Smith, however, Fukuyama sees no eventual expiry date to liberal capitalism. 
Indeed, for him, the victory of liberal democracy over other types of societies marks "the end of 
history,” a new era in which "all of the really big questions had been settled" (p. xii). 
A similar glorification of capitalism and its fragmenting tendencies is evident in 
postmodern inspired analyses of contemporary political economy. For example, Manuel Castells 
(2010) argues that the world is undergoing a massive transformation in which the ‘space of 
flows’, functionality, wealth and power, dominates the ‘space of places’, physical spaces defined 
by cultural and social meaning. For Castells, this is a fundamental contradiction of the new era, 
which he calls the ‘network society’. This new society is characterized by new communications 
technologies through which inclusive cultural expressions become channeled, what Castells 
refers to as ‘real virtuality’. In addition, the network society is comprised of a new economy that 
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has moved away from industrial production toward one in which new knowledge workers 
operate with a high degree of autonomy in megacities such as New York and London. 
Central to his conception of the network society is a particular understanding of time. For 
the author, time had traditionally been multiple, experienced differently by different people in 
different circumstances. However, industrialization and the invention of the clock ushered in 
linear time, best exemplified in the practice of Taylorism. With the rise of new communication 
technologies, time was once again transformed, this time into ‘timelessness’ or the annihilation 
of time. This refers to the creation of a ‘forever universe’ that is random and incursive rather than 
cyclical and recursive. The network society is therefore a new era in which history, characterized 
by the triumph of culture over the material base, can now begin. This beginning is best 
exemplified by the environmental movement, which against timeless time articulates glacier 
time, a slow-motion time in which human perception is in tune with the evolution of the planet.  
On the surface, Castells seems to offer a highly innovative framework for understanding 
today's global economy. However, what we have here is simply linear Marxism blended with 
postmodernism. His starting point, the relationship between ‘spaces of places’ and ‘spaces of 
flow’ is a re-articulation of Marx's use value – value dialectic. For Marx, use value and value 
correspond to two different forms of labour, namely concrete and abstract, where the latter 
dominates but depends on the first. This gives capitalism a highly contradictory dynamic in 
which, as discussed above, cooperation and fragmentation coexist generating a number of 
tendencies and counter tendencies. However, Castells simplifies the relationship between use 
value and value, and creates a highly linear and glorified narrative of capitalism.  
For Castells, today's economy is one in which value (spaces of flow) has taken over use 
value (spaces of places) to the point where it seemingly no longer depends on it. Out of this 
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supposed triumph of value over use value, a new historical agent has emerged: the knowledge 
worker. In contrast to manual labourers, the knowledge worker enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy, which makes him the new producer of culture and meaning in society. However, this 
glorification of the knowledge worker can only be based on a crude distinction between manual 
and intellectual labour. In contrast, for Marx, both manual and intellectual labour where merely 
different forms of concrete labour and therefore both embodied the contradiction between use 
value and value, or concrete and abstract labour. In other words, rather than seeing the 
knowledge worker as another category of worker reflecting the deeper fragmentation created by 
the ongoing division of labour, Castells proclaims him as the bearer of a new society. In the end 
it's a familiar linear narrative: with the development of technology, history has progressed 
toward the network society, an ‘end of history’ moment in which we become in tune with the 
planet. 
The postmodern influence on Castells comes from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1987) who develop the concept of the ‘rhizome’. Deleuze and Guattari attempt to break from 
linear approaches of the past when he tells us that "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is 
always in the middle" (p. 25). However, Deleuze and Guattari also tell us that the rhizome is like 
a line: ”Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations 
between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only 
of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification” (p. 21). By rejecting beginnings and endings, 
Deleuze and Guattari miss the inherently linear and universal qualities of the human body, 
qualities that give time a certain predictability. Yet, in using the image of the line, they miss the 
dialectical forces that shape capitalist temporality. This proposition is the result of their explicit 
rejection of the dialectical method on the grounds that it supposedly operates in dualisms and 
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binaries. Rather than attempting to understand the relationship between opposite forces, they 
simply reject their existence, telling us that a rhizome constitutes ‘linear multiplicities’ without 
subject or object (p. 21). In the end, as with Castells, what we get here is the glorification of 
capitalist fragmentation, rather than its critique. 
In contrast to the glorification of the fragmented form of cooperation in capitalism by 
liberal political economy, and postmodernism, Marx interpreted the unprecedented efficiency of 
capitalism as merely creating potential, rather than a fait accompli for humanity. Hence, Marx is 
quick to point out that in capitalism the benefits of cooperation primarily accrue to a minority, 
the capitalist class, rather than society as a whole. For example, the capitalist pays wages to the 
individual worker only, not to the collective. In addition, rather than there being a growth in 
workers' capacities, capital fosters the growth of an underdeveloped class of ‘unskilled labourers’ 
whose degree of specialization "makes a specialty of the absence of all development,” turning 
the worker into “a fragment of himself” (pp. 470-482). Finally, the anarchic manner in which the 
social division of labour develops outside the factory is but the flipside of the despotism 
practiced inside the factory (p. 477). Hence, the labour process becomes increasingly regulated 
and supervised by the capitalist, encouraging further suspicion and competition amongst 
workers. 
Postmodernists are not the only ones that fail to grasp the cooperative tendencies in 
capitalism. Writing from a Marxist perspective, Moishe Postone (1996) begins with the classic 
Marxian proposition that fundamental to capital is the creation of ‘abstract labour’ through a 
process of quantification, whereby specific qualities of various labours are turned into 
exchangeable quantities of abstract labour time. However, he goes further by arguing that, not 
only Marx's category of abstract labour, but also his category of concrete labour, contains this 
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reduction from specific qualities to abstract quantities. In other words, Postone tries to argue that, 
for Marx, there is no necessary connection between direct human labour and social wealth, but 
rather that it is capitalism itself that makes this connection. In short, in Postone's reading of 
Marx, labour as productive human activity does not have any inherent meaning outside of 
capitalism.  
Having stripped concrete human labour from having intrinsic meaning, Postone then 
argues that in capitalism material wealth is only ‘apparent wealth’ (p. 194) and that ultimately a 
post-capitalist society would consist of  “a new social formation in which direct human labour 
would no longer be the primary social source of wealth” (p. 197). For the author, this argument 
goes against certain notions of socialism in which labour is still predominant, but in an open, 
non-mystified manner. Indeed, for him, Marx’s analysis of capitalism points to the abolition of 
labour itself. From this perspective, the author tells us, rather than seeing capitalism as class 
struggle between capital and labour, we need to see it as the struggle to do away with the 
proletarian and transform the general structure of labour and time. However, what this new 
structure would be remains a mystery. The author only suggests we look at new social 
movements, rather than labour struggles, as examples of subjectivities of the future. Why this 
should be the case is clear enough. Postone simply doesn't see the potential for new forms of 
cooperative labour building organically within the capitalist labour process. As a result, he has to 
appeal to forces outside of it. 
However, Postone's argument is highly problematic. First, the proposition that, for Marx, 
labour has no meaning outside of capitalism is simply wrong. One need only to recall Marx's 
discussion of the labour process in Chapter 7 of Capital Volume 1, in which he discusses the 
transhistorical characteristics of human labour, “the labour process independently of any specific 
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social formation” (p. 283). Here, Marx makes the distinction between human and animal labour, 
noting that, unlike the ‘best of bees’, the architect "builds the cell in his mind before he 
constructs it in wax" (p. 284). For Marx, the dialectical relationship between thinking and doing 
(praxis) evident in the architect's work represented "labour in a form in which it is an exclusively 
human characteristic" (p. 284). Hence, as István Mészáros (1970) argues, productive activity, or 
labour, is the mediator between humans and nature, making capitalism a “historically specific 
mediation of the ontologically fundamental self-mediation of man with nature” (p. 8). In other 
words, capitalism is merely a "second order mediation" or a "mediation of the mediation” (p. 8). 
Given this, we can see that Postone's argument is simply a mistaken attempt to collapse concrete 
labour into abstract labour. As David McNally argues,  
But Postone then errs in treating purely alienated, instrumentalized labour as an 
accomplished brute fact of capitalism rather than a tendential drive. This results in 
a one-dimensional account of labour in capitalist society, one which loses sight of 
the dual nature of commodity-producing labour and the critical charge this 
concept carries. (p. 198)  
Postone’s misapprehension of the dialectical relationship between concrete and abstract 
labour is why he then mistakenly attempts to collapse necessary labour time into time in general. 
The result is that he ultimately reduces a post-capitalist future to a radical reduction of labour 
time through the appropriation of the past, or dead labour (p. 65). The idea that a post-capitalist 
society would have to necessarily also be based on the development of new forms of labour is 
rejected. However, Postone's argument that a post-capitalist society is simply one based on the 
elimination of labour is far too simplistic and overlooks Marx's discussion of the cooperative 
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forces intrinsic to the dual character of labour in capitalism, which unlike Postone actually gives 
us a sense of how a post-capitalist future may be created in the present. Ultimately then, to once 
again cite McNally, “Postone cannot ground an anticapitalist dynamic (however partial and 
contradictory) within the lived experience of actual social groups. As a result, his theory cannot 
fulfill Marx’s dialectical injunction to ‘find a new world through the critique of the old’” (p. 
206). 
As I argued above, for Marx, finding a new world within the old required looking at the 
cooperative forces being developed within capitalism. Although normally these remain dormant 
and distorted, at times, they do emerge to the surface in more meaningful ways. To quote Marx, 
“when the worker cooperates in a planned way with others, he strips off the fetters of his 
individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species” (p. 447). Later, in Capital Volume 3, 
Marx (1976b) even went as far as pointing to one specific form of cooperation evident to him in 
mid 19th-century England: the cooperative factory. The cooperative factory, or worker 
cooperative, is a worker owned businesses that is democratically managed by its workers. 
Although quick to point out how cooperative factories would reproduce "everywhere in their 
actual organization all the shortcomings of the prevailing system,” Marx nevertheless tells us that 
they "represent within the old form the first sprouts of the new" and "show how a new mode of 
production naturally grows out of an old one, when the development of the material forces of 
production and of the corresponding forms of social production have reached a particular stage" 
(p. 440). 
 In other words, for Marx, worker cooperatives, as one form of working class 
cooperation, make explicit the merely implicit powers of the collective worker, going one step 
beyond the ‘Not-Yet-Conscious’. This means they prefigure a new society that is, they show us a 
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glimpse of the future within the present. This is not to say that forms of conscious worker 
cooperation are utopias that exist outside of market relations. To the contrary, they remain 
embedded within the class contradiction. However, as ‘the first sprouts of the new’, they can be 
said to express a sharpened class contradiction in which the future comes into sharper relief 
against the present, and new problems coexist with old ones. In short, they are the outside 
emerging from the inside. 
However, there's nothing automatic about the movement from the ‘Not-Yet-Conscious’ 
to conscious worker cooperation. As Lebowitz argues, fostering human development will require 
that the working class confront the fragmenting and exploitative powers of capital. Furthermore, 
it will require that the working class engage in forms of transformative learning that emphasize 
specific collective capacities, such as solidarity, participatory democracy and collective 
management, what Motta (2011) calls ‘pre-figurative epistemologies’ in everyday life. However, 
as Freire (1970) argues, popular education, what he calls ‘conscientização’, is necessarily messy 
and contradictory, featuring advances as well as retreats. This is because the oppressed, 
reflecting their own objective conditions, are divided and unauthentic beings that fear their own 
freedom. Consequently, the struggle to overcome the oppression and alienation inherent to 
capital opens the doors to liberation, but also partial reforms, and even new forms of domination 
by capital. The concept of post-capitalist struggles is an attempt to capture this complex process 
of learning in struggle. 
Because of the complexities and difficulties in developing conscious working class 
cooperation, its flourishing should not be underestimated in importance. As quoted above, For 
Marx, the development of the cooperative factory implied that capitalism had reached a 
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‘particular stage’ (p. 440). Similarly, Bloch makes clear that the Not-Yet-Conscious faces a 
powerful social and historical ‘block’ to its further development. As he puts it, 
The block that operates in this way first and always appears as a historical one. 
More precisely as a social one; even when that which is to be expressed or to be 
known is actually by no means new itself...there is thus in history a socio-
economic barrier to vision, it cannot be scaled by even the most daring mind... 
Not all insights and works are possible at all times, history has its timetable, the 
works that transcend their time often cannot even be intended, let alone carried 
out (pp. 129-130). 
Hence, to suggest a movement from the Not-Yet-Conscious to conscious cooperation is 
to suggest nothing less than a historical breakthrough. Importantly, as Bloch emphasizes through 
his use of italics, this historical breakthrough is ultimately a social one, meaning history's 
‘timetable’ should not be understood as representing a linear calendar in absolute time, but rather 
a social calendar whose pages can be flipped forwards and backwards provided the right social 
conditions are in place. As we will see in the final section of this Chapter, being able to see the 
future within the present has important strategic implications for how to overcome capitalism. 
However, before discussing these in some detail, it will be important to distinguish the concept 
of post-capitalist struggles from similar ideas developed in the last two decade by two strains 
within Marxist theory, Autonomism and Analytical Marxism.                      
Cracks, Value Struggles and Real Utopias 
One of the most prominent voices to emerge within autonomist Marxism in the last 
decade is that of Holloway. In Crack Capitalism, Holloway (2010) argues that central to 
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capitalism is what Marx called the ‘two-fold character of labour’, that is, the relationship 
between concrete and abstract labour. However, for Holloway, traditional Marxism has largely 
looked at only one side of this relationship, namely abstract labour. For him, this approach fails 
to articulate the necessity of eliminating the wage relation, leading to struggles that simply 
attempt to improve the condition of workers within capitalism (i.e. the labour movement). 
Against the traditional Marxist approach, Holloway argues that struggles against capitalism are 
those that reassert concrete labour, or more accurately, ‘concrete doings’. This distinction is 
important because, for the author, concrete doings represent more than simply accomplishing a 
concrete task within the alienated capitalist labour process. They rather express our 
transhistorical human capacity for ‘conscious life activity’. 
The list of struggles based on concrete doings, Holloway tells us, is potentially endless, 
consisting of things such as playing guitar at work, caring for a patient at a hospital, or simply 
daydreaming on the job. As such, these small ‘everyday rebellions’ express a lingering human 
agency that overflows from the constraints of abstract labour and the value form. They stand ‘in-
against-and-beyond’ abstract labour and are the substance of what the author calls ‘cracks’ 
within capitalism (p. 99). Hence, for Holloway, an alternative to alienated labour exists, albeit in 
a limited form, in ordinary moments in our everyday lives. 
Holloway's achievement is to assert that an alternative to capitalism must consist of doing 
away with alienated or abstract labour through new activities (doings) within capitalism. In doing 
so, he goes beyond the linear approach of orthodox Marxism that argues a new society can only 
emerge after capitalism has been abolished. However, Holloway makes a crucial mistake that 
leads him to misunderstand what eliminating abstract labour would actually look like. His 
mistake is to see the contradiction between concrete labour and abstract labour almost 
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exclusively as one between alienated and nonalienated labour. The factory worker works 
(alienation), but when the boss is not looking he plays guitar (non-alienation). 
The problem with this formulation of the ‘dual character of labour’ is that almost 
completely erased from this picture is the contradiction between concrete labour and abstract 
labour that is already contained in the category of abstract labour. To be fair, Holloway is 
actually aware that concrete labour does exist within abstract labour. However, the relationship 
between the two is systematically ignored, as Holloway chooses to instead focus on what 
‘overflows’ from abstract labour. The problem with focusing only on what overflows from 
abstract labour is that these activities are oversimplified, appearing as if free of contradictions. In 
addition, Holloway makes the labour that doesn’t overflow simply disappear into abstract labour.  
Earlier, we saw a similar mistake made by Postone (1996, 2004) who collapses the 
category of concrete labour into abstract labour. Holloway explicitly criticizes Postone for doing 
this and reiterates that for him concrete doings overflows from abstract labour. However, as 
noted above, understanding the dual character of labour as simply abstract labour versus its 
overflow is the same as collapsing the contradictions that exist within abstract labour. Not 
surprisingly, when it comes to identifying a transformative agency within capitalism, Postone 
and Holloway reach the same conclusions. They both put their hopes in social movements 
outside of the labour process, or in the sphere of reproduction only.           
For example, Holloway denounces the labour movement and demands for full 
employment as merely victories for abstract labour. He doesn't see how full employment (to use 
his example) might simultaneously undermine capitalist accumulation by putting a check on and 
questioning capital's need to create a ‘reserve army of labour’, that is, a large pool of 
unemployed workers whose readiness to enter the wage relation helps to increase the rate of 
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exploitation. Holloway's framework simply doesn't allow us to think of these complexities. The 
result is a sometimes one-sided notion of class struggle: "we cannot think of class struggle as 
labour against capital, because labour is on the same side as capital, labour produces capital" (p. 
182).6 
Given that labour is on the side of capital, Holloway's solution becomes the ‘splitting’ of 
doing from labour so as to avoid abstract labour. This one-sided view of labour is the direct 
result of erasing from view the contradictions that exist between concrete and abstract labour 
within abstract labour, and focusing only on the ones between abstract labour and the concrete 
doings that ‘overflow’ from it. In other words, Holloway's mistake is not in highlighting that 
activities not immediately tied to abstract labour exist. After all, playing music on the weekends 
or caring for a family member are activities that offer a different experience from those of paid 
work. Holloway's mistake is rather in his tendency to first romanticize these activities, often 
presenting these as somehow free of contradictions, and then reducing capitalism and resistance 
against it to this moment only. 
Similar to Holloway's concept of ‘overflow’ is De Angelis' (2007) concept of ‘the 
outside’. De Angelis begins with the premise that capitalism is not a total system, but rather one 
of many social systems interacting together. Hence, for the author, we do not live in capitalism 
per se. Nevertheless, De Angelis continues, capital is dominant and seeks to enclose anything 
‘outside’ it through a recurring process of primitive accumulation. In this he differs from the 
work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and other autonomists as well as orthodox Marxists 
who argue there is nothing outside capitalism. ‘The outside’, he argues, is most visible during 
                                                
6 It is important to clarify here that, in this passage, Holloway uses the word ‘labour’ to mean ‘alienated’ or 
‘abstract’ labour, which he juxtaposes to ‘concrete doings’. 
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struggles against capital in which linear, cyclical and phase time is re-articulated on a different 
dimension and around a new set of value practices that bring with it a new set of subjectivities. 
De Angelis' central question then becomes where to find an ‘outside’ to capital. The 
answer he gives is anytime living subjects engage in struggle against the dominant values. In 
other words, there is no predefined location where it exists. Indeed, for the circuit of capital to 
unfold through each of its phases, a struggle is required “in order to overcome the inherent crisis 
of each of its moments” (p. 53). The successful unfolding of this struggle, he argues, is what 
gives rise to the ‘law of value’, that is, the systematic transformation of use values into value. 
Hence, for De Angelis value should not be understood in a deterministic way, but rather as the 
result of a contested relational process.  
The contested character of value, De Angelis tells us, takes an added importance once we 
recognize that the circuit of capital relies on the reproduction of labour power, a process that 
includes a mass of unwaged labour that is not immediately tied to capital, and therefore remains 
invisible to neoclassical economics and orthodox Marxism alike. This means that the 
reproduction of labour power is itself a process in which new values can be articulated against 
those of capital. This could take place in, for example, struggles against patriarchy in the 
household, which is one way of organizing human coproduction in a new way and setting limits 
to capital. However, unless these new value practices are able to develop into self-sustaining 
social feedback processes, De Angelis tells us, they risk being assimilated into capitalism's 
evolving forms. 
As we have seen, both De Angelis and Holloway rely on the idea that there is something 
outside or that overflows capital from which an alternative can be created. The main difference 
however is that, for De Angelis, the outside is not only something that exists beyond labour, but 
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rather something that can be developed at every pressure point within the system. In other words, 
in his framework, there is no need to reduce labour struggles to ‘struggles for abstract labour’, 
the mistake Holloway makes. However, Holloway and De Angelis share the view that 
anticapitalist struggle and indeed an alternative to capitalism is potentially everywhere. Indeed, 
as Holloway (2010) tells us, "There is nothing unusual about struggling against capitalism: anti-
capitalist struggle is all around us" (p. 198). 7 Hence, both frameworks share a similar image of 
class struggle: 
If the sheet of ice that is capitalism is being cracked from different sides, it 
probably makes little sense to say 'you are cracking in the wrong place, come and 
crack here'. It is better to say 'all these crackings are trying to break up the same 
ice, let us see how we can draw lines of connection, by doing and by reflecting on 
our doing'. Instead of telling everyone where they should start the struggles, it is 
better to recognise the myriad forms of struggle and look for ways to make them 
connect. (Holloway, 2010, p. 198) 
Although it would be difficult to argue against the importance of connecting multiple 
struggles, what is missing from this image is the specificity of what we are struggling for, or 
what multiple struggles should ultimately connect to. This is missing in Holloway because, as we 
have seen, his understanding of capitalism is reduced to a narrow and simplistic contradiction 
between alienation (commodified labour) and non-alienation (activities that ‘overflow’ 
commodified labour). As a result, erased from view are the cooperative counter tendencies found 
organically within the capitalist labour process. With this out of the picture, the need to orient 
                                                
7 The difference being that, for Holloway, class struggle is everywhere because non-alienated labour is 
always contesting abstract labour. It's a bit different for De Angelis. For him, there's also constant contestation, but it 
not reduced to a battle between non-alienation and alienation.  
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struggles toward new forms of cooperative labour also disappears. It disappears also in De 
Angelis but for a somewhat different reason. For De Angelis, capitalism is not an organic whole, 
but a dominant system among several. If this is the starting place, there is no need to see 
struggles as needing to converge into anything in particular. After all, from this perspective, 
society is already fragmented into different competing systems. Indeed, for De Angelis, rather 
than trying to build the cooperative forces within the collective worker, the strategy is to 
‘decouple’ from capital and then extend the ‘outside’: 
We need to decouple from the mechanism of capital's self-preservation, from the 
mechanism of homeostasis through which capital derives its oxygen, and ground 
the reproduction of our livelihoods on a different terrain. This process of 
decoupling and constitution coincides with the problematisation of the outside. In 
a word, we must ask again and again how do we (re)produce, sustain and extend 
an outside to capital's value practices? (p. 226) 
For De Angelis and many autonomists the answer to this question lies primarily (although not 
necessarily only) in the strengthening of social movements, movements that may or may not be 
located within the capitalist labour process. In short, what is lacking in autonomism is a sense of 
strategic specificity, a specificity demanded by capitalism itself. 
Although coming from a different theoretical starting point (Analytical Marxism) Wright 
comes to a similar conclusion. As outlined in his book Envisioning Real Utopias (2010), 
Wright's starting point is that society is comprised of three distinct forms of power: the state, the 
economy and civil society. The state has the power to create and enforce rules. The economy has 
power in that it controls ‘economically relevant resources’, and civil society has the power to 
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develop collective capacities through voluntary association, what the author calls ‘social power’ 
(p. 120). What's unique about capitalism in this model is that it is economic power that 
dominates. Nevertheless, for Wright, capitalist societies are hybrid structures, containing 
elements of capitalism, statism and socialism that interact in and ecology rather than in a fully 
integrated organic system (p. 190).  
In Wright's framework, an alternative to capitalism consists of building a radically 
democratic and egalitarian society through seven ‘pathways’ that fit under three broad ‘modes of 
transformation’: ruptural, interstitial and symbiotic. Although Wright doesn't rule out the 
possibility of a total and sudden break from capitalism via a frontal attack on the state (ruptural), 
his emphasis is rather on the building of social power in civil society (interstitial) and the 
creation of ‘positive class compromises’ (symbiotic) in order to transform both the state and the 
economy. These three modes of transformation are not mutually exclusive and rather represent a 
‘menu of strategic options’ (p. 364). As part of this strategic menu, Wright highlights a wide 
range of organizations and institutions that are critical for moving beyond capitalism, including 
participatory budgeting, NGOs, and worker cooperatives. For Wright, these are ‘Real Utopias’ as 
they embody the ideals of a better world in the imperfect conditions of the present.  
As with the autonomists, in Wright we see a pluralist approach to social transformation, 
one in which transformation can be found in many places and can take a multiplicity of forms. 
Indeed, in Wright’s framework, Mondragon and Wikipedia are given equal status as Real 
Utopias. However, as with the autonomists, there is no attempt to strategically link these to some 
common horizon. Like the autonomists, Wright also misses the specific organic unity of the 
capitalist system centered on the dual character of labour, whose tendencies and counter 
tendencies demand a specific strategy, even when these will have to be built out of multiple 
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spaces and agencies. The commitment to strategic pluralism is ultimately why both Wright and 
the autonomists reject or at least underestimate the need for political struggle through political 
parties, what have traditionally been the vehicles for developing cohesive transformative 
strategies and agencies by the working class. 
The rejection of political struggle through political parties by both autonomism and the 
Real Utopias framework is directly linked to how they understand the capitalist state. Most 
autonomists believe one can ‘change the world without taking power,’ as Holloway (2002) 
argues. This means that both traditional parties and the ‘revolutionary party’ are rejected as 
vehicles for social change. After all, as Holloway (2010) puts it: "The state, by its very form, and 
independently of the content of its action, confirms and reproduces the negation of subjectivity 
on which capital is based" (p. 58). Leaving no doubt as to his view of the state, Holloway 
summarizes: "The state is a way of doing things: the wrong way of doing them" (p. 58). 
In contrast to autonomism, Wright makes clear that a post-capitalist society will require 
the state. In Wright’s view, the state's role in a post-capitalist society would be that of instituting 
and enforcing rules, and developing coordinating mechanisms through which civil society can 
gain coherence and integration. However, within capitalism it would be ultimately up to civil 
society to insert social power into the state with the goal of transforming it by creating new more 
democratic institutions. For him, this means understanding the state not simply as being 
functional to the reproduction of capital, but as a hybrid structure capable of holding within it 
contradictory elements (p. 190). What these elements are exactly remains somewhat unclear, 
however. How exactly social power is to be inserted into the state is a question that also remains 
under-explored, with political parties appearing as somewhat peripheral in his model. However, 
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as I will argue, the state and political struggle are absolutely essential in the development of a 
post-capitalist society and therefore at the core of the concept of post-capitalist struggles. 
New Democratic Road to Socialism?  
In contrast to autonomism and analytical Marxism, for Lebowitz (2006), the struggle for 
a post-capitalist society will have to take place through the state. In his words, "to construct a 
socialist society in reality, one step in every particular path is critical–control and transformation 
of the state”. Without this step, Lebowitz continues, "every real threat to capital will be 
destroyed.” According to Lebowitz, what is needed is therefore a new kind of state that can serve 
as "the midwife of a new society,” one that is capable of simultaneously restricting the 
reproduction of capital and opening doors to elements of a new society. Particularly important in 
the development of this new kind of state would be creating ‘power from below’, without which 
what is likely to develop is a new class "that identifies progress with the ability to control and 
direct from above" (p. 68). Hence, although for Lebowitz a socialist party is essential in a 
transition to socialism, rather than being an isolated vanguard, it would have to be closely 
connected to power at the base. 
Although Lebowitz does not outline a state theory in great detail, his views on the state 
resemble the work of Poulantzas (2000). For Poulantzas (2000), the state plays a key role in the 
reproduction of capital. First, it ‘incarnates’ the capitalist division between mental and manual 
labour, as politics becomes the intellectual labour of professional politicians. Second, because it 
does not have direct access to the means of production, the state operates in relative autonomy 
from the economy. This allows it to represent capital as a whole, rather than a particular fraction 
of it. This also allows the state to intervene directly in the economy, giving the system a degree 
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of unity and stability. However, state action is always contradictory, often sharpening crises in 
the process of dampening them. 
Importantly, for Poulantzas (2000), the state is not simply a monolith that is functional to 
the reproduction of capital. As a social relation, the state is rather a strategic field in which the 
balance of class forces is condensed. This means that the state also expresses struggles and 
demands of the working class. Hence, representative democracy should be seen as an 
achievement of the working class that acts as a barrier to class domination. However, working- 
class struggles are not immediately and directly expressed in the state, but are rather ‘refracted’ 
by it to ensure continued accumulation. For these reasons, Poulantzas (2000) thought the state 
had to be part of a transition to socialism, which he labeled, a ‘democratic road to socialism’. 
Poulantzas (2000) distinguished his democratic road to socialism from two other 
approaches. The first is Lenin’s strategy of dual power, characterized by a frontal attack against 
the state from the ‘outside’. This outside is comprised of a counter power of popular organization 
existing in parallel to the capitalist state and growing in force until a crisis of dual power is 
created. Once this crisis occurs, the capitalist state is smashed and replaced by the already 
existing popular power. This new state then becomes the instrument used by the vanguard of the 
revolution to build socialism. 8  
Also rejected by Poulantzas (2000) is the social democratic path. This path consists of 
winning parliamentary elections, after which the state, now populated by a left technocratic elite, 
can move the revolution forward through the development of new policies. Hence, for 
Poulantzas (2000), although these two roads are at one level quite different, they both lead to the 
same conclusion, namely the development of statism and the exclusion of the popular masses 
                                                
8 For an interesting discussion of the key strategic and organizational aspects of Leninism see D’Arcy 
(2009). 
  53 
from the revolutionary process.9 The error that these two approaches share is that of conceiving 
the state as either a tool/object, in the case of dual power, or as a subject with an intrinsic social 
rationality, in the case of social democracy. In other words, conceiving the state as an object that 
can be used or a subject with intrinsic agency is ultimately to make the same mistake. In contrast, 
for Poulantzas, the state had to be understood as a social relation. 
Against the above two approaches, Poulantzas (2000)'s democratic road to socialism 
consists of an uneasy alliance between a left political force in government and popular forces 
working outside the formal state institutions with the goal of radically transforming the state. 
This road would attempt to combine direct democracy with representative democracy in a 
relatively long struggle through which new forms of democratic expression would be developed. 
Unfortunately, Poulantzas (2000) ideas about what kind of movements and parties would be 
needed and what an alliance between them might look like remained highly underdeveloped. We 
therefore get little or no sense of what kind of challenges this alliance might face and what a 
transformed state might look like. 
The concept of post-capitalist struggles helps us not only fill some of the silences in 
Poulantzas (2000) work, but also go beyond it, allowing us to think of a new democratic road to 
socialism. In this new path to social transformation, rather than an alliance between government 
and movement, what is needed is a new fusion between them, one in which the division between 
worker (manual labour) and politician (intellectual labour) is overcome. This means, first, 
prioritizing the development of democratic and cooperative capacities in working class 
organizations in both the spheres of production and reproduction. The challenge is then 
extending these into the development of new political parties through which diverse working 
                                                
9 For a similar interpretation of the failures of 20th century socialism, see (Devine, 1988; Wainwright, 
1994; Katz, 2004). 
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class forces can converge politically and begin to redefine traditional forms of leadership and 
representation.  
The development of new forms of leadership means rejecting the ‘banking’ model of 
education in which an elite vanguard simply deposits revolutionary knowledge into the 
oppressed. As Freire (1970) argues, a truly transformative pedagogy, would involve a leadership 
that works ‘with’ rather than ‘for’ the oppressed. Finally, the concept of post-capitalist struggles 
also suggest that any transition to a new society, although certainly long and arduous, will be 
accompanied by short bursts of struggle that push beyond the existing moment. As we will see, 
this is a process in which the dispossessed, as holders of both capitalism's past and future, take 
on strategic importance as potential agents of transformative change.  
Analytical Propositions 
From the above theoretical discussion we can draw four analytical propositions. These 
are summarized as follows: 
1. Unlike anti-capitalist struggles that focus on winning material demands and extracting 
concessions from capital, post-capitalist struggles are those that emphasize the creation of new 
social relations that point beyond capitalism. This means that post-capitalist struggles are 
identified primarily by a qualitative assessment of concrete practices by real people, and not 
necessarily by their adherence to particular political ideologies, such as socialism or 
communism. In addition, in contrast to anti-capitalist struggles, post-capitalist struggles are 
relatively rare, tending to emerge out of processes of dispossession. Finally, as a set of concrete 
social relations, post-capitalist struggles can take place in a variety of situations or institutions 
within both the spheres of production and reproduction.  
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2. The building of new social relations within capitalism through post-capitalist struggles 
is understood as a process of human development, meaning the working class develops a range 
of new capacities and values that at least partially supersede the fragmentation, division and 
alienation of value relations within capitalism. However, because human development is a 
process that occurs within capitalism, it should not be understood as a fully formed expression of 
a new society. It is rather merely a glimpse or prefiguration of a possible future based on 
democracy and cooperation found implicitly within the present. This means that human 
development faces constant challenges and contradictions as a result of taking place within 
existing value relations. 
3. The concept of post-capitalist struggles understands that one of the key divisions 
necessary for the reproduction of capitalism is that between manual and intellectual labour, a 
division crystallized in and by the capitalist state as the division between politician (intellectual 
labor) and worker (manual labour). This means that in contrast to notions of post-capitalism 
developed by Autonomism and Analytical Marxism, post-capitalist struggles are those that 
attempt to transform the state by creating a fusion between worker and politician. This therefore 
also means the creation of political parties that can contest state power on this basis. 
4. Finally, the development of new capacities and values is essentially a learning process. 
As such, this process cannot simply replicate the rigid division between teacher and student 
typical of capitalist social relations. For the left, this means breaking from the banking model of 
education in which an elite political vanguard simply deposits ready made knowledge into the 
heads of the oppressed. A truly transformative pedagogy must rather emphasize processes of 
democratic and participatory learning led by the oppressed themselves. Central in this process is 
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the development of forms of representation and leadership that break from the vanguardist 
approaches of both Leninism and social democracy. 
In Chapters 3-6, I present four case studies that illustrate these four propositions in the 
context of 21st century Latin American politics. However, before delving into these, a brief 
background of Latin American development and politics in the 20th century is necessary. This is 
the topic of the following Chapter. 
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 Chapter 2: Latin American Development and Post-capitalism: 
From ISI to Neostructuralism 
 
From the end of second world war to the present day, Latin America has gone through 
three distinct phases of capitalist development: Import Substitution Industrialization (1945-
1970), neoliberalism (1980-2000), and neostructuralism (2000-2015). This Chapter provides a 
brief summary of the successes and shortcomings of each phase. The final section also 
introduces my case studies in light of the history discussed and the analytical matrix presented in 
the introductory Chapter. 
Import Substitution Industrialization 
Following the Second World War, Latin American governments began to implement a 
series of policies aimed at achieving economic growth and rising living standards through the 
development of domestic markets and the diversification of industrial output, a process that 
became known as ‘Import Substitution Industrialization’ or ISI (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. 1-
4). Broadly speaking, ISI was designed to alter the patterns of trade between the first and third 
world, a pattern that consisted of a tendency for developing nations to export primary goods 
while importing finished ones (Rapley, 2002, p. 36). The import substitution process starts off 
with capital or imported intermediate goods and proceeds to the manufacture of more advanced 
finished consumer goods and intermediate goods that were previously imported (Hirschman, 
1968, p. 6). Examples of ISI policies include the placing of tariffs and quotas on imported goods, 
the nationalization of key industries and the establishment of development corporations or banks 
in order to promote specific ventures (Hirschman, p. 5).  
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Much of the intellectual foundations for ISI in Latin America came from the Comisión 
Económica para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
ECLAC), founded by the United Nations in 1948. ECLAC saw ISI as a development strategy 
that challenged classic modernization theory, in particular, the work of Rostow (1960). However, 
it was not a challenge to the broader project of capitalist modernity that prioritized economic 
growth. Indeed, ISI was based on the assumption that it was possible and desirable for Latin 
American countries to ‘catch-up’ to the west. As Ramón Grosfoguel (2000) argues, ISI was the 
expression of a developmentalist ideology that understood Latin America to be stuck in a 
backwards feudal state in relation to Europe and North America. ISI found support in many of 
the region’s progressive forces.10 
From the point of view of its stated aims, ISI found considerable success during 
approximately its first two decades of implementation. According to Enrique Cárdenas et al., 
during this period, per capita growth rates in Latin America were the highest in 100 years, 
reaching a peak of 7.2 per cent per year between 1968 and 1974 (pp. 16-18). Indeed, growth 
rates during this period were higher than those in East Asia in the 1950s and faster than those in 
the developed world at the time, prompting the World Bank to re-categorize all Latin American 
countries (Haiti excepted) as either ‘middle income’ or ‘upper middle income’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 
2014, pp. 330-331). In addition, most of the region witnessed major improvements in the areas of 
labour productivity, employment generation, and significant reductions in levels of 
underemployment and poverty (Cárdenas et al., 2000, 18-22).  
                                                
10 These included many communist parties (as well as other leftist parties) that justified a pro-capitalist 
growth strategy in Latin America on the Marxist orthodoxy of stagism (discussed earlier). Consequently, communist 
parties throughout the region found themselves supporting the local bourgeoisie and even populist dictators 
(Grosfoguel, 2000, p. 357). 
  59 
State-led industrialization during this period also resulted in important improvements in 
public services, including social security, health, education and labour training. Combined, all of 
these changes resulted in significant improvements in the regional standard of living relative to 
the US, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela (Cárdenas et 
al., 2000, pp. 20-21). Behind many of these changes were important improvements in the 
region's productive sector, including strong growth in manufacturing, and partial diversification 
in agricultural production (Cárdenas et al., 2000 p. 20). In other words, as Wiarda notes, many 
Latin American countries began breaking from their historical dependence on the production and 
sale of a single crop (Wiarda, 1990, p. 97).  
However, the ISI model also ran into a number of challenges. As Albert Hirschman 
(1968) notes, although ISI did manage to develop core industries, it had problems developing 
spin-off industries. This is because the import protections provided by ISI became an incentive 
for the new industrialists to rely on cheap imported inputs rather than the more expensive 
domestic alternatives. In other words, import protection simply became a pure source of rent 
and/or a protection from exchange rate overvaluation (Cárdenas et al., 2000, p. 24). Thus, 
contrary to the goals of ISI, import protection may have increased dependence on imported 
inputs and technology (Cárdenas et al., 2000, p. 25).  
Another crucial problem with the ISI model was its inability to induce a sufficient export 
drive, a result of a lack of cohesion in the domestic capitalist classes, insufficient spinoff 
industries, and overvalued currencies. Indeed, following the postwar boom in commodity prices, 
Latin America’s share in world trade declined from 7 to about 4 percent by the 1970s, while its 
ratio of exports to GDP fell dramatically to below 20 percent by the early 1970’s (Cárdenas et 
al., 2000, pp. 22-23). Lastly, the application of ISI brought forth rising inflation, a result of a 
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neglected agricultural sector, underdeveloped infrastructure, shortages of skilled labour, 
inadequacies in fiscal systems, and the intensification of government investments (Furtado, 1976, 
p. 120-124). 
The problems that the ISI model was experiencing by the late 1960s coincided with an 
immense political event: the Cuban revolution. These two factors, along with a new layer of 
critical intellectuals that entered ECLAC, became the driving forces behind renewed criticisms 
of modernization and ISI by what became known as the dependency school (Grosfoguel, 2000). 
11 The dependentistas core argument was that the underdevelopment of Latin America could be 
explained not by the idea that it remained stuck in a feudal or semifeudal state, but rather because 
of its particular position within a single capitalist world system. In other words, Latin America 
was already fully inserted into global capitalism, and its position within the global social division 
of labour is what explained its underdevelopment.  
Consequently, for the dependentistas, the application of modernization theory and ISI to 
the region was bound to fail. The solution was rather to de-link from the capitalist world system 
in order to apply a new and superior system: socialism (Furtado, 1964; Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979; Frank, 1971; Quijano, 1966; Dos Santos, 1968). The dependentistas' Marxist inspired 
argument became the source of a split within the communist movement in Latin America. Rather 
than pursuing alliances with the national bourgeoisie under the framework of further developing 
the forces of production in the region, many leftist groups and currents in the 1960s attempted to 
replicate the Cuban experience through guerilla movements (Grosfoguel, 2000, p. 357). 
However, as history has shown, the guerrilla strategy adopted by leftist groups during this period 
proved fruitless. 
                                                
11 Not all dependentistas were critical of ISI, however. As Grosfoguel (2000) notes, some (most notably 
Cardoso) became strong promoters of the model. 
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Transition to Neoliberalism 
The challenges the ISI model began to face in Latin America in the late 1960s were 
aggravated by the dismantling of the global economic framework known as the Bretton Woods 
system. Instituted in 1944, the Bretton Woods system consisted of three pillars: a gold standard 
based on the US dollar, controls on the international movement of capital, and a progression 
toward free trade (Sens and Stoett, 2002; Gowan, 1999; Rowbotham, 2000; Soederberg, 2005). 
Importantly, the Bretton Woods system institutionalized the hegemonic position in which the US 
economy found itself in relation to the rest of the world following the Second World War. As a 
producer of one third of the world's economic output and more than half of its production in 
manufactured goods (Rapley, 2002 p. 32), US industry stood to easily outcompete international 
rivals under a regime of free trade. In addition, pegging global currencies to the US dollar meant 
that the US acquired political control over global currencies. This political control came through 
the US Federal Reserve, as well as the International Monetary fund and World Bank. 
However, by the late 1960s America's global economic dominance became threatened by 
intensified competition from the European and Japanese economies. In addition, expenditures on 
the Vietnam War were significantly expanding the US deficit, and US gold reserves were 
becoming insufficient to convert other nations' surplus dollars into gold (Gowan, 1999, p. 17). 
As a result of these new pressures, the US began to dismantle the Bretton Woods system. Two 
key moves are associated with this process. First, in 1971, President Nixon removed the US 
dollar from the gold standard (Soederberg, 2005). Second, in 1974, amidst the global economic 
depression that resulted from the 1973 OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) oil embargo, the Nixon administration unilaterally abolished restrictions on capital 
flows in and out of the Unites States. As Gowan (1999) notes, this move led to a dramatic shift in 
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the scale of these flows, bringing international private finance into the very center of the global 
monetary system (Panitch, 2000; Panitch and Gindin, 2005). Indeed, in the mid-1970s, private 
US banks found themselves flooded with petrodollars from the OPEC countries and (now freed 
from capital controls) proceeded to make massive loans to third world governments, who were 
eager to take up loans to compensate for export losses in primary products.  
The loans made by the banks to developing countries in general and Latin America 
specifically were highly questionable. As Rapley notes, “so flooded were they with money that 
many banks threw caution to the wind in their hunt for borrowers and offered low-interest loans 
for questionable projects” (2002, p. 34). In some cases, capital flight was the result. As Prabirjit 
Sarkar and Hans Wolfgang Singer (1992) point out, capital flight from Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina between 1974 and 1982 amounted to $32.7 billion, $10.8 billion and $15.3 billion 
respectively, representing over 40 percent of the combined total of loans received by the three 
countries.  
In 1979, two events combined to further sink the developing world into deep debt. The 
first was the second oil shock following the Iranian Revolution. Second, this was the year the US 
Comptroller of the Currency, John Heimann, adjusted accounting rules to allow US banks to 
increase their lending to the Third World. As in the first oil shock, petrodollars in Western banks 
were quickly turned into loans to already highly indebted Third World countries. Indeed, as of 
1979, the 9 largest US banks had committed 113 percent of their capital in loans to just six 
countries Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea and Philippines (Soederberg, 2005). 
The rising cost of oil also triggered a sharp rise of inflation in the First World and 
governments in the 1980s proceeded to fight this by raising interest rates. In the US, this took the 
form of ‘Volcker Shocks’, a dramatic increase in interest rates by Chairman Paul Volcker of the 
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US Federal Reserve (Rapley, 2002; Soederberg, 2005). The rise in interest rates directly affected 
Latin America as a large portion of its debt was incurred at floating interest rates. Thus, the cost 
of servicing the debt skyrocketed. In 1985, the debt service ratio – debt service payments as a 
proportion of export earnings – for Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico was 41.8, 26.2, 26.5 and 
44.4 percent respectively. By 1986, the debt service ratio for both Mexico and Argentina was 
over 50 per cent (Sarkar and Singer, 1992; Haynes, 1996). As intended by Volcker, higher 
interest rates also caused the value of the dollar to increase, as investors seeking high returns on 
their money increased the demand for US currency. This effectively hiked the Third World debt 
as most of it was denotated in dollars (Rapley, 2002). 
By the early 1980s, the debt was too much to bear for a number of Third World countries. 
By now, the price of primary products in the global market had collapsed as a result of a 
recession in the West (Rapley, 2002), leaving Latin America in an impossible position. Thus, in 
1982, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil announced they could not meet their current debt 
obligations (Haynes, 1996). Fearing a global monetary collapse, the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened by promoting structural adjustment programs on 
deficit countries, what would soon become known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 
1990). First tested in Chile by the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) (Klein, 2007; 
Grandin, 2006), Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are based on neoclassical economic 
theory and contain five general elements: fiscal austerity, privatization of state owned 
enterprises, trade liberalization, de-regulation of the economy and labour market flexibility 
(Collins and Lear, 1995; Cook, 1998; Harris, 2003). 
Guided in part by the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, Miltion Friedman and Robert Nozick, the 
fundamental assumption behind neoliberal policies is that the market, rather than the state, is the 
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most efficient way to allocate resources (Albo, 2002). Hence, as Robert Gwynne and Cristóbal 
Kay (2000) argue in their analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America, the state has reduced its 
commitment to social provision in diverse areas such as pensions, health and education, while 
creating more market driven forms of social support (p. 150). In addition, neoliberalism believes 
that domestic economies should adapt to the demands of international capital and that states 
should therefore simply restrict themselves to facilitating this process. Thus, neoliberalism calls 
for monetary policies that cater to financial markets, in particular, interest rate manipulation 
aimed at delivering a balanced trade account, low inflation and economic stability (Rapley, 2002; 
Saad-Filho et al., 2007). Finally, under the neoliberal model, states are encouraged to produce 
balance budgets under the guidance of an independent central bank (Gwynne and Kay, 2000). 
However, the promise of modernization made by neoliberalism never materialized, as 
indicated by a wide range of indicators, such as income inequality, poverty and crime (Portes, 
1997; United Nations Development Programme, 1999; Gwynne and Kay 2000; Portes and 
Hoffman, 2003; Soederberg, 2003). There are a number of reasons for this. First, as James Crotty 
(2000) notes, neoliberal policies provide chronically weak aggregate demand, which, in turn, 
produce low levels of economic growth. This creates a vicious circle as capitalists, in response to 
low demand, seek to increase their competitive advantages, which only exacerbates the problem 
further. Second, they led to desperation exports in the part of debtor nations who, in seeking to 
individually increase their exports to service their loans, flooded the global market with goods. 
This simply depreciated the value of such goods, producing less net revenue for each country.  
Given the contradictions of the neoliberal model, between 1980 and 1986, all of the 
Highly Indebted Countries expanded their exports and all suffered a loss of unit value, the 
market price for their exports (Sarkar and Singer, 1992). For Argentina, Chile, Peru and 
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Uruguay, the authors continue, “the loss in unit values of exports was so sharp as to reduce their 
total export earnings” (p. 15). In other words, SAPs, as Susanne Soederberg (2003) argues, 
resulted in a massive transfer of wealth from debtor countries to the developed world (p. 98). 
Finally, because SAPs decrease the state's revenue-generating capacities, particularly in the long-
term, the result is that the state is less able to provide social programs for those most negatively 
affected by neoliberalism. For these reasons, structural adjustment and neoliberalism in Latin 
America should be understood as a vehicle for accumulation by dispossession and a new form of 
imperialism, as wealth is systematically transferred from the public to the private sector, for the 
benefit of US led transnational capital (Harvey, 2003, 2010; Soederberg, 2003, 2005). 
The implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment in the region proved to be a 
significant victory for the region's capitalist classes. According to Alejandro Portes and Kelly 
Hoffman's (2003) comparative analysis of class structures in Latin America, the capitalist classes 
in the region saw their earnings significantly increase relative to the subordinate classes during 
the 1980s and 1990s, a result of a decrease in public sector employment, stagnation in the private 
sector and growth in the informal proletariat. However, capital's victory in Latin America was 
also political. As Richard Harris (2003) notes, neoliberalism excluded or marginalized the 
masses from political participation, concentrating power among political and economic elites 
(pp. 369-370).  
In addition, as Maria Victoria Murillo (2000) shows in his study of Argentina, Venezuela 
and Mexico, organized labour in these three countries largely facilitated the transition to 
neoliberal reforms out of loyalty to political parties and leaders formerly supportive of labour but 
now turned neoliberal. This forms part of a wider trend of labour retreat in Latin America in the 
face of neoliberal policies, evidenced by, among other things, loss of union membership 
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reduction in strikes, and ideological vacillation (for various cases see Drake, 2003; Galvão, 2004; 
Palomino, 2005). In other words, in Latin America Margaret Thatcher's proclamation that there 
is no alternative to neoliberalism had seemingly taken hold. 
Neostructuralism and the Pink Tide 
As might be expected, the social devastation produced by neoliberalism did not go 
uncontested, particularly in cases where structural adjustment was so severe as to produce 
significant crises at either the local or national levels. As Harris (2003) outlines in his detailed 
survey of resistance movements during the neoliberal period, nothing short of a flood of 
struggles emerged throughout the region. These included everything from court actions and 
electoral activity, to mass demonstrations, riots, building occupations and people's parliaments 
(p. 373). As highlighted earlier, some of the most notable struggles during this period included 
the Zapatistas fight against the North American Free Trdae Agreement (NAFTA), el Caracazo in 
Venezuela, the gas and water wars in Bolivia, and the cacerolazos during the 2001 Argentinian 
crisis. Other important movements could also be highlighted, namely the Movimento Sem Terra 
(Movement of Landless Rural Laborers or MST) in Brazil and the Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Harris, 2003). 
As Harris (2003) notes, the variety and quantity of these struggles reveal the high degree 
of opposition to neoliberalism in the region (p. 392). However, one needs to add that these 
struggles largely departed from more traditional forms of resistance, expressing novel forms of 
democratic and political participation.12 Hence, during this time period, it wasn't unions, leftist 
parties, or guerilla groups leading the way, but diverse and often heterogeneous groups 
                                                
12 This is not to say that resistance of a similar character did not occur during previous moments in Latin 
American history (for examples of various forms of worker self-organization see Barcelli, 1957; Hart, 1989; Drake, 
2003; Murmis and Portantiero, 2011). However, it is clear that neoliberal reforms produced a unique wave of these 
types of struggles. 
 
  67 
experimenting with more direct and local democratic forms of participation (Vanden, 2003; 
Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006; Kay, 2008). As Harry Vanden argues, the political and economic 
threats posed by neoliberalism to various popular sectors of Latin American society has driven 
these sectors to seek forms of political organization that "they can call their own" (p. 310). In 
short, this wave of movements across the region point beyond both the impositions of 
neoliberalism and previous histories of leftist struggles in the region. 
By the late 1990s, many of these new struggles became articulated within existing 
political systems. In some cases, movements became allies or supportive of already existing 
leftist parties. For example, following the 2001 crisis, sections of the piquetero or unemployed 
workers movement in Argentina came to support the Kirchner governments (Partido 
Justicialista) out of a sense that these governments would reinstate some of the principles and 
values associated with Peronism (Pérez and Natalucci, 2010). Similarly, in Brazil, the MST 
developed close relations with the PT out of the hope that this would lead to agrarian reform, the 
movement's central demand (Carter, 2010). However, in other cases, these new movements and 
struggles became or were central in the creation of new political parties, such as the Movimiento 
al Socialismo in Bolivia (Webber, 2011) and Movimiento Quinta República in Venezuela 
(Wilpert, 2007). In any case, by the turn of the century, the result of these processes was a wave 
of electoral victories for left and centre left parties across the region, a phenomenon known as 
the ‘pink tide’. 
However, the pink tide is far from a homogeneous block. Indeed, its arrival to the 
political scene prompted many commentators to assess and classify the various left governments 
in power. Some favoured the more ‘moderate’ governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or 
Lula, as he is commonly known) in Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile and Tabaré Vázquez in 
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Uruguay (Castañeda, 2006; Llosa, 2007), while others supported the more ‘radical’ governments 
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia (Lebowitz, 
2007; Ciccariello-Maher, 2013). However, as Steve Ellner (2013) argues, even if one focuses on 
the more radical governments, one finds an embrace of heterogeneity. In other words, as Striffler 
(2017) suggests, it seems that if anything unites the new left in Latin America it is its diverse and 
flexible approach that constantly interrogates the Marxist orthodoxies of the past (p. 8). 
Despite the many differences displayed by the pink tide, broad political and economic patterns 
have nevertheless emerged in the region, prompting many to understand the changes in the 
region over the last decade and a half as encompassing a new phase of development, often 
labelled neostructuralism or neodevelopmentalism. 
As Leiva (2008) outlines, the neostructural model began to be developed in Chile under 
the first government of the Concertación, and contains four political and economic pillars. First, 
it attempts to induce a more balanced export drive when compared to the neoliberal period, 
aiming to move up the value added chain through alliances with transnational capital. Second, it 
gives up the currency devaluation shocks of the neoliberal period in favour of a more gradual 
devaluation. Third, it combines the neoliberal demand of labour market flexibility with new 
forms of participatory governance. Finally, it introduces a new discourse of social cohesion 
backed by ameliorative economic measures for vulnerable populations. Neostructuralism, Leiva 
(2008) tells us, therefore departs from both neoliberalism and classical structuralism, 
convincingly combining the concept of growth and equity, while eschewing discussions of 
power relations. 
Central to the neostructuralist model is also a new role of the state. In contrast to the 
neoliberal period in which the state's primary role was to implement and manage the 
  69 
dispossession associated with structural adjustment, the neostructuralist state plays a more active 
role in social provision and welfare. In large part, this has been possible through increased state 
spending, taxation, and most importantly, tighter control over the use of revenues from natural 
resources (Gudynas, 2009, Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Rosales, 2013). This new economic 
approach has in turn allowed the new left to distance itself from the debt regime of the 
Washington Consensus.  
Indeed, since coming to power, there has been a tendency in the new left to not renew 
agreements with the IMF and in the cases of Brazil and Argentina to settle its outstanding debt 
(Moreno-Brid and Paunovic, 2006). With this in mind, it is notable that unlike previous 
economic collapses since the Great Depression, the 2008 economic crisis led neither to bank 
failures or a renewed debt crisis in the region (Katz, 2015, p. 14). These new economic measures 
taken by the state are accompanied by a new political outlook that enhances citizenship through 
cultural recognition, evident in institutional reforms and, sometimes, new constitutions (Grugel 
and Riggirozzi, 2012). All in all, as Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi (2012) argue, the pink tide 
seems to promote new forms of democratic belonging by establishing new state–society 
relationships (p. 3).13 
The application of neostructuralism in the region has resulted in important successes 
based on its stated aims. Indeed, since the early 2000s, the region has experienced significant 
improvements in a number of social indicators, including poverty, inequality and unemployment. 
As Nora Lustig and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez (2013) note, on average, the Gini coefficient in the 
                                                
13 It's worth noting that, to some extent, these new progressive policies have transcended the individual 
nation-state. This is the case with the creation of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, later renamed Alba). Founded in 2004, this organization 
promotes regional integration through alternative trade patterns and development projects, particularly in education 
and health (Kellog, 2007). 
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region fell from 0.530 in the 1990s to 0.497 in the 2000s (see also Cornia, 2010).14 Similarly, the 
percentage of people living in poverty and extreme poverty fell significantly between 2002 and 
2010, from 44 to 23.1 per cent and 19.4 to 12.9 per cent respectively (Grugel y Riggirozzi, 
2012). During the same time period, unemployment also fell significantly from 11 per cent to 7.4 
per cent (Bárcena, 2010). Although unevenly, improvements have also been made in women's 
rights, particularly in the areas of political participation and sexual violence (Friedman, 2009). 
In part, these improvements have been the result of what are known as ‘pro poor 
policies’, most notably, conditional cash transfers aimed at vulnerable populations (Bulmer-
Thomas, 2014, pp. 432-433). Examples of this include the Bolsa Familia program developed by 
the PT (Hall, 2006; 2008), Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados introduced by the Kirchner 
governments (Pautassi, 2004) and Chile Solidario introduced by the Concertación (Serrano, 
2005; Larrañaga y Contreras, 2010). Other initiatives combine a pro-poor outlook with 
participatory governance. These include municipal participatory budgeting (for specific cases see 
Ford, 2008; Fedozzi, 2001) and communal councils in Venezuela (El Troudi, 2005; Burbach and 
Piñeiro, 2007; Ellner, 2009). The second factor behind the success of neostructuralism is 
consistent growth. As Alicia Bárcena (2010) notes, from 2002 to 2008, the region achieved 
levels of growth comparable to the 1970s, peaking at an average of 5 per cent annually between 
2003 and 2007 (p. 9). Much of this growth can be explained by a massive expansion in the 
region's international trade, which rose by 138 per cent during this period, and a strong 
improvement in its terms of trade (Bárcena, 2010, p. 10).  
However, a closer look at growth and trade patterns in the region reveals some of the 
shortcomings of the neostructural model. As Leiva (2008) argues, the neostructuralist promise of 
                                                
14 However, as Katz (2015) notes, these reductions in inequality have not changed Latin America’s position 
in the global inequality rankings. 
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moving up the value chain ladder through an export drive ignores the pressures that international 
trade organizations impose on this strategy and wrongly assumes capitalists will choose to 
innovate rather than cost cut. Not surprisingly, the result has been a decline in industrial 
production (Katz, 2015), and an overwhelming reliance on the export of primary goods, 
particularly as a result of strong demand from Asia (Bárcena, 2010). Indeed as Eduardo Gudynas 
(2009) argues, the new left in Latin America has become an active promoter of extractivism, 
natural resource extraction geared toward international markets and largely based on mono-
cropping (see also Robinson, 2008; Katz, 2008; Rosales, 2013; Chiasson-LeBel, 2016).  
As Caludio Katz (2015) notes, in Brazil and Argentina, the spread of soy cultivation is a 
particularly damaging example, relying on minimial labour, displacing other crops and 
depending on a transnational corporation (Monsanto) for seeds (p. 11). In other words, 
neostructuralism is simply reproducing, if not deepening, the region's historic dependence on 
primary resources, even as it channels some of the earnings of this model to social development. 
For these reasons, as Maristella Svampa (2013, 2012) argues, we can understand the period of 
the pink tide in Latin America as representing at least a partial shift from accumulation based on 
finance (the Washington Consesus) to accumulation based on the exploitation of land, what she 
calls the ‘commodities consensus’. 
The participatory governance model pursued by neostructuralism also displays a number 
of contradictions, most notably that democracy is supposed to coexist with the social domination 
underpinning the requirements of accumulation (Leiva, 2008). Hence, Leiva continues, the 
promotion of participatory governance may simply have the effect of weakening autonomous 
forms of organization that question the imperatives of accumulation. In addition, forms of 
participatory governance reinforce the neoliberal imperatives of decentralization, which seek to 
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reduce the role of the state in social provision. Because of this participatory governance tends to 
be weakly instituted within state structures and is therefore prone to the control of local 
municipal leaders who may not always be supportive (Andersson and Van Laerhoven, 2007). 
Given all these factors, it is not surprising that, as Daniel Chavez (2008) notes, the World Bank, 
in the name of ‘good governance’, began promoting ‘lite’ versions of participatory budgeting in 
Latin America. This offer was then taken up by many local right wing administrations in order to 
legitimize neoliberal policies, including the emblematic case of Porto Alegre, (Chavez, 2008).  
Given the contradictions found at the core of the neostructuralist model, it is not 
surprising to see continued struggles taking place in its context. Indeed, in recent years a 
substantial amount of literature has emerged examining these (Svampa, 2011; Gordon and 
Webber, 2011; Becker, 2011, 2013; Kowalczyk, 2013; Peña, 2016). Of note is that that many of 
these struggles resist various forms of dispossession. This shows that although the 
neostructuralist model seems to avoid more systemic forms of dispossession associated with 
structural adjustment and debt, more localized or sectorial forms of dispossession that target the 
exploitation of land are a continued reality (Borras et al., 2012).  
These struggles have been interpreted in a number of ways. For some, they reveal that the 
progressive governments in the region betrayed social movements and are simply pursuing a new 
form of neoliberalism (Webber, 2011, 2011; Gutiérez Aguilar, 2011; Ospina and Lalander, 2012; 
Zibechi, 2015, 2016). For others, these struggles represent a productive dialectic with left 
governments in which demands and struggles from below fuel progressive changes from above 
(Ciccariello-Maher, 2007; Harnecker, 2010; García Linera, 2011; Sader, 2013b). García Linera’s 
(2011) concept of ‘creative tensions’ in the case of Bolivia and Ciccariello-Maher’s (2007) 
notion of a new form of ‘dual power’ in Venezuela best exemplify this perspective. 
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 However, as I will argue in the following Chapters, this tense relationship between 
movements and left governments in the region is best understood by referring to what I call the 
‘neostructuralist bargain’. As we will see, through the neostructuralist bargain, pink tide 
governments provide partial material concessions to vulnerable populations. In return for these 
concessions, social movements are asked to give up their aspirations for forms of democracy and 
cooperation that point beyond neostructuralism, toward a post-capitalist future. This shows that 
rather than internalizing the experiences of social movements in a virtuous dialectic toward 
socialism, as the concept of creative tensions argues, pink tide governments leave this bargain 
less capable of moving toward a post-capitalist future. On the other hand, the material 
concessions provided by these governments demonstrate a break from the neoliberal model of 
the past, disputing the thesis of ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’ (Webber, 2011). 
Case Studies in Historical and Comparative Perspective 
The four countries in which my case studies are located occupy different development 
trajectories from ISI to the present. Argentina pursued one of the most successful ISI programs, 
giving the country some of the highest levels of industrialization and standards of living in the 
region. The implementation of ISI occurred under the leadership of Juan Perón (1946-1955 and 
1973-1974) and the Peronist movement more broadly. During the early years (1946-1955), 
Argentina’s Partido Justicialista, founded by Juan Perón, brought together the urban working 
class, the provincial middle classes and the new industrialists of the time (Snow and Wynia, 
1990). After 1955, Peronism becomes more clearly a working class movement with its most 
important ally becoming the Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina 
(General Confederation of Labour or CGT). After the death of Juan Perón in 1974 and the 
subsequent arrest of his successor and wife, Isabel Martínez de Perón (1974-1976), by the 
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incoming military regime, the party goes through a crisis of leadership until the 1983 elections. 
Nevertheless, Peronism loses the elections to the Unión Cívica Radical, Argentina’s second most 
important party (Snow and Wynia, 1990).  
In 1989, Peronism bounces back under the leadership of Carlos Menem (1989-1999) who 
becomes President for two consecutive terms. Despite campaigning on a traditional Peronist 
platform of strong social spending, industrial development and an alliance with organized labor, 
Carlos Menem, once elected, began to aggressively apply neoliberal policies (Fair, 2008). 
Paradoxically, these policies were supported by organized labor who received a wide range of 
‘selective incentives’ from the government, such as stock options of privatized companies, 
retirement insurance and control over specific social programs (Fair, 2008). In addition, the 
Convertibility Plan introduced in 1991, in which the Peso was pegged to the dollar in a 1:1 ratio, 
appealed to broad sectors of the Argentinian society who were facing economic instability from 
bouts of hyperinflation (Fair, 2008). 
However, by the late 1990s, the neoliberal reforms had severely weakened the labour 
movement and the state’s role in social provisions. This led to perhaps the biggest political and 
economic crisis of Argentina’s history in 2001. Furthermore, left political alternatives to the 
neoliberal revolution started by Carlos Menem seemed to be lacking. After all, it was the 
Peronist party with substantial support from the labour movement that introduced the reforms 
that quickly devastated the country’s working and popular classes. It is in this context that we 
can fully understand the emergence of the ERT movement. The ERT movement, as we will see, 
poses a direct, if incomplete, challenge to the collapse of traditional Peronism in the country, as 
expressed in the Carlos Menem years. 
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The arrival of the Kirchner governments (2003-2015) marked a new phase of 
development for Argentina. On paper, the values of social justice and democratic governance 
espoused by the Kirchner administrations, which echo elements of classic Peronism, should have 
addressed the demands of the ERT movement. However, the movement has largely been ignored 
by the Kirchner governments. Indeed, as we will see, the ERT movement’s values of democracy 
and cooperation go well beyond the boundaries set by the neostructural model of the Kirchner 
governments.  
Venezuela’s encounter with ISI in the postwar period was heavily conditioned by its 
status as a major oil-producing nation. Indeed, unlike Argentina and other countries in the region 
that were attempting to industrialize, Venezuela, under the dictatorial regime of Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez (1952-1958), simply used oil revenues to fund ever increasing volumes of imported 
goods (Myers, 1990, p. 292). It was not until democracy was consolidated with the election of 
Rómulo Betancourt (1945-1948 and 1959-1964) as President of the country in 1959 that ISI 
actually began being implemented (Myers, 1990). Nevertheless, ISI policies were built in the 
context of a relatively weak labour movement. It was at this moment in history that Venezuela 
established the Punto Fijo, a power sharing pact between the country’s three main parties: 
Acción Democrática, Partido Social Cristiano, and Unión Republicana Democrática.  
By the 1970s, the expansion and nationalization of oil production coupled with increasing 
state expenditures in health education and public works saw a notable improvement in social 
indicators, making Venezuela’s goal to modernization seemingly well within grasp (Lander, 
2005, pp. 25-26). However, unlike Argentina, Venezuela possessed a relatively weak labour 
movement that was not integral to state’s oil based developmental approach. Indeed, the state 
developed a seemingly infinite capacity to harness oil revenues to fund a myriad of often-
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outlandish development initiatives with no organic endogenous links. As Fernando Coronil 
(1997) argues, this gave the Venezuelan state the illusion of possessing magical properties that 
created the expectation among broad layers of society that the state on its own could solve any 
number of social and economic problems (pp. 4-5). However, the fall of oil prices in the mid 
1980s confirmed Venezuela’s status as an oil dependent nation suffering from a classic case of 
so-called ‘Dutch disease’, in which the abundance of natural resources blocks rather than 
facilitates industrial diversification and development over the long run (Ross, 1999; Bresser-
Pereira, 2008) 
By the late 1980s, facing revenue shortfalls and increasing debt as a result of the fall of 
oil prices, the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (Acción Democrática) introduced a neoliberal 
package of structural reforms (Lander, 2005). These reforms were not well received by the 
popular classes who had come to rely on the state for basic survival and had only minimal 
connections to labour unions and the protections they typically offer. As Lander (2005) notes, the 
introduction of these reforms and the social economic decay that ensued as a result triggered a 
decline in the legitimacy of the political system (p. 27). This crisis of legitimacy was first evident 
in the 1989 popular rebellion known as el Caracazo. It is in the context of this social unrest that 
the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200, or 
MBR 200), a clandestine military-political organization formed by Hugo Chávez, performed a 
failed coup in 1992 (Maya, 2008). 
After receiving a pardon for his involvement in the attempted coup, Hugo Chávez (1999-
2013) launches a successful presidential campaign and becomes president of Venezuela in 1999. 
His electoral victory officially ends the 40-year-old Punto Fijo pact and starts Latin America’s 
pink tide. At first Hugo Chávez seeks to reverse some of the neoliberal measures applied by the 
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previous governments and becomes an outspoken critic of the policies of the Washington 
Consensus. However, following the 2002 attempted coup on his government, Hugo Chávez takes 
a radical turn and by 2005 is openly calling for a transition to socialism in the country (El 
Troudi, 2005). It is out of this context that the Chávez government begins to actively promote the 
popular economy and the Socialist Production Enterprises (SPEs). In other words, unlike ERTs 
in Argentina, which continue to struggle to find expression within the state, SPEs are a 
workplace experiment created by the state. However, in comparison to Argentina, the 
Venezuelan state historically had considerably weaker links to the labour movement. As such, 
the SPEs represent a continuation of ambitious state led development projects of the ISI period. 
However, this time, because of the participatory role of communities and workers, this form of 
development takes a less magical and more endogenous character. 
Brazil’s process of modernization began primarily under the leadership of Getúlio Vargas 
in the 1930s. In power first as a revolutionary leader turned dictator (1930-1945) and then as 
elected President (1951-1954), he adopted nationalist policies and a pro-labor stance with a 
corporatist character (Wiarda, 1990; pp. 179-180). His policies and those of his first successor, 
Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951), led to the development of the country’s social security, health 
care and transportation systems (Wiarda, 1990, p. 180). Brazil’s economic development was 
intensified in the 1950s under the leadership of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961). During this 
period, ISI policies were particularly effective. They created or expanded a range of dynamic 
industries, including automobile, shipbuilding, steel and petroleum (Tavares, 1964, p. 18), as 
well as led to the creation of universities, highways and airports (Wiarda, 1990, p. 1981). 
However, ISI policies soon faced heavy inflationary pressures and growing social unrest, leading 
to the 1964 military coup. 
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Through technocratic and often brutal rule that opened the country to foreign investment, 
the dictatorship achieved dramatic levels of economic growth, an achievement often referred to 
as the ‘Brazilian Miracle’ (Weisskoff, 1980). However, the oil shocks of the 1970s brought the 
miracle to an abrupt end and the dictatorship began taking steps toward a return to democracy, 
notably, through the introduction of a multi-party system (Wiarda, 1990, p. 1984). It was in this 
context that the PT began to emerge as an umbrella for a number of socialist groups, the labour 
movement and the Catholic Church’s liberation theology wing (Wiarda, 1990, p. 185). Although 
unambiguously a socialist party, the PT was highly novel. As French and Fortes (2005) note, the 
PT’s brand of socialism went beyond the social democratic and Leninist tendencies, relying on a 
participatory, bottom-up approach with a mass base (French and Fortes, 2005). Using this 
approach, the PT became central in the struggle against the dictatorship, which officially ended 
with the victory of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) in the 1985 
general elections (Wiarda, 1990, p. 1985). 
Although making important electoral inroads at the municipal level in 1989, the PT, led 
by Lula (2003-2011) failed to make sufficient gains at the national level. In the 1990s the 
governments of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992)15 and Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1994-1998) would move to consolidate the neoliberal model that was spreading throughout the 
region. However, the failure of the neoliberal model coupled with corruption scandals helped the 
PTs popularity grow over this period. This occurred as the PT moved closer to the center. As a 
result of these shifts, Lula, in his third attempt at the presidency, went on to win the 2002 
elections with a decisive 61.3 per cent of the vote (Samuels, 2004). Thus, in 2002, Brazil, now 
led by a former union leader in the Latin America’s largest leftist party, joined the ranks of the 
                                                
15 Fernando Collor de Mello resigned in 1992 and his Vice President Itamar Franco succeeded him until 
1995. 
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region’s pink tide. Under the leadership of Lula (2002-2010) and then Dilma Rousseff (2010-
2015), the PT would become the dominant political force in Brazil for a decade and a half. 
Although the PTs adherence to the neostructural framework lead to significant 
improvements in a variety of social indicators, the limits of the model would slowly unravel, 
particularly following the 2008 economic crisis. It is out of this context that the 2013 free transit 
movement would emerge. The transit movement, the largest in a generation, became a critique of 
the neoliberal continuities in the PTs management of the country. However, like Argentina in 
2001, the transit movement was also a critique of the political system more broadly, evident in its 
desire for new forms of the democracy. The difference is that in the case of Brazil, the transit 
movement emerged in the context of a left government that, unlike in Argentina, had instituted 
sufficient progressive labour measures to appease its union base. This helps explains why the 
transit movement emerged exclusively in civil society, while resistance during the 2001 crisis in 
Argentina, in contrast, also featured the workplace, taking the particular form of ERTs.  
Chile’s first attempt at implementing ISI policies came in the 1930s, under the 
government of Arturo Alessandri (1932–1938). These took the form of deficit spending, public 
projects, and protections and support for industry and landowners (Silva, 2007, p. 72). These 
policies gained greater cohesion during the period between 1938 and 1952, during which the 
Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Chilean Development Corporation, or CORFO) was 
created.  Through CORFO, the state acquired greater control over the economy (Sigmund, 1990, 
p. 207) and Chile successfully developed a variety of non-traditional manufacturing sectors, 
including textiles, chemical products and metallic products (Silva, 2007, p. 73). From 1952 to 
1964 development policies shifted gears toward a more market friendly approach, particularly 
during the government of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) (Sigmund, 1990, p. 201).  
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However, the government of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) shifted gears again to a more 
progressive development approach, including the partial nationalization of US-owned copper 
mines, the passing of aggressive land reform legislation and the implementation of government 
programs for marginalized sectors of the country (Sigmund, 1990, p. 203). The surprise victory 
of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) in 1970 meant the radicalization of development policies under 
the framework of an eventual transition to socialism. In practice this meant the full 
nationalization (via confiscation) of US-owned mines, aggressive wage rises coupled with price 
controls and the encouragement of open class conflict (Sigmund, 1990, p. 209). This experiment 
would come to an end with the 1973 US backed coup against Salvador Allende, which installed 
Augusto Pinochet as dictator. 
As is well documented, Augusto Pinochet’s brutal and murderous regime reversed the 
policies pursued by Salvador Allende and imposed a neoliberal program of the most aggressive 
kind (Wiarda, 1990; Grandin, 2006; Klein, 2007). In the process, the dictatorship decimated the 
labour movement and existing leftist parties, successfully reconfiguring the country’s left for 
decades to come (Drake, 2003). The neoliberal shock to the country was backed by a new 
constitution, passed in a fraudulent plebiscite in 1980 (see: Wiarda, 1990; Pastor, 2004). The new 
constitution had a highly authoritarian character that gave strengthened powers to the military 
(Pastor, 2004). In addition, it imposed a binominal electoral system that would favour the right in 
an eventual return to democracy (Pastor, 2004). Nevertheless the constitution also contained 
provisions for a possible return to democracy via a plebiscite in 1988 (Wiarda, 1990, pp. 218-
219). The collapse of the economy in 1982 triggered a wave of mobilizations by diverse sectors 
of society, leading to the rejection of continued military rule in the 1988 plebiscite. Democracy 
officially returned to Chile in 1989 with the election of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) of the 
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Christian Democratic Party (which formed part of the Concertación  coalition) to the Presidency 
(Wiarda, 1990; p. 219). 
For the next 20 years the Concertación ruled Chile under a system of free elections yet 
remained hampered by the continuation of Augusto Pinochet’s 1980 constitution (one of 
Augusto Pinochet’s conditions for ending the dictatorship) (Pastor, 2004). Not surprisingly, 
despite using a new rhetoric of social justice and inclusion, the Concertación only managed 
minor changes to the neoliberal model, what would slowly evolve into neostructuralism (Leiva, 
2008). It is in this context that the first signs of the student movement began to emerge, fully 
materializing in 2011 under the Conservative neoliberal government of Sebastián Piñera. Put in 
this context the student movement’s demands for free, public education and political reform can 
be understood as a direct critique of the neoliberal legacy of Augusto Pinochet still present in the 
country. Given the decimation of the labour movement under Augusto Pinochet, it is not 
surprising that this challenge to neoliberalism would emerge primarily from civil society. 
Furthermore, because of how deeply neoliberalism was institutionalized in the state, the student 
movement targeted the state much more directly than the more autonomous Brazilian transit 
movement, even when both shared an overall critique of the political system. 
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Chapter 3: Argentina's Worker Recuperated Enterprises: 
Redefining the Peronist Class Bargain 
One of the countries to embrace most fully the neoliberal promise of progress and 
modernization was Argentina in the 1990s. During that decade, under the leadership of President 
Carlos Menem and his successor, Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2011), Argentina became nothing 
short of the poster child for the ‘Washington Consensus’. Closely following the advice of the 
World Bank and IMF, the reforms applied in the country included the well-known neoliberal 
recipe of deregulation, privatization and labour market flexibilization. However, the neoliberal 
reforms went further than other cases in the region, featuring the so-called ‘convertibility plan’, 
which pegged the Argentinian peso to the US dollar. 
Although at first the neoliberal reforms acquired some legitimacy in the country, 
stabilizing inflation and generating growth, by the late 1990s, their contradictions became 
evident. Unemployment, poverty, and debt soon spiraled out of control. Wages fell and growth 
began to slow down, as capital began to exit the country (Carranza, 2005; Vilas, 2006). Urban 
centers were particularly affected. For example, in Buenos Aires, precarious employment rose to 
40 per cent by the year 2000, while the combination of unemployment and underemployment 
affected 36.4 per cent of the workforce by 2001 (Patroni, 2004, p.111). In other words, rather 
than putting Argentina onto a path of progress and modernization, neoliberal ‘structural 
adjustment’ became a new form of  ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003, 2010). 
As the country plunged into a crisis, signs of unrest began to emerge. At first, this unrest 
came primarily from sectors outside the traditional labour movement, large sections of which 
paradoxically had come to support Carlos Menem’s reforms in return for selective economic 
incentives (Fair, 2008). One of these new movements was the piqueteros, unemployed workers, 
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who showed their discontent by regularly organizing road blockades through community 
organizations (Dinerstein, 2003b, 2013; Campione and Rajland, 2006). 16 By late 2001, it 
became clear that the system was broken. In an attempt to prevent the financial system from 
collapsing, savings accounts were frozen by the government (an event known as el corralito). 
This triggered widespread anger among the middle classes who began organizing cacerolazos 
(banging of pots and pans). On December 19 and 20, people from wide sectors of Argentinian 
society poured into city squares, resulting in mass demonstrations and an insurgency-like 
environment that some began to describe as akin to the Paris Commune of 1871 (Moreno, 2011). 
It was out of this political environment that the now famous demand, ‘que se vayan 
todos’ (they all must go), was produced. This demand, aimed at all of Argentina's established 
political class, succeeded in toppling five presidents in less than two weeks. The result was that a 
power vacuum was created in the state, one that was eventually filled with the election of Néstor 
Kirchner as president in 2003. In the meantime, asambleas barriales, popular neighborhood 
assemblies, began to pop up all over the country (Dinerstein, 2003a). Through them, people 
began to self organize, often forming clubes de trueque, barter clubs, to meet people's everyday 
material needs (Cassano et al., 2003). 17 In other words, in reaction to the collapse of the 
neoliberal edifice and the shock of dispossession, people began to find alternative forms of 
organizing economic and political life. 
Although the popular assemblies and barter clubs became relatively short-lived 
experiments, other initiatives proved more sustainable. The most durable of these became the 
Worker Recuperated Enterprises (Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores or ERTs). ERTs 
                                                
16  It is worth noting that, as Benclowicz (2011) shows, the piquetero movement first emerged in a more 
localized form as early as the late 1980s. 
17 As with the piquetero movement, the clubes the trueque preceeded the 2001 crisis, but were greatly 
intensified during that period (Hintze, 2003). 
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are worker cooperatives that were previously traditional capitalist firms. Typically, these firms 
were unionized and formed part of the Peronist labour structures. In other words, unlike other 
new forms of resistance that emerged during this time period, ERTs emerged from the core of 
the Peronist labour movement. During the crisis, these firms were abandoned by their original 
owners, most of whom were facing bankruptcy, leaving workers out of a job and often out of 
months of unpaid wages.  
With the immediate goal of ‘recuperating’ their livelihoods, workers at these firms 
decided to take over their workplaces. In other words, the factory takeovers became a way for 
workers to challenge dispossession and avoid joining the growing ‘reserve army of labour’ in the 
country. Borrowing a page from the landless workers movement in Brazil, their slogan became 
‘occupy, resist, produce’. As worker cooperatives, ERTs are managed by the workers themselves 
under the principle of ‘one person, one vote’. This makes ERTs unusual examples of collective 
property in the context of a capitalist market. Because of this, ERTs exist in a legal gray zone in 
relation to the liberal conception of private property in Argentina, are therefore under the 
permanent threat of eviction. As we will see in the following Chapter, this is quite different from 
the case of Venezuela in which the state is actively promoting similar workplace experiments. 
Closely following the growing unemployment, poverty and business closure rates, the 
number of ERTs in Argentina increased rapidly after 2001, extending across a variety of sectors, 
including service, manufacturing and construction (Vieta, 2014). Many ERTs had a long and 
important history in the country. For example, in the 1980s, Zanon was one of Latin America's 
most important ceramics factories. Similarly, Hotel Bauen was one of Argentina's most luxurious 
and well-known hotels when it opened in 1978. In many cases, these businesses were originally 
started with the help of the state who provided the private owners with, for example, donated 
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land and/or generous loans. However, many of these loans were never repaid, as owners found 
various financial loopholes to avoid repayment. 
In taking over their workplaces, workers had to struggle against not only the former 
bosses and the state, but also often their own unions who, when push came to shove, either sided 
with the bosses or remained indifferent to the demands of workers. Although the number of 
ERTs is relatively small, the movement has garnered broad support in Argentina. People began 
to see the movement as a feasible solution to the problem of unemployment, and a better 
alternative to state welfare programs. The best and most up to date figures put the number of 
ERTs at 314 with a total workforce of 13,462, continuing a trend of strong growth since 2001 
(Ruggeri, 2014).18 Nevertheless, ERTs continue to represent a tiny fraction of Argentina's 
economy. 
In this Chapter, I argue that ERTs articulate forms of democracy and inclusion that 
radically depart from the fragmentation, division and alienation of the traditional capitalist firm 
as it developed in Argentina. In doing so, ERTs express the latent powers of what Marx calls ‘the 
collective worker’ and therefore prefigure an alternative to capitalism within the capitalist 
present. However, to adequately understand these transformations, it is important to put them in 
the context of capital-labour relations in Argentina. This, in turn, demands a basic understanding 
of Peronism and how it became the most important political force in the country during the 
postwar period. 19 As will be seen, this allows us to understand the ERT movement as more than 
strictly a workplace movement, but one that attempts to redefine the Peronist class bargain from 
below. For these reasons, the ERT movement is an example of a post-capitalist struggle. 
                                                
18 Other figures are more optimistic. The Ministry of Labour estimates there are 350 ERTs in Argentina, 
while la Unión Productiva de Empresas Autogestionadas, one of the ERT associations, puts their total workforce at 
25,000 (“En Argentina hay 350”, 2013). 
19 The term Peronism is a reference to Juan Domingo Perón, President of Argentina from 1946 to 1955 and 
1973 to 1974. 
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The Peronist Class Bargain 
In their classic and highly influential work on the origins of Peronism, Miguel Murmis 
and Juan Carlos Portantiero (2011) argue that at the core of Peronism was an alliance between 
the dominant and subordinate classes in which the state played a crucial mediating role. 
Importantly, for the authors, this alliance was the result of the strength of the organized working-
class rather than its weakness. In other words, rather than seeing Peronism as an example of how 
the working class can be co-opted and manipulated by a political elite (a competing 
interpretation to this date) Murmis and Portantiero (2011) saw it as the outcome of workers 
looking to forward their own interests. Indeed, central to the authors' argument is that significant 
working-class mobilization preceded Juan Perón, demonstrating that Peronism was more the 
result of, rather than the cause of working-class action and organization. 
As Murmis and Portantiero (2011) show us, although the labour movement in the 1930s 
was well organized and maintained a great degree of autonomy from the state, it nevertheless 
failed at winning their central demand for higher wages. Their gains came later, once Juan Perón 
became Minister of labour following the military coup in 1944. For example, as Peter Snow and 
Gary Wynia (1990, p. 138) note, under Juan Perón’s influence, union membership in the textile 
and metal sectors rose dramatically between 1943 and 1946. Not surprisingly, by 1946, the 
labour movement began to see Juan Perón as their opportunity for making further economic and 
political gains. 
With the arrival of Juan Perón to Argentina's political scene, a particular relationship 
between the state and the working class began to develop. For the working class, this was based 
on the real gains they had begun to make, gains which re-vindicated workers' long-held demands 
and values of dignity and hard work. For example, as Murmis and Portantiero (2011) tell us, on 
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the eve of the 1946 elections, the country's biggest union, Confederación General de Trabajo 
(CGT), defended the political direction Juan Perón had taken as labour Minister, stating that: 
Working conditions, housing, health, workday and compensation positively 
improved for large masses of workers in the sugar and forestry sectors in the 
northern provinces and territories; many thousands of workers in the various 
industries in the capital and surroundings obtained, with the tenacious support of 
the Confederación General de Trabajo, substantial improvements for a life of 
greater well-being and dignity (p. 163). 
Similarly, the Partido Labourista (Workers Party), expressing the most radical section of the 
labour movement at that time, and an important political force that supported Juan Perón's 
presidential campaign, stated in its Declaration of Principles (approved in 1945): 
That the Argentinian nation, within its representative and republican form of 
government, should ensure to all of its inhabitants the greatest well-being that is 
compatible with the times, the immense richness of its prodigal land and the 
exemplary spirit of work and sacrifice of its working population. (“Documentos”, 
1945) 
Once elected president in 1946, Juan Perón continued to deliver gains for the working 
class. As highlighted by Hugo Gambini (1983), affiliates to the CGT's retirement fund increased 
from 300,000 to 3.5 million between 1944 to 1949, social benefits were extended to all unions, 
not only those linked to the state, and collective agreements were reached under an industrial 
union model, rather than one merely based on profession, as was previously the case (p. 37). 
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Reflecting on this crucial period in Argentinian history, Viviana Patroni (2004) accurately 
summarizes: 
As in no other country in Latin America, Peronism granted the working class a 
political homogeneity and organizational capability that transformed it into a key 
political actor. Equally important, Peronism provided the terms around which the 
notion of a more socially just capitalist development persistently and consistently 
found expression. (p. 94) 
However, there was a flipside to the political homogeneity acquired by the working class. 
First, because the workplace (and therefore unions) was largely male-dominated, women could 
not as easily gain access to the benefits made available by the state. This system was different 
from, for example, the social democratic model of universal benefits that emerged in Europe. 
The result was that patriarchal social relations were further entrenched in the Argentinian 
working class, as women found themselves having to access social benefits primarily as 
dependents of men, rather than independently through paid labour, a reality that continued in 
subsequent decades (Gimenez, 2005, p. 46). Secondly, labour unions developed a highly insular 
approach to organizing, failing to develop connections with the unemployed or precarious 
workers. In both cases, the degree of separation within the working class, what Lebowitz (2006b) 
calls the ‘x-factor’, was increased, facilitating the accumulation of capital during Peronism. 
In addition, organized labour paid a price for its newfound political and economic status. 
Once elected president in 1946, Juan Perón quickly moved to dissolve the three party coalition 
that brought him into power, including the staunchly independent Partido Labourista (Workers 
Party). In doing so, Juan Perón successfully incorporated labour into the state's hierarchical 
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structure, marginalizing its most critical elements. In addition, although Juan Perón provided the 
institutional mechanisms for further organizing the labour movement, he did so using a top down 
militaristic model. As he told rail workers at one of their assemblies in 1943: “The best union, 
the most well organized guild is us, the soldiers, and I recommend you go in this direction so that 
you [the labour movement] can achieve the cohesion and the strength that we [the soldiers] 
obtained” (Gambini, p. 27). 
In other words, the particular arrangement between the working class and the state in 
Peronism consisted of a range of quantitative gains for workers, which organized labour had 
been (without success) fighting for since the 1930s, coupled with increased institutional strength 
for the labour movement. In return, the working class would give up a certain degree of political 
independence as political decisions became concentrated within the top down and pseudo-
militaristic structure of the Partido Unico de la Revolución (Single Party of the Revolution), 
what later became the Partido Peronista (Peronist Party).  
Juan Perón's vertical approach was heavily criticized by the liberal opposition in 
parliament, often comparing Peronism with Naziism and totalitarianism. According to Gambini 
(1983, p. 82), Juan Perón would typically respond to these accusations by the opposition with 
comments such as: 
The new politics is to be of truth and of work. There are few naive people left in 
our country. We have to act with new patterns, more honorable and more modern 
ones. I have asked all Argentinians, even our adversaries, to look at reality. If they 
continue in their old procedures, they are going to end up without people. The 
people have reached the age of majority and don't want politicking nor nonsense, 
but rather want real and effective work for their benefit. 
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Do not reduce this to simply a confrontational approach from a military strong man. What is 
most important about this typical comment, is that in justifying his top down approach, Juan 
Perón makes an appeal to ‘real and effective work’, an appeal his working-class base would 
immediately understand as a re-vindication of their historic demands and values which stand in 
sharp opposition to the ‘politicking’ and ‘nonsense’ of previous governments. However, in 
appealing to the already existing values held by workers, Juan Perón also re-articulates them, 
adding a strong element of hierarchy and verticalism inspired by his military experience. 
In short, Peronism was neither mere manipulation of the working class to support a 
movement against its own interests, nor was it an expression of a revolutionary working class 
that wanted to do away with capitalism. It was a class alliance (albeit a tumultuous and unstable 
one) based on a particular bargain. For the working class, at the core of this bargain was the re-
vindication of their deeply held value of work as a dignified human activity. In practice, this 
meant that workers increasingly looked to the state to guarantee a number of specific demands, 
namely high levels of employment, rising standards of living, and a degree of political influence 
over national politics.20 
Hence, we can understand the 2001 crisis as the result of the complete breakdown in the 
country's historic class bargain, one that was driven by neoliberal state policies (from above) for 
over two decades. This means that the ERT movement is not only a specific workplace reaction 
to the dispossession generated by structural adjustment, but also a broader reaction (from below) 
to the unmet expectations generated by neoliberalism. Lastly, although a worker movement, the 
ERT movement challenges the organizational structures and politics of the Peronist labour 
movement, a movement that had been both greatly weakened by neoliberalism and effectively 
                                                
20 Although beyond the scope of this work, these demands and expectations held by workers could be 
thought of as what Thompson (1971) and Lebowitz (2012), in different contexts, describe as the "moral economy.” 
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coopted by Carlos Menem. From this perspective, we can understand the practices and goals of 
the ERT movement, as embryonic as they remain, as an attempt to not only redefine the 
workplace, but indeed also Argentina's political economy. However, as we will see, the 
movement remains politically ambiguous about what this means exactly, with sections of it 
retaining an allegiance to classic Peronism, and other sections looking to build something 
fundamentally new. 
Redefining the Peronist Class Bargain from Below 
As discussed above, one of the key features of Peronism is that although workers made 
important gains, they did so under the highly vertical and bureaucratic structures of the union 
movement and the state. One of the most important features of ERTs is that they break from the 
verticalism of the past by organizing themselves on the basis of participatory democracy. In 
addition, participatory democracy also challenges the social relations of the traditional capitalist 
enterprise, fostering new values, such as collective responsibility, collective management, and 
freedom. These findings are consistent with the recent work of Marcelo Vieta (2014) who 
describes ERTs as ‘transformative learning organizations’ for their capacity to transform 
subjectivities through a process of informal learning.  
However, the ERT movement does not confine itself to the workplace. ERTs are spaces 
that also look to the state for support and recognition in a manner consistent with the history of 
Peronism in the country. In other words, the demands and struggles of the ERT movement 
traverse the state. Given this, rather than thinking of ERTs as examples of value struggles, Real 
Utopias or cracks in capitalism, we can think of them as attempting to redefine the Peronist class 
bargain. This suggests the need for a clear political strategy in Argentina, one that neither the 
autonomists nor the Real Utopias framework are capable of capturing or providing. Indeed, as I 
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will discuss in the conclusion, sectors of the ERT movement are at the forefront of building a 
new political party that brings some of the values and practices of the ERT movement into the 
state. For its capacity to transform the workplace and make incursions into the existing state 
structures through clear political strategies, the ERT movement is therefore best thought of as a 
post-capitalist struggle. 
Challenging Union Bureaucracy 
Before taking over their workplaces, ERT workers had to, in many cases, challenge their 
own unions.21 Many of these unions had historically formed part of the bureaucratic and top 
down Peronist structure and, as noted above, had come to collaborate with Carlos Menem in the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms. As Dario Rosales (Interview 23), one of the workers at 
Hotel Bauen, put it: "The union worked for him [the owner]. It put itself at the service of what he 
[the owner] said.”22 Dario explained how every time a worker went to the union office with a 
complaint or a grievance, the union would not take any action, telling the workers to "take what 
you can get" because the business is not in good shape. The message from the union was clear: 
don't complain and just be happy that you have a job. Then, when the hotel filed for bankruptcy, 
Dario continued, the union simply administered the bankruptcy without putting up a fight. 
However, what became most shocking to the workers was that they spotted union 
representatives sneaking into the hotel late at night taking couches and other furniture. It was at 
this moment, Dario explained, that workers realized that they were never going to be 
compensated for what they were owed, and were able to overcome their fears and take the 
                                                
21 Although it should be noted that in recent years better relations between unions and the ERT movement 
have developed (Itzigsohn and Rebón, 2015). 
22 To protect the identity of research participants, names used throughout the text are pseudonyms except 
for public figures. 
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decisive step of occupying the hotel. In other words, their decision to recuperate the hotel was 
inspired as much by the actions of the owner as those of the existing union structure. 
It was a similar case at Maderera Cordoba, a woodworking shop and retail outlet in 
Buenos Aires. When I asked Mateo Pérez (Interview 27), one of the workers there, if there 
existed a union in the shop before the takeover, he said: 
Yes, but here unions are not very effective for certain things… They [the 
woodworkers] were affiliated with the woodworking union and us [administration 
and sales] were affiliated with the commerce union, but they never made 
themselves present. They literally erased themselves during the bankruptcy. The 
only ones that helped were [the people from] the movement of recuperated 
enterprises (Interview 27). 
Hence, in both the cases of Maderera Cordoba and Hotel Bauen, the old union structures 
were part of the problem and ultimately had to be replaced by new organizations that represent 
recuperated factories.23 
A somewhat different situation took place at Zanon. When I asked Raúl Godoy 
(Interview 20), one of the workers there, to tell me how he became politically active within the 
plant, he expressed the difficult political climate he confronted when he was hired in the early 
1990s. As he explained, the employers didn't allow the workers to express any political views or 
join any groups. If the business found out that workers were involved in any political activities, 
Raúl continued, they would simply get fired. Making reference to Argentina's return to 
                                                
23 The two organizations representing recuperated factories in Argentina are called Movimiento Nacional de 
Fábricas Recuperadas (National Movement of Recuperated Factories) and Unión Productiva de Empresas 
Autogestionadas (Productive Union of Self Managed Enterprises). 
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democracy in the early 1980s, he sums up the workplace atmosphere at the time: "it was formal 
democracy outside but inside the plant there continued to be a dictatorship.” I then asked him if 
the union helped the workers through this situation. His response was: 
No, the union was a ‘yellow union’. It was the opposite. The union collaborated 
with the owners. They signed productivity agreements, signed downsizing 
agreements, ‘restructuring agreements’ as they were called. But, they always gave 
the arguments of the owners: "The business can't, we have to tighten our belts.” 
They also pinpointed the more rebellious workers and they would give them [the 
owners] this information... for them [the union] it was normal. [They saw 
themselves] as a serious and responsible union... So, we organized against the 
owners and the union (Interview 20). 
At first, Raúl continues, organizing was difficult. Workers often met in secret and 
political discussions often took place in the context of broader conversations about music or 
sports. Indeed, workers organized a football league, which became essential for having political 
discussions. After years of this, workers were able to organize a slate to run against the existing 
union leadership. The union and the owners responded aggressively: 
When there was going to be elections at the internal commission and the union 
heard something, that there were people that were organizing, there were mass 
firings. 38 workers [were fired], the ones they [the union and the owners] 
calculated were the most dangerous (Interview 20). 
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However, unlike other cases in which workers, facing a hostile union, simply began to 
organize outside of the union, in the case of Zanon, workers organized within the union and 
eventually completely transformed it. Indeed, for Raúl, transforming the union was an essential 
step toward taking over the factory later on.  
Workplace Democracy 
As takeovers began to spread in Argentina after 2001, workers found themselves having 
to reorganize their workplaces and forming worker cooperatives. This means that workers 
suddenly became collective owners and directly participated in the decision-making at their 
workplaces. For the overwhelming majority of workers interviewed, the experience of running 
the workplace collectively is what they value most about their cooperative. Not surprisingly, as 
Andrés Ruggeri (2014) notes, the assembly is the most important decision making mechanism at 
ERTs. For example, when I asked Eliana Carbajal (Interview 11), a worker at Zanon, what the 
purpose of her cooperative was, she told me that it was to demonstrate to the whole of the 
working class that they could run the workplace without exploiting one another. Curious as to 
what exactly this meant in practice, I asked her to expand. 
Eliana proceeded to immediately highlight the process of participatory democracy. She 
explained that, when big decisions need to be made, production is stopped and all workers join 
an assembly, which can sometimes last for one or two days. For less important decisions, weekly 
or biweekly assemblies of one or two hours are organized. During the assemblies, workers put 
forth motions, openly discuss them and then vote. Motions with the largest number of votes 
carry.24 Finally, workers also get together by sector of production (i.e. quality-control, packing, 
shipping etc.). As she explained, every sector has an elected coordinator and once a week 
                                                
24 This is typical of how decisions are made at the ERTs I visited. 
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coordinators of all the sectors get together to discuss and try to solve a particular problem. These 
meetings are open to all workers. This is important because, as she explained, every worker 
should have access to all of the same information. 
Also highlighting the process of participatory democracy, when I asked Magali Súarez 
(Interview 26), a shipping person at Maderera Cordoba, to compare her current experience as a 
cooperative member to her previous job at a traditional private firm, she said: 
I prefer a cooperative, it's more complex. It's a lot of responsibility, but it's good. 
It's easier to work with a boss, and make good money [at a traditional firm], but 
you don't make any decisions, or participate in absolutely anything. You only do 
your work, put in your hours and behave as best as possible. We do the same 
thing here but it's more complex because the responsibility is bigger. Even though 
there's a directive committee that makes most of the decisions, the rest of the 
cooperative members vote them in and the most important decisions are decided 
by all. Not the everyday decisions because then it would be a permanent meeting 
and nobody can live like that either. But basically, the most interesting part is the 
decision-making process (Interview 26). 
I also asked two of Magali's coworkers the same question. Mateo responded by saying: 
Before things were more centered on the managers. Without exception there was 
a manager of sales... a workshop manager, which exists now also but now the 
workshop manager is simply one more of us… He is not a boss. There's no boss. 
He has the responsibility and obligation of organizing work, but he's also one of 
us (Interview 27). 
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Similarly, Claudio Salinas (Interview 25) stated: 
This [the cooperative] is much better. There is no comparison because before you 
had to work with a manager… You were under the orders of the manager. It's not 
the case now... there is no manager on top of you that is looking at you and 
bossing you around. There is a coordinator [now]. He coordinates work. He gives 
you a paper that says you should do this and that. But he's not going to make 
demands of you. He's not going to be behind you looking at you [telling you that] 
you should do it faster (Interview 25). 
Eliana, from Zanon, also appreciated the new found freedom of working without a boss. 
When I asked her if participatory democracy was a good way to manage the workplace, she said 
that there definitely are problems and things can be difficult and tiring sometimes, but that it had 
important benefits. For her, the greatest benefit was the satisfaction of meeting an objective or 
changing an attitude without anybody being “behind you with the whip.” She then compared 
what work and life was outside of Zanon with the way it is now. She said: 
I've seen what the world is like outside, I know the injustices. It is not fair that 
they oppress us in this way and that they take arbitrary decisions... firing a person 
without justification, as if we were merely numbers and nothing else. Here, no! 
Here you have all the possibilities. We've had compañeros that have gotten 
themselves in difficult situations.25 They have damaged machines... But if 
he...recognizes his responsibility and he is willing to change, we give him the 
                                                
25 There is no English word for compañero. Its meaning is somewhere between friend and partner. 
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possibility. For us the compañero is not a number... he is a compañero, a person. 
He has feelings. Behind him he has a responsibility with a family (Interview 11). 
Similar themes were brought up in a focus group by female workers I spoke with at Hotel 
Bauen (Interview 22). I asked them to compare their experience before the take over with their 
experience now, and one woman said: "It's a big change because we wouldn't be drinking mate26 
at this time [Approximately 10 a.m.].”  Another woman jumped in: "You couldn't walk around, 
you had to stay in your section.” Then, the first woman clarified that even though they have the 
freedom to drink mate whenever they want, if there was a big workload, they wouldn't be 
drinking it. For her, the point was that they were the ones who decided. "Nobody comes and give 
you orders,” she said. In contrast, "If you're under a boss, they come and they suspend you for 15 
days.” 
I then asked the focus group about some of the advantages and disadvantages of running 
an enterprise by assembly. The third woman said it was a great advantage to work through an 
assembly because that's how people got to know each other, and how different people think. 
Under the boss, they explained, they had no right to have any opinions. "The boss says no, and 
it's no,” she explained. In contrast, she continued, under self-management "anyone can give their 
opinion and express what she feels and sees." 
Learning New Values and Capacities 
As workers began to organize themselves and run the workplace collectively, they also 
unleashed a process of learning through which they began to acquire new values and 
subjectivities that counter the fragmentation, division and competition of the traditional capitalist 
                                                
26 Mate is a popular Argentinian beverage usually shared among friends. 
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workplace. These include democratic management, collective responsibility and freedom. For 
example, I asked Mateo at Maderera Cordoba what was the most valuable thing he had learned at 
the cooperative. He said: 
Coexistence and the challenge to carry forward an enterprise amongst ourselves. 
One was always accustomed to working with the boss. One would arrive, work, 
meet the required hours and leave. Here you have a responsibility. If a sale is lost, 
you're also losing what's yours. For us it was a big shock, for example, I had never 
worked in a cooperative (Interview 27). 
I asked Magali, also at Maderera Cordoba, the same question and she said: 
The most valuable thing I learned is that something that appeared impossible to 
me, works. That's what I value the most. Imagine that one day this cooperative 
didn't exist anymore, it has demonstrated that even though they tell you that you 
are dumb, that you weren't born to manage anything, that you come from a low 
class, when you have drive and are decent you can do things better than anybody, 
especially those that aren't decent [the previous owners]. Because sometimes you 
can make a mistake because of something you didn't know. That's one thing. But 
it's another thing to do something wrong on purpose [another reference to the 
previous owners]. We don't owe a penny to anybody, we don't owe any taxes, we 
have everything up to date. There are few enterprises that can say that (Interview 
26). 
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I then asked her what the most memorable thing during her time at the cooperative was. 
Her answer highlights the learning that occurs when different opinions are shared: “The fights... 
between members, not fights, discussions. The different points of view. You learn to look at 
things from a different side… Not only your point of view. When you are listening to two 
compañeros that are arguing, perhaps both are right” (Interview 26). 
At Hotel Bauen, I also asked the two women of the focus group what the most valuable 
thing they had learned at the cooperative was. One of them said, "Being free, totally free. I'm not 
your boss, and you're not mine. Working in freedom.”  Another woman interjected, "being free 
and being responsible for what we're doing."  The first woman then explained that although you 
still need to be responsible under a boss, you have to be even more so in the cooperative because 
"if you do something wrong it hurts everybody, and if you do something right it benefits 
everybody, and we are always thinking about that (Interview 22)." 
Puzzled by how exactly they regulate the amount of work and effort each person puts in, 
I asked them to explain this point. One of the women responded: “whoever finds himself having 
to work more, works more, and whoever finds themselves having to work less, works less." Her 
coworker interjected: "that's why I say the responsibility belongs to each person. One knows if 
they find themselves having to work more or less.” In other words, unlike traditional workplaces, 
in which work is regulated by an outside force (the boss), in this cooperative, work is regulated 
by each individual person who nevertheless has the whole of the cooperative in mind. In other 
words, there's a sense of collective self-regulation that was developed. 
Nevertheless, as I was told by one of the workers at the Hotel, there are cases where 
people feel others lack a certain amount of discipline. Some people sometimes arrive late to work 
or don't show up. These types of issues are worked out at the assemblies. Indeed work discipline 
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is one of the most heated issues, with older workers sometimes complaining that newer workers 
aren't pulling their weight. When I asked them how the assembly dealt with these situations, they 
said that they haven't found a solution that works for everybody and that ultimately people vote 
and the majority wins. In other words, in the cases where a more informal method for regulating 
work is not sufficient, the assembly becomes the space where specific guidelines or sanctions are 
developed and workers learn a collective sense of responsibility. 
At Zanon, Eliana brought up a similar theme. When I asked her how success is measured 
at the factory, she explained that like all companies they have production and sales targets, but 
that the most important thing was a sense of collective motivation among workers. She explained 
that sometimes one worker will become extremely negative and that this negativity can become 
contagious. But then when that worker changes his attitude and becomes more motivated, that is 
a sign of success. For her, that change has to do with the process of dialogue in the factory in 
which everybody shares their views and opinions freely. I then asked her if she ever works more 
than is expected from her. She said: "Always." I then asked how this is different from the 
pressure to overwork that is endemic in traditional capitalist firms. She responded, "for me, it is 
different because I do it out of conviction. So for me it is a pleasure, not an obligation.” In other 
words, it is herself, not a boss, who decides her work rhythm. 
Another interesting feature of ERTs is that they sometimes implement work rotation 
schemes, which allow workers more freedom to switch positions within their workplace. 
However, it is important to recognize that the existence of work rotation that goes beyond the 
normal patterns of a traditional capitalist workplace is relatively limited (Ruggeri, 2014). 
Nevertheless, when workers do establish more flexible job duties, they can learn new skills and 
abilities that break down the typical division of labour found in capitalist firms. For example, at 
  102 
Zanon, although workers join the cooperative to fulfill a particular vacancy at a given sector, 
once this happens, they sometimes move around to different sectors. For example, Eliana began 
in production doing manual labour and now works in the prensa (press) sector doing more 
political work. 
Similarly, she noted how Raúl and Alejandro López (Interview 21), two of her 
coworkers, began doing manual labour and also went on to do work in the press sector. 
However, as Eliana told me, political positions are to be rotated and therefore both Raúl and 
Armando are now back working in production sectors. When I asked Eliana if she liked this 
option to rotate positions, she said:  
I like it because first of all I always like to learn, to learn something new. Then, I 
think it's excellent that we have a great deal of capacity as humans and we 
demonstrate it by doing different labours. We are not machines that have to do the 
whole day and every day of our lives the same thing. We are human beings 
(Interview 11). 
Given how transformative the experience of working in a cooperative has been for many 
workers, it is not surprising to find that they have developed a strong commitment to their jobs. 
For example, I asked Magali at Maderera Cordoba if she would switch jobs if she found one that 
paid her more, even if it wasn't a cooperative. She said: "No. It depends. Neither yes nor no. 
They would have to offer me something concrete. No, I don't know." Her doubt is certainly 
telling of how important the cooperative experience has been for her. Others are less doubtful. In 
the focus group at Hotel Bauen, I asked the same question I asked Magali. This time, the answer 
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was a resounding no. The three women preferred the freedom of not having a boss to a higher 
income.  
Indeed, the women told me of several people who had left the cooperative for jobs that 
paid more, in one case triple the amount they made at the hotel. All of them, they told me, came 
back to work at the cooperative, often citing tight workplace control as the main grievance at the 
other jobs. Eliana, from Zanon, was also firm in her commitment to stay at the factory. When 
asked if she would leave the cooperative for a higher paying job, she said: "I think that not 
everything is money. Money doesn't give you happiness. If one sells one's ideals for money, it 
doesn't lead anywhere." Indeed, her plan is to become a lawyer and use her knowledge "for the 
benefit of the working class" while remaining a worker at Zanon. 
Inclusivity 
As with the industrialized world, the typical capitalist workplace in Argentina during the 
post-war era was divisive and exclusionary in two important ways. First, it was male-dominated, 
meaning women were largely excluded from the workforce or were relegated to lower skilled 
and precarious work. A second feature of the Peronist workplace was that labor unions became 
highly insular, mostly working within the state's vertical structures and failing to reach out to the 
broader community. An important aspect of ERTs is that they take meaningful steps to address 
these two forms of division and exclusion.  
First, as Vieta (2014) notes, ERTs display a fusion of community and enterprise and this 
is why an ERT is often referred to as a fábrica abierta (open factory) (p. 206). On the gender 
front, ERTs give women the freedom to combine work responsibilities with parental ones, 
helping to redefine the limits between the workplace and the home (Fernández Alvarez and 
Partenio, 2010). In addition, the participation of women in the initial struggle gave them a new 
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sense of empowerment that challenges machismo in the workplace (see also Dicapua and 
PerBellini, 2010).27 
Focusing first on the topic of gender, my interviews revealed how many women had 
acquired a new sense of empowerment through their experience at ERTs. For example, I asked 
Magali, from Maderera Cordoba, if she had experienced machismo or had any difficulties 
participating at her cooperative in which only 4 out of 19 workers are women28. She answered 
with a confident voice: “No. If they have machismo, I feel sorry for them. We are four real 
bitches here. There is no problem with that [machismo]. We are a small minority here...but I 
never felt discrimination of any kind...Really, we are all equal here!” (Interview 26). 
I asked the same question to the focus group at Hotel Bauen, and one woman responded: 
"At the beginning yes they [the men] tried...but we wouldn't let them. We told them, we are 
women and we are fighting side-by-side with you…let's struggle together. "I'll tell you,” she 
continued, "women are always more fierce than men… It comes from the family because in the 
family it's always the woman that takes the household forward. It's rare that a man takes care of 
the household." She then explained how she was able to use her skills and knowledge of running 
the household to run the cooperative. "It's the same thing,” she said. 
I then asked them whether under self-management they had established new benefits for 
women. One of the women explained how the cooperative provides much more flexibility for 
women. For example, women can freely leave work in the middle of the day to pick up their 
children from school and then later come back to work again alongside them. Although this 
flexible arrangement for women does not address the broader sexual division of labour in which 
                                                
27 This in no way means that the challenges associated with traditional gender roles and divisions inside the 
workplace have disappeared at ERTs. Indeed, as Peréz Bancalari et al. (2008) argue, women’s experience of 
patriarchy and empowerment appear to co-exist inside ERTs. 
28 This gender distribution is typical of the ERT movement as a whole. As Ruggeri (2014) notes in his latest 
study, 75per cent of ERT workers are male.   
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it is women rather than men that are responsible for childcare, it nevertheless does encourage 
women to enter a traditionally male workplace. In contrast, under a boss, their children weren't 
allowed in the hotel. Before, if women had to be with their children, for whatever reason, they 
had to take a day off work. Not only did they lose pay for this, they also faced a ‘latent danger’ 
of being fired. As one woman put it, "with a boss, they always try to find a motive to fire you."  
 When I asked Eliana, from Zanon, what difficulties or challenges she might have 
encountered as one of 40 women in a factory of 400, she told me that machismo does exist at the 
plant. Although many workers, she continues, have developed progressive ideas about gender 
relations, not everyone has.29 Before, there were fewer women at the factory, she told me. During 
those days, many men saw the role of women as staying at home taking care of the children, 
while the men engaged in politics. She then told me a personal incident she experienced: 
One day a compañero said to me "what are you speaking for, your husband used 
to hit you and you just shut your mouth.” Then I told him, "You know what, 
you're right, but he was my husband, and I let him do that because I loved him. 
But now, no! That ended. I am no longer that person. I am changing and I will 
continue to change.” So, it's difficult but it's made easier when you have 
compañero that have a different logic of thinking, and they support you and give 
you encouragement (Interview 11). 
In addition to finding supportive compañeros, women at the plant formed a committee dedicated 
specially to addressing their needs. Through that committee, women instituted ‘women's day’, 
which gives all women at the plant a paid day off. 
                                                
29 Indeed, at several of the break rooms I visited at the plant, the walls were covered with sexually explicit 
posters of women. 
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In addition to fostering a more inclusive environment toward women, ERTs are much 
more open to the broader community than the traditional unionized workplace. For example, 
when I asked Eliana if she feels that the factory is truly hers, she said that she does, but that it 
was not a sense of personal ownership, but a collective one. "I even feel that [the factory] 
belongs to the community, which supported and sustained us so that this factory could go 
forward,” she told me. As she explained, many people come to Zanon to buy products simply 
because they support workers management, even if they live very far. "There is a value people 
put in us." 
Indeed, a few days later, a community member told me that when he got his house re-
tiled a few years ago he went out of his way to go to Zanon. He even had to drive back-and-forth 
several times to get all the tiles he needed, even though it wasn't close to where he lived. He told 
me he believed in Zanon because after the 2001 crisis, they were the only ones that demonstrated 
a realistic alternative. In recognition of this kind of community support Zanon receives, workers 
have made it a political priority to support communities. For example, on a monthly basis, the 
plant donates ceramics to hospitals, libraries and community centers. As Eliana explained, there 
is one person at the factory whose job is to visit various communities and assess their level of 
need so that adequate donations can be made. In addition to donations, she continued, the factory 
opened a high school (bachillerato popular) that is open to the public and aimed at reaching poor 
and marginalized communities. 
Opening the high school wasn't easy, however. As Eliana explained: "It was a struggle 
that we had to undertake because first we had to fight [with the government] to get the high 
school and then we had to make it open to the community, because they [the government] 
wanted it to be only for the ceramics workers, but we said no: If the plant is open to the 
  107 
community, then the school must also be." It was the same case in Maderera Cordoba, which 
donated part of its space to a group of progressive teachers who volunteered their time to run a 
high school program open to the community. For its part, Hotel Bauen donates space for 
community meetings and often allows workers from other recuperated factories to stay at the 
hotel for free during particular events. 
The State 
As they redefine the workplace, ERTs also continue to look to the state for support and 
recognition, a theme largely overlooked or de-emphasized in empirical studies of ERTs. Workers 
continue to look to the state partly because of the precarious legal status many ERTs continue to 
exist in, which has resulted in numerous eviction threats by the government. More broadly, many 
workers continue to believe that the state, as it had done during the Peronist era, should do its 
part to guarantee the dignity and well being of the working class. This sentiment reflects, not 
only the historical expectations of workers about the state, but also their profound connection to 
work as a dignified human activity.30 For example, in discussing what the goals for the 
cooperative are at the moment, Milagro Aguero (Interview 22), from Hotel Bauen, said: 
Our struggle today is because we want this to become ours. Being able to win the 
expropriation is very difficult but today the state is working toward this. I hear 
their president [Cristina Kirchner] talk about cooperatives something that before 
wasn't mentioned. As I said, I'm a Peronist, they [my colleagues] are Kirchneristas 
[Laughs]. So, you hear talk of cooperatives, they [the government] visits us. One 
feels a bit flattered by the fact that the government is [paying attention]. But we 
                                                
30 For similar findings about how ERT participants understand their relationship to work, see Itzigsohn and 
Rebón (2015). However, the authors don’t detect, as I do, that workers’ views about work are in turn connected to 
specific demands and expectation of the state. 
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have that thing that the work is ours but the building is still disputed (Interview 
22). 
I then asked her what exactly was being ‘recuperated’ when they took over their 
workplace. Her answer was, "the culture of work.” She then explained what this meant by telling 
me how when she was a kid she always wondered why her mother used to always keep the 
dining table very clean and organized. One day, she continued, her mother explained: 
This [table] is life. We eat here, we drink mate here...This part of the table [the 
top] is the powerful people, the ones who have money, the business people. And 
this table leg is the working class, the worker who works and provides for a 
country. This part [the top] doesn't work without this [the leg]... Never forget that 
you belong to this part [the leg] (Interview 22). 
Maria Fornari (Interview 22) then told me how some time ago the cooperative had a 
discussion with members of a Maoist organization. The visitors made the suggestion that perhaps 
workers at the hotel should start engaging in armed struggle. She told him: "Here, we don't hold 
machine guns. We hold vacuum cleaners, pens, trays, forks…what we have here is a productive 
revolution.” Then, she affirmed to me: "the only flag we uphold is the culture of work."  
Maria then began to reflect on the events of the 2001 crisis, a deeply traumatic event for 
workers, which, as noted above, marked the complete breakdown of the Peronist class bargain. 
She commented: 
I thought it was like a puzzle that wasn't going to be put together, and well at that 
moment a person appears [Néstor Kirchner] who didn't have all the solutions, he 
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wasn't mandrake the magician. He was a person, a citizen. A citizen with 
progressive ideas, with good ideas, with a political history that well…like I 
explained to you about the Pope, If the Pope gave communion to Videla it doesn't 
matter to me because I saw that he got covered in mud taking out a poor child out 
of a slum (Interview 22).31 
The sentiment here is clear. Like the Pope, Néstor Kirchner was not perfect. However, for 
Milagro, Néstor Kirchner played an important role in getting Argentina out of the crisis. She and 
many of her coworkers looked to Christina Kirchner, successor and widow of Néstor Kirchner, 
for recognition and support. 
Then, as if to emphasize her point even more, Milagro showed me a piece of paper with 
some words written on it. "We wrote it down because we really feel it,” she told me. She read the 
words out loud to me: "In moments like these, in which one's work is valued, recognized, it is 
when one recognizes that so much effort is not in vain.” These words belong to Raquel Morales, 
an independent artisan in a social enterprise in the city of Moreno. They were Morales' response 
upon receiving the news that it was her mate that the president gave the Pope during their first 
meeting in Rome on March 21, 2013. Morales' words are vintage Peronism, reflecting the deeply 
held belief among the Argentinian working class that work is to be valued and that the state is to 
guarantee the dignity and well being of workers. Milagro keeps that piece of paper with Morales' 
words in her wallet. 
                                                
31 Jorge Rafael Videla was an Argentinian military dictator between 1976 a 1981. He was sentenced to life 
in prison for crimes against humanity. Soon after the Argentinian born Jorge Mario Bergoglio became Pope, a 
photograph of him giving communion to Videla circulated the internet. This picture was proven to be a fake. 
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Political Organization and State Transformations 
I began this Chapter by discussing how neoliberal policies of dispossession created the 
context out of which the ERT movement emerged in Argentina. I then situated the ERT 
movement within the history of Peronism in the country. During the Peronist phase, I noted, 
Argentinian workers came to expect that the state should guarantee high levels of employment 
and increasing standards of living. From this perspective, we can understand Argentina's 2001 
crisis as a complete breakdown of the Peronist bargain, one that paradoxically was facilitated by 
significant sections of the Peronist union movement. Thus, we can understand the emergence of 
ERTs as an attempt to redefine the Peronist bargain from below by creating new forms of labour. 
Indeed, my research on ERTs shows that they are spaces in which people develop new values 
and subjectivities that counter those of capital and breakdown the bureaucratic and vertical 
structures of the Peronist era. These include collective responsibility, equality and freedom. In 
addition, ERTs are highly democratic and inclusive spaces that take steps to promote gender 
equality and community participation.  
My research also shows that workers continue to look to the state for support and 
recognition, be it to acquire full legal ownership of the cooperatives or to re-vindicate the 
importance of working-class values in Argentinian society. This latter point, the re-vindication of 
working class values (‘the culture of work’), can be contrasted to the case of Venezuela, in which 
the labour movement, and the culture of work more generally, have historically taken a back seat 
to the rentier culture based on oil revenues. In addition, the ERT movement’s yearning for state 
recognition and support means that the relatively diffuse strategic approaches presented by 
autonomism and the Real Utopias Project are not fully adequate to the ERT movement. What the 
case of the ERTs show is that the state needs to be at the center of strategic discussions about 
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how to forward an alternative to capitalism in the country. Indeed, if ERTs are to ever grow 
beyond small islands in a sea of capitalism, the state will need to take concrete steps to nurture 
them. 
Unfortunately, under the Kirchner administrations (2003-2015), the Argentinian state did 
little to support ERTs. Indeed, although adopting a neostructuralist development model that 
breaks from the orthodox neoliberal policies of decades past, Kirchnerism maintained a 
commitment to labour precarity as a strategy for accumulation (Féliz, 2012). Not surprisingly, 
the help the state gave ERTs usually came in the form of small, temporary subsidies and worker 
education. The biggest change at the level of the state was the modification made to the national 
bankruptcy law in 2011, which is supposed to make it easier for workers to form a cooperative 
and continue running a business in situations where the original owner is threatening bankruptcy. 
However, this has not helped already existing ERTs that continue to face challenges to their legal 
status. In addition, the new bankruptcy law, as Ruggeri notes, has benefited prospective ERTs in 
merely 10 to 20 per cent of disputed cases (2014). In other words, ERTs, both already existing 
and prospective, continue to face a highly precarious legal status. For this reason, Hotel Bauen 
continues to put forward its central demand that the state fully expropriate the business from its 
previous owners and hand it over to the workers to manage. 
In an interview with Marta Firelli (Interview 29), head of the government team 
responsible for supporting ERTs at the national level,32 I asked what she thought of Hotel 
Bauen's demand for expropriation. She said that her team is there to provide ERTs with legal 
assistance, education and even small subsidies, but that "expropriation was impossible,” as that 
                                                
32 The government agency responsible for providing support to the social economy sector is Instituto 
Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social (National Institute of Asociativism and Social Economy). Within this 
government body, a specific team was created that works only with the ERT sector, an initiative from the Crisitina 
Kirchner government. 
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would require changing the constitution. These kinds of limits the ERT movement faces at the 
level of the state means that the movement will have to build the political capacities needed to 
make inroads into the existing state structures in order to transform it. This is the central strategic 
task if the ‘impossible’ can be made possible. This task raises key political challenges. As Anna 
Popovitch (2014) notes, the key question dividing the Argentinian left in the 20th century 
became whether to ‘deperonize’ the masses, or join the masses in their embrace of Peronism (p. 
207). This research suggests that the ERT movement continues to struggle with this question. 
Indeed, although challenging the vertical structures that made up the Peronist class bargain, 
many ERT participants, as my interviews revealed, continue to politically identify with some 
version of Peronism.  
However, a politics beyond Peronism is also evident in the movement. The most 
important example of this comes out of Zanon. As Raúl Godoy (Interview 20) and Alejandro 
Lopez (Interview 21) outlined, for a number of years, Zanon has been at the forefront of building 
a new ‘political grouping’, as it is called, which now consists of an alliance of three radical 
political parties in the province of Neuquén. Going by the name, Frente de Izquierda y de los 
Trabajadores (Workers Left Front), the organization won a single seat in the provincial 
legislature in 2011. Further electoral gains were made in the 2013 legislative elections, where the 
Workers Left Front achieved historic results throughout the country. Although a Trotskyist party 
wanting nothing to do with Peronism, the Workers Left Front does not hold to the Leninist line 
of smashing the state. Their goal is rather to use the state to mobilize the working class and 
further the demands of the ERT movement. 
What's most innovative about this political initiative is that it borrows from the values of 
the cooperative movement. For example, the single seat at the provincial legislature in Neuquén 
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is rotated among the three parties that form the alliance. So far, two workers from Zanon have 
held the seat, Raúl Godoy and Alejandro López. In addition to wearing their traditional worker 
slacks at the legislature, their salaries are capped to that of a worker at Zanon. The rest of the 
money goes to a ‘struggle fund’. The point of this, Raúl explained, is to avoid being co-opted by 
the state. Through these initiatives, the transformations achieved by ERTs within the workplace 
are extended within the state structures, helping to erode the division between mental and manual 
labour incarnated in the state. Put differently, Raúl Godoy and Alejandro López are 
embodiments of a new merging unity between politician (intellectual labour) and worker 
(manual labour). 
The efforts of the Workers Left Front in Neuquén are important because they show that it 
is possible to think of radical political parties that break from the top-down models of the 20th 
century. In other words, this political project is not simply a nostalgic attempt to re-create a 
Peronist class bargain of decades past, but rather an attempt to redefine it by transforming the 
state from below. This is why I consider it a post-capitalist struggle. Indeed, in Argentina, it is 
this kind of political initiative, drawing on the experience of the ERT movement, that becomes 
strategically central if an alternative to capitalism in the country is to one day fully emerge. 
Although in Argentina the cooperative movement is still struggling to find expression within a 
state that is committed to labour precarity, the case is different in Venezuela. As we will see in 
the next Chapter, the Bolivarian state, as part of its strategy to build 21st century socialism, is 
actively promoting cooperative workplace experiments. 
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Chapter 4: Human Development and Class Struggle in Venezuela’s 
Popular Economy: The Paradox of ‘21st Century Socialism’ 
In protest against the incoming economic package developed by the administration of 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez, in 1989, thousands of Venezuela's poor climbed down from the 
country's barrios and into city centers. With its epicenter in Venezuela’s capital city of Caracas 
and surrounding popular neighbourhood, this event, now known as ‘el Caracazo’, became the 
region's first mass insurgency against the now familiar neoliberal policies of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003). This popular rebellion, which ended with the death of up to 
thousands of poor people to the hands of police repression (Martínez, 2008), intensified a 
political process that nine years later would see the election of Hugo Chávez to the Venezuelan 
presidency, an event that marked the beginning of the country’s Bolivarian Revolution and the 
region's ‘pink tide’.33 
As with many of the pink tide countries, Venezuela experienced positive changes in 
many social indicators, particularly during approximately the first decade of Chavismo.34 Data 
from the United Nations Human Development Reports shows that, for the period between 2001 
and 2009, Venezuela experienced a meaningful decrease in inequality and, according to some 
figures, had the lowest Gini index value in the region (Eastwood, 2011, p. 6). Furthermore, 
poverty and unemployment rates, although fluctuating considerably at times, have continuously 
declined in Venezuela since Hugo Chávez took office, as public and social spending as a 
                                                
33 As Maya (2008) notes, although el caracazo was a crucial moment in the rise of Hugo Chávez as the 
leader of the country’s Bolivarian Revolution, this process began in 1983 with the formation of Movimiento 
Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200, or MBR 200), a clandestine military-
political organization that Chávez helped form. 
34 However, as Maya (2014) notes, although accurate data for the last few years is not available, there has 
likely been a recent deterioration of social indicators as a result of inflation and currency devaluation. 
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percentage of GDP have increased (Weisbrot, 2011, pp. 204-205). Central to these changes has 
been the creation of a number of anti-neoliberal social programs geared toward helping the 
country’s poor, most notably the country’s community-based social ‘missions’ in areas including 
health care and education (Parker, 2005; Alvarado Chacín, 2009; López, 2012; Motta, 2013). 
However, Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution stands for more than just anti-
neoliberalism. Since 2005, Venezuela’s government and supporters have been openly embarked 
on a project to transition into what they call ‘21st century socialism’ (El Troudi, 2005). In 
contrast to examples of 20th century socialisms, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union, that 
emphasized the formal socialization of the means of production via centralized state power, at 
the centre of the Bolivarian Revolution is the goal of developing ‘popular power’, that is, power 
at the level of both workplace and community. This is to happen through the country’s social or 
popular economy, comprised of a variety of new democratically run organizations and 
institutions, including cooperatives, communal councils, and co-managed enterprises (El Troudi, 
2005).  
This new transition to socialism is conceptualized by Lebowitz as a triangle that includes 
social ownership of the means of production, social production organized by workers, and 
production for social needs and purposes (Lebowitz, 2010). For Lebowitz, 21st century socialism 
is therefore centred on the concept of human development through praxis, whereby people 
simultaneously change themselves as well as their circumstances, to paraphrase Marx’s third 
thesis on Feuerbach (Marx and Engels, 1970). In other words, socialism does not drop from the 
sky, but is rather a process of destroying the old while building new human beings (Marx and 
Engels, 1970, p. 64). Central to this process is democracy in production through experiments in 
self-management and co-management. Through these initiatives, Lebowitz continues, people can 
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draw upon their hidden human resources and capacities and begin to eliminate the division 
between mental and manual labour so characteristic of the capitalist workplace (Braverman, 
1974; Burawoy, 1985). 
Similarly, Víctor Álvarez (2007), one of the central figures within the Venezuelan 
government promoting the popular economy, understands co-managed enterprises as key to 
transforming capitalism in Venezuela, allowing the human being to reach their full potential 
through productive activities imbued with social meaning and communitarian values (p. 19). 
Also supporting this view, Gregory Wilpert (2007) conceptualizes Venezuela’s social-economy 
initiatives as the embryo of a new socialist state characterized by the emerging values of 
participatory democracy, solidarity and social justice. For her part, Marta Harnecker (2010) 
points to organizations, such as the communal councils, as constituting a new state that begins to 
be born from below (p. 62).  
This takes us to the other key aspect of 21st century socialism, namely the role of the 
state in the process of transition. For many supporters of the Venezuelan process, the state is 
understood in a Poulantzian manner, as the articulation of class forces. It therefore differs from 
both the Leninist and autonomist strategies outlined in earlier Chapters. Hence, Lebowitz (2005) 
argues that acquiring state power in order to transform the state is central to a transition to 
socialism. For him, the can and should be used to fight capital by building counter-power 
through it (p. 228). Following this view, George Ciccariello-Maher (2007) conceptualizes 
Venezuela’s state-supported popular economy as the basis of a popular power that represents a 
new form of dual power. Ciccariello-Maher argues that the Chávez government is the direct 
outcome of popular power from below as expressed in the 1989 uprisings of el Caracazo, the 
Bolivarian Circles and pro-Chávez mass mobilizations. Hence popular-economy initiatives, such 
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as the communal councils, can be thought of as forming the basis for dual power in spite of the 
fact that they are state-supported. In other words, in a reformulation of Lenin’s classic concept, 
in Venezuela, dual power is occurring through the state, and not against it.  
From here, debates tend to centre on what the relationship should be between the state 
and the new state-supported popular institutions. Ellner (2010), for example, argues for a strategy 
that reconciles the two dominant political strains within the Chavista movement, namely the 
‘realists’, who call for a gradual transition to socialism via market incentives, and the ‘cultural 
optimists’, who demand an immediate transition through popular-economy experiments. 
Harnecker (2010) goes even further, arguing that, in Venezuela, it is now possible to speak of a 
transition to, rather than a struggle for socialism, and that the goal is to develop a 
complementary, rather than a conflictual, relationship between the old state structures and the 
new (p. 62). 
Others supporters of 21st century socialism are more critical. For example, Carlos 
Martínez et al. (2010) highlight the need for grassroots struggles against “a corrupt and 
disempowering bureaucracy” as a way to fight “the errors and deviations” (pp. 7-8) in the 
Venezuelan process and “the legacies of the old regime” (p. viii). Similarly, Iain Bruce (2008) 
understands the tensions that exist between popular-economy organizations and the government 
as an inherent antagonism between the new democratic institutions and the old state (p. 138). 
Although these authors do better in highlighting the importance of struggles by workers and 
communities against the government, they nevertheless fall short of conceptualizing them as 
class struggles per se, an important point I will come back to later. 
Having outlined what I take to be the two innovations of socialism in the 21st century, 
namely an emphasis on human development and a Poulantzian approach to state theory and a 
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transition to socialism, this Chapter will present research on Venezuela’s popular economy, 
specifically its Socialist Production Units (SPUs). As co-managed enterprises, SPUs are an ideal 
case study for critically assessing how 21st century socialism is developing in Venezuela. I argue 
that Venezuela’s state-supported popular economy is a site of human development. As such, it 
expresses a sharpened class contradiction, not only challenging the dominant values of capital, 
but also articulating new ones, such as cooperation, solidarity and active participation. In other 
words, Venezuela's popular economy is an example of a post-capitalist struggle, allowing us to 
see a glimpse of a future post-capitalist society being built within the present. 
 Importantly, Venezuela’s popular economy is also a site riddled with class struggle in 
which the state emerges as the central barrier to overcoming the class relation. Herein, lies the 
paradox of 21st century socialism, namely that the Venezuelan state simultaneously opens spaces 
for human development, and entrenches the class relation. I proceed by providing a brief 
historical background to Venezuela’s popular economy, and institutional outline of my case 
studies. I then present qualitative data on three of Venezuela’s SPUs. I conclude with a brief 
discussion that reflects back on the main concepts and debates presented above, and provides 
some strategic and theoretical implications. 
From Cooperatives To Socialist Production Units 
Although the presence of cooperatives in Venezuela has been strong since the 1960s, 
since the Chávez administration took office in 1999, there has been nothing less than an 
explosion of both worker and consumer cooperatives. According to Camila Harnecker, in 1998, 
there were 877 cooperatives, while in September 2006 that number grew to 158,917 (2007). 
However, since then, many of the cooperatives that were the first to be formed were discovered 
to be non-functioning or simply fronts created for the purpose of accessing government funds. 
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Some were also traditional businesses operating under the legal framework of a cooperative in 
order to avoid taxes, while others were created by sections of the government for the purpose of 
outsourcing in order to avoid the higher labour costs associated with hiring workers directly into 
the public sector. Still others may have been started by people with good intentions who were not 
able to find adequate support from the government (Graterol and Díaz, 2007). In 2008, the 
estimated number of active cooperatives was between 30,000 and 60,000 (Harnecker, 2007). The 
cooperative sector is governed by the Ley General de Asociaciones Cooperativas y su 
Reglamento (General Law of Cooperative Associations) and is supervised by the 
Superintendencia Nacional de Cooperativas (National Superintendence of Cooperatives, or 
SUNACOOP). 
Venezuela has also witnessed the appearance of Factory Recuperated Enterprises or 
Empresas Recuperadas por sus Trabajadores (ERTs), a phenomenon that, as discussed in the 
previous Chapter, began in Argentina during its 2000-2001 economic crisis. ERTs began to 
appear in Venezuela between 2002 and 2003, with their numbers reaching a total of between 20 
and 30 by 2006 (Lucena and Carmona, 2006; Vieta and Ruggeri, 2009). Most of these ERTs, 
Lucena and Carmona outline, are small or medium in size, employing a total of a few thousand 
workers. ERTs, they note, surged as a reaction on the part of workers and the government to the 
political and economic crisis that the country was undergoing in 2002 and 2003, in which many 
owners, for political reasons, decided to temporarily paralyze their businesses. These actions 
conducted by the business sector coincided with the government opposition’s attempt to paralyze 
the country’s economy in order to oust Hugo Chávez from power.  
Once the crisis was averted, the government began to take a greater interest in ERTs and 
began expropriating contested enterprises, such as Industria Venezolana Endógena de Papel 
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(INVEPAL) in 2005 Lucena and Carmona, 2006). That same year, the government also hosted 
the first Latin American Encounter of Worker-Recovered Enterprises, attended by 400 workers, 
unionists and government representatives from several Latin American countries (Vieta and 
Ruggeri, 2009, p. 30). However, since then, the ERT fizzled away, having witnessed ongoing 
conflicts between workers and the state bureaucracy, as has been the case with INVEPAL since 
2006 (Lucena and Carmona, 2006; Rodriguez, 2006). 
What is important to note is that, in contrast to the Argentinian case, the huge overall 
growth of cooperatives in Venezuela during the last few years, as Harnecker (2007) notes, has 
been the result of official public policy. This is reflected in, for example, the 2001 Special Law 
of Cooperative Associations and the Vuelvan Caras (About Face) cooperative-development 
government program. The proactive role the government has taken in relation to the cooperatives 
is also evident in its economic support for the sector, which includes substantial financing ($1 
billion between 2003 and 2008), preferential aid, tax exemptions, increased access to 
government contracts, logistical and political assistance, and education (Llerena, 2006; Díaz, 
2006; Graterol and Díaz, 2007; Azzellini, 2011). Lastly, in contrast to ERTs in Argentina, 
Venezuela's cooperative sector was never embedded in the structures of the already existing 
labour movement. In other words, cooperative members in Venezuela are not former unionists, 
but rather previously unemployed or precarious workers from diverse backgrounds. 
 However, in the last two years, due in part to the problems associated with the 
cooperative sector mentioned above, there has been a shift in government policy from supporting 
the traditional cooperative model toward the creation of what are known as Unidades de 
Producción Socialista or Socialist Production Units (SPU). This shift has also been a product of 
the government’s progressive move toward the left, going from an anti-neoliberal stance toward 
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openly socialist politics (El Troudi, 2005). In addition, their development has been posited by the 
Venezuelan government as central to the country’s transition to 21st Century Socialism. Indeed, 
Hugo Chávez’s 2012 campaign proposal called for an increase in the number of Empresas de 
Propiedad Social (Social Property Enterprises) to 30,000 by the year 2019 (Chávez, 2012). 
However, this seems highly optimistic given that in 2008–2009 the number of SPUs was 
somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000 (Albert, 2008; Azzellini, 2011).  
In sum, SPUs are specific state-led response to the crisis created by neoliberalism. This 
contrasts the case of Argentina’s ERTs, which emerged from below with no state support. In 
addition, although a workplace initiative, SPUs, unlike ERTs, have no links to the country’s 
labour movement. SPUs therefore represent a continuation of Venezuela’s history of 
(over)ambitious state led development projects from above. Yet, it simultaneously attempts to 
depart from this history, as it relies on the active participation of workers and local communities. 
Socialist Production Units: Institutional Features 
SPUs are small to medium enterprises dedicated to the production of goods or services. 
At an institutional level, SPUs are state-owned, non-profit and managed democratically by a 
combination of their workers, local communities and the state. At the production stage, SPUs 
work closely with small and medium-sized local private producers. The goods they produce are 
then distributed through Mercal and Producción y Distribución Venezolana de Alimentos 
(Venezulan Food Production and Distribution or PDVAL), state-run discount stores located 
throughout the country. The support the state gives SPUs is perhaps most evident in what can be 
called a ‘triple subsidy’: workers’ wages are well above the minimum; the inputs obtained from 
local small and medium producers are purchased at above-market prices; the goods produced are 
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sold at considerably below market prices through Mercal and PDVAL. This means that SPUs are 
‘in the red’, dependent on state funds to remain in operation.  
Each SPU is funded through the larger institutional bodies known as Empresas de 
Propiedad Social or Social Property Enterprises (SPE). In addition to funding individual SPUs, 
SPEs are responsible for their longer-term management, a point of contention, as we will see. 
SPEs, in turn, are funded through the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. or 
PDVSA, whose role is to help SPEs through, among other things, preferential contracts, and 
financing (PDVSA, 2006). This means that, to a significant extent, these enterprises are 
dependent on the sale of oil in the world market. In addition, each SPE is administered by a state 
corporation and receives political guidance from a corresponding government ministry. For 
example, the three SPUs in this study belong to one single state corporation, namely the 
Corporación Venezolana Agicola (Venezuelan Agrarian Corporation), recently absorbed by the 
Ministerio del Poder Popular de Agricultura y Tierras (Ministry of Popular Power for 
Agriculture and Land). 
Like a worker cooperative, decisions about many of the SPU’s day-to-day activities are 
made democratically by all of their workers through the SPU’s Workers’ Council, an assembly-
style political body based on participatory democracy. However, the state is also an important 
decision maker. Hence, at each SPU there exists at least one ‘coordinator’. This person is not 
democratically selected, but hired by managers working at the SPE level. This puts the 
coordinator in a position of having to answer to both the demands of workers and those of 
management, another source of conflict, as we will see. The third, and weakest, decision-making 
party are the local communities. These are comprised of communal councils, neighbourhood 
organizations that function on the basis of participatory democracy, and local producers. These 
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two constituencies participate in each single SPU through the Socialist Council of Participation, 
the local political body responsible for, among other things, nominating potential new hires into 
the SPU. 
Like all social-economy organizations, SPUs possess a social mission that is foundational 
to their existence. The SPUs’ social mission is complex, emanating from various government 
levels as well as from workers themselves (Empresas de Propiedad Social; Corporación 
Venezolana Agraria, abc). The government’s executive level provides the long-term vision, 
which has an internal and an external dimension. The internal dimension relates to key goals and 
principles of SPUs: non-alienated labour, no discrimination, no hierarchies, gender equity, 
adherence to labour rights (including a fair salary, the elimination of exploitation and access to 
social security), fiscal responsibility, and equality based on participation. The external dimension 
relates to the contribution of SPUs to Venezuelan society as a whole, and can be summarized as 
attempting to move beyond market relations while promoting local community development and 
participation. SPUs in the agricultural sector are also expected to contribute to the mission of the 
Venezuelan Agrarian Corporation, namely to achieve food sovereignty and avoid dependence on 
food imports. 
Human Development at Socialist Production Units 
In my study, I found three main areas of learning that reflect human development: worker 
and community needs; collective management and organization; and active participation, or 
‘protagonism’. Most of this learning was acquired through informal interactions or through 
participation in the Workers’ Council and its various committees (i.e. health, housing, food). 
These findings are therefore consistent with the human-development approach of supporters of 
21st century socialism. Consequently, SPUs, I argue, express a sharpened class contradiction, not 
  124 
only challenging the dominant values of capital, but also articulating new ones, such as 
cooperation, solidarity and production for needs. 
Worker and Community Needs 
Many participants reported that they learned a great deal about each other’s needs, 
particularly through their participation in the various committees of the Workers’ Council. For 
instance, one of the SPUs distributes food stamps (that can be used only in certain grocery stores 
and restaurants) to workers as part of their salaries. Marisa Magas (Interview 31), one of the 
workers, explained that her colleagues often did not know what to do with the food stamps 
because in the surrounding area it is difficult to find establishments to use them in. After careful 
examination and discussion, the food committee proposed that the SPU buy a certain amount of 
basic foodstuffs such as cooking oil and flour from one of the state-run discount stores, so that 
workers could use their food stamps right on location. Committees, then, are crucial spaces 
where workers can discuss their needs, consider options and propose actions. Indeed, the 
capacity to meet needs seems to be one of the most important functions of the SPUs. For 
example, when asked about how success is measured in her SPU, Yolanda Acosta (Interview 33) 
answered: “little by little we’ve been making progress. We have managed to satisfy many needs, 
family needs, personal needs and community needs.” 
Workers also reported learning about the needs of their communities, especially through 
the active role SPUs play in them. One of the central aspects of the SPUs’ social mission is to 
help communities in need. Marisa noted that one way in which her SPU fulfills this mission is by 
transporting the foods they and other SPUs produce to isolated communities that cannot access 
them. These often include staples, such as rice, pasta, fruits and vegetables. Where exactly the 
food is taken is often the decision of the communal councils, that determine which communities 
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are most in need. The communal councils then communicate this information to the SPUs 
through the regular dialogue that takes place between the two organizations. Therefore, as SPU 
workers service communities in this way, they begin to learn what their collective necessities are. 
In other cases, it is the communities in need that directly approach the SPU. As Yolanda 
revealed: 
Many people have come here [the SPU] asking for economic help and we have 
never turned our backs on them. Many times they have come after payday. ... few 
of us have enough resources but we always give something. It’s not a lot, but we 
do give them something. Those who come here [asking for help] never leave 
empty-handed. 
SPUs also have more formal means of helping the community. One SPU, for instance, 
provides an ambulance to anybody from the nearby communities that requests it. Another way 
participants learn about the needs of surrounding communities is through their SPU’s hiring 
process, which involves SPU workers, communal councils, and the state. Take, for instance, the 
case of Jorge Montiel (Interview 38), a candidate for a job at one of the SPUs. Several communal 
council representatives argued against hiring him because he did not live in the community 
immediately nearby, an important criterion established by the hiring committee. However, when 
they learned that Jorge was a young, single father of two and that the SPU’s Workers’ Council 
considered him an appropriate candidate for the job, they changed their minds and voted for him. 
To be fair, Jorge did possess many of the skills that the job required, contributing to him getting 
the job. But the important point is that the democratic hiring process allows for all parties 
involved to learn about the needs of community members and to listen to each other’s arguments. 
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For Jorge, the outcome of the process meant that he is now better able to meet the needs of his 
family. 
Collective Management and Organisation 
The second learning area most frequently mentioned by SPU workers was collective 
management and organization. Some reported that such learning helped them in reducing the 
rigid division between intellectual and manual labour found in traditional capitalist firms 
(Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1985), and in experimenting with a new social organization where 
people can contribute according to their own abilities. When we asked Enrique Machado 
(Interview 35) the most valuable thing he had learned, he said: 
Organization, that is, how to organize production and advance toward a socialist 
mode of production. A year and a half ago I had no idea what the Workers’ 
Council was or how it was going to be organized. Maybe I knew what I had read, 
that the Workers’ Council was a tool for moving toward worker self-management. 
But how it was to be organized, what was its function, what was collective 
planning ... I didn’t know, so this learning has been very productive (Interview 
35). 
Later in the conversation, Enrique expanded: 
Collective planning by the workers was not easy. It was a process that we 
acquired through sweat and tears. Even the discussions with management, the 
administration and the presidency in those days were difficult, but it was the most 
important accomplishment. That workers plan their own work, that workers arrive 
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on Monday to work already knowing what they are going to do and where they 
are going to do it ... because it was a product of their own intellect (Interview 35). 
Another outcome of workers learning to collectively plan and organize their own work, 
Enrique revealed, is decreased tension and conflict in the workplace: 
When some people make decisions and others have to execute them, of course 
sometimes I’m not happy. I disagree with impositions. They generate tension and 
conflict at work. From the time we began planning things collectively, these 
tensions have been eliminated. Because if I am working at the pool [washing 
tomatoes], or working in reception, this is the result of my decision, which I 
proposed and accepted in the assembly, or, if I didn’t propose it, perhaps 
somebody else did and I accepted (Interview 35). 
Learning to organize and plan collectively also helped to increase productivity. One SPU 
had to suddenly operate without a state coordinator because the government was reorganizing the 
whole management structure and was unable to find a coordinator for approximately six months. 
The workers dealt with the situation by having meetings and developing a strategic plan for their 
SPU. The results were impressive. When there was a coordinator, the maximum amount of 
tomatoes they had managed to process in a month was 90,000kg. Under self-management, the 
workers pushed this number up to 150,000kg. Juan Cortéz (Interview 36) commented on this 
experience: 
This gives a sign that indeed we can, and that this is the way it should be because 
this gives encouragement to workers, because we participate and stand behind 
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everything we do, and because we were part of the planning process. There is no 
need for ‘an enlightened’ one to come and decide things! Because that’s when the 
problems begin (Interview 36). 
Indeed, workers, through their own process of collective planning and management, have 
also learned to find leaders from among their own ranks, avoiding the imposition of ‘an 
enlightened’ leader from above. To give an example, Juan described democratic participation as 
‘a learning process’ that has allowed SPU workers to identify particular people demonstrating a 
high level of clarity to take on a leadership role, serving as ‘teachers’ that are able to explain 
things that sometimes others do not understand. Importantly, Juan explains, workers begin to 
recognize these leaders by putting aside skin colour, formal-education level and other superficial 
factors that often “do not let us see that a diamond in the rough exists among us.” These are 
people, Juan continues, that never had the opportunity to study but who have certain capacities 
that have been learned in the ‘school of life’. It is clear, then, that as workers learn to 
democratically and collectively plan and manage their workplace, organic leaders emerge, 
eliminating the need for an artificial boss. In the process, workers also learn to look beyond 
superficial divisions amongst them, therefore increasing their degree of unity, or ‘x factor’ 
(Lebowitz, 2006b). 
Active Participation, ‘Protagonism’ 
In recent years, the concept of ‘protagonism’ has become widely used in Venezuela and 
is an important part of the Chavista government discourse of 21st century socialism. The concept 
means being a protagonist, a leading figure or an active participant in the workplace, community 
or in any other space associated with the Bolivarian Revolution. In part, the concept and practice 
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of protagonism is meant to address the passive and often undemocratic character of social 
relations under twentieth century socialism, as well as the ‘contemplative’ character of the 
capitalist workplace (Lukács, 1968, p. 89). In addition, in the context of the popular economy, it 
can be interepreted as an attempt by the Chavista government to integrate sectors of society 
historically outside the formal sector into new forms of productive activity. Indeed, active 
participation or protagonism is another important area of learning being acquired by SPU 
participants. This learning is helping SPU participants challenge capitalist social relations, while 
fulfilling their mission to eliminate workplace alienation.  
One case that demonstrates the learning of protagonism is that of Alegre Ávila (Interview 
37). When I asked her what was one of the most important challenges she has experienced in 
terms of being able to fulfill her SPUs mission, she replied: 
Well, the challenge many times has been overcoming our stage fright because 
there are people who have stage fright. And there we have learned and continue to 
learn to move forward, to face people, to deal with people from the streets, to 
know them well ... that is something that is learnt every day (Interview 37).  
Later in the interview, I asked Alegre what was the most valuable thing she had learned 
while participating at her SPU, and her response was, “being a protagonist, that has been very 
valuable.” “How have you managed to learn this?” I then asked. She replied, 
Through my colleagues who tell me ‘you are good with words, you express 
yourself and try to reach people without humiliating them, without offending 
them. You think about the people, you speak very well what you want to say’. 
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And well I learned little by little. ‘I am not perfect’, I tell them. In high school and 
university I actually didn’t participate in anything (Interview 37).  
Alegre gives us further insights into her learning when discussing participation in the Workers’ 
Council: “Yes, we have assemblies here. People vote. Here we elect whoever wants to do 
something. We have had colleagues that did not want to participate in something, including 
myself, but here I am participating because in the end, one is convinced” (Interview 37).  
 
Juan Cortéz, one of Alegre’s coworkers, gives us more evidence of similar changes at 
their SPU. When I asked him if he had noticed any changes in the way democracy is practiced at 
his SPU throughout his time there, he replied: 
Yes, well look, we have seen many changes since we first arrived here. The truth 
is that when we arrived here there existed a ‘boss’ culture, exactly the same as any 
private company as such. Then, after we all began learning, reading, studying, 
interchanging ideas, debating, we have seen a radical change (Interview 36). 
The Spanish word Juan used to describe the ‘boss culture’ that existed at his SPU was 
‘Jefesismo’. Like ‘protagonism’, this is another popular word used in Venezuela to describe 
authoritarian-like relationships between people in a variety of circumstances, but especially at 
work. To expand, the word refers not only to the existence of an authoritarian boss but also to 
that of a docile and submissive worker. Therefore, the existence of Jefesismo implies a lack of 
protagonism on the part of workers. But, as Juan implies in his comments, Jefesismo no longer 
seems to be as much of a problem at his SPU.  
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As SPU participants learn to become protagonists, they begin to erode alienated 
workplace-relations in which workers are not the subjects of their production process but merely 
objects, or ‘abstract labour’. As noted above, this can be a slow learning process for SPU 
participants, but it is a powerful one capable of achieving, as Juan from Complejo Agroindustrial 
Socialista de Quíbor (CASQ) put it, “radical changes.” Radical changes are not the norm, 
however. At the other two SPUs I looked at, Tomas Montilla and Pedro Camejo, similar changes 
in this area of learning were more modest. At Pedro Camejo, for example, my observations 
clearly pointed to a continuing rigid hierarchy between the administrative staff and the rest of the 
personnel working in the fields as tractor drivers.  
Class Struggle at Socialist Production Units 
Another salient feature of SPUs is ongoing conflicts between workers and communities, 
and the state bureaucracy. As we will see, workers and communities find themselves struggling 
for, among other things, substantive equality, improved labour rights, deeper forms of workplace 
democracy and the elimination of the social division of labour. Crucial to emphasize is that these 
are fundamentally class struggles, rather than simply cases of ‘too much bureaucracy’, 
‘corruption’, or ‘legacies of the old state’ getting in the way of workers, as they are most often 
understood. This is not to say that bureaucracy and corruption are not also at work here, but that 
the class dimension of these struggles is most important. Also important to note is that only in 
one case did struggles resemble traditional union concerns (labour rights), while the rest were 
based on more radical demands that expressed a sharpened class contradiction at SPUs. In all 
cases, it is the state that emerges as the barrier to overcoming the class contradiction. 
Responding to my question of what would make her SPU more successful, Alegre Ávila 
gives us an initial sense of the differences that exist between workers and management: 
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Well, that management would unite with us. Because … for us to achieve the 
revolutionary process, we would have to be all united. Sadly we have different 
ways of thinking… you know about how what divides people is different thinking 
but I say that here we should all have the same thinking and that is to help your 
neighbour, and sadly the ones above [management] don’t see it that way. It is sad 
to say really (Interview 37).  
When I asked this participant what this lack of unity between the workers and 
management was all about, she replied that it was not about how the SPU related to the outside 
world but about its internal organization. Juan displayed a similar sentiment. When asked to 
comment about some of the challenges he has experienced as an SPU worker, he replied,  
Well, the first challenge as such is the organizational part that we have here at the 
SPU. It is what we’ve had since the beginning. It is a tough struggle. There is a 
great deal of bureaucracy in this country still. We have advanced a great deal but 
still within our institutions we see encrusted people, let’s not say people, but 
capitalist thinking… and they don’t seek to give power to the producers, workers 
and to all the organs to which this power should be given… [As a response to 
this] we have organized the Workers’ Council as such, and we are in struggle 
(Interview 36). 
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When asked to give concrete examples of how bureaucracy and capitalist thinking 
manifest themselves at his SPU, Juan once again reveals a tension between workers and 
management: 
Well here we see it a lot when a person refuses to discuss an issue with the 
workers and he simply goes to the boss. For example the workers decide on 
something at the assembly so then this person [one of the workers] goes and tells 
the boss, you see! So then the boss gives this person a contradictory order. That’s 
when the confrontations come and fortunately the workers have taken on a 
protagonist role in all of this (Interview 36). 
Interesting to note in this comment is that the scenario described very much resembles the 
divide-and-conquer strategies that are traditionally used by managers against workers in private 
firms. The main difference of course is that, formally, ‘the boss’ (the SPU’s Coordinator) 
responds to the state bureaucracy rather than to private owners.  
The conflictual relationship that sometimes exists between SPU workers and the state is 
also evident in the way management envisions the SPU’s relationship with producers. As 
Enrique Machado explains, his SPU is trying to develop a producer network that tries to 
incorporate the producers into the SPU. As he put it, “they [the producers] have to be a power 
within the plant [the SPU].” But the SPU’s management, he continues, has a technocratic vision 
that sees the relationship between SPUs and producers as simply a commercial, buy-and-sell one. 
And this technocratic vision, Enrique continues, “talks in the name of science” and puts “what is 
technical, what they learned in university, above the human.” 
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The areas of labour rights and social security are yet another source of tension. At one 
SPU, as one worker revealed, management had not fulfilled its duty to provide workers with a 
series of benefits including health care as well as a savings and housing fund. As Gerardo 
Marino (Interview 40) detailed, management discounts a percentage of the workers’ salaries 
every month and puts it toward a workers’ housing and savings fund, but workers had not been 
able to access these funds for over six months. In addition, management had not been providing 
adequate health care for the workers. The workers responded to the situation by shutting down 
the plant, demanding that their rights be returned to them. As Gerardo put it,  
For more than six months we have asked them for explanations… but nobody has 
had the dignity to come. So, this [the plant shutdown] is a way to pressure them to 
sit down to dialogue with us and resolve all the problems we have been 
presenting… which are an insecurity at work (Interview 40). 
Commenting specifically on the health and safety grievances, Gerardo expands, 
For example, if one goes to the clinic but does not have an emergency you are not 
attended to. That’s why we are fighting. One has to be dying in order to be 
attended to. Here [at the SPU] we should have a paramedic… it has been a week 
since our friend died. When they brought him here before he died he was choking 
and here we needed a paramedic… This is what led us to doing this [the factory 
shutdown] and we [the Workers’ Council] all decided this (Interview 40).  
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Interesting to note is that although SPU workers are not unionized, the factory shutdown 
very much resembled a strike action, demonstrating how the class dynamics at SPUs can, at 
times, resemble those found in traditional capitalist enterprises. Also important to note is that, in 
this particular case, the coordinators did not participate in the shutdown. Although, interestingly, 
one of the coordinators I spoke with that day said he supported the action, but felt it was not his 
place to take sides in the dispute. Ultimately, as Julio Chávez (former mayor of Carora and 
legislator for the state of Lara, Interview 52) communicated to me, the dispute was resolved after 
heated discussions between SPU workers and state managers and government representatives, 
who promised to meet the workers’ demands.35 
The social division of labour within SPUs is another area that expresses class conflicts 
between SPU workers and the state. Contradicting their explicit mission, SPUs maintain a social 
division of labour characteristic of private enterprises, which includes a division between mental 
and manual labour. Enrique Machado comments on this issue, 
The social division of labour… a division between those in charge of executing 
the intellectual work of planning, of giving orders and those who are seen as 
simply extensions of machines that do not think but simply execute the orders of 
others. So, to change those relations, to advance toward the construction of 
socialism, we have to eliminate that social division of labour. Let’s all plan, think 
and execute. Let’s all be subjects of the production process! (Interview 35) 
When asked to expand, Enrique highlights the connection between the SPUs’ social 
division of labour and the educational system, 
                                                
35 Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain more information relevant to the resolution of this dispute. 
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They [management] don’t realize that that way to organize work comes from 
those assholes that spent all their life studying how to organize work in order to 
exploit the worker more, like Ford and Taylor… So then a tension is produced 
between those who give orders, or those who think that it is they that have to do 
the planning because that’s what they learned in university… and the workers that 
say no (Interview 35). 
One way this social division of labour concretely manifests itself at SPUs is through the 
existence of rigid hierarchical ranks, not only between management and workers but also 
amongst the workers themselves. Hence, different workers get paid differently according to the 
positions they hold. Some of the different positions include operators (these are manual labourers 
such as tractor drivers and machine operators), analysts, supervisors, and coordinators, who have 
the highest rank. And it is the state that determines the positions and the salaries, which to a large 
degree are based on level of formal education. At the time, as one participant revealed, there 
existed approximately a 3:1 ratio between the lowest and highest-paid SPU worker or manager, a 
situation that caused a great deal of debate and tension amongst workers.36  
As a response to this situation, in two out of the three SPUs I visited, the Workers’ 
Council had brought forward to management an initiative called the ‘integral worker’. This 
initiative proposed that salary ranks based on job description be abolished. This would mean that 
all workers, irrespective of job duties, would be considered integral workers and would therefore 
earn the same wage. As Marisa, an administrative worker, put it, the goal is that “the accountant 
and the tractor driver are considered equal.” Her reasoning behind this is quite telling:  “The 
                                                
36 It should be noted that by any cooperative standard a 3:1 salary ratio is extremely egalitarian. 
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operator [the tractor driver] leaves for work at 4 a.m., while I, because I have an education, start 
work at 8 a.m. ... But I am not more than the operator who works more than me.” What Marisa’s 
comments reveal is recognition that the work an ‘uneducated’ tractor driver performs is no less 
important than the work of an ‘educated’ administrator. In fact, as Marisa recognized, in terms of 
concrete labour time, the tractor driver actually works more than she does. Marisa concludes her 
comments on this issue by attacking the meritocracy argument that says those with more 
education deserve higher compensation: “We have to change that old view, because many get 
sick with that whole [university] degree thing and they think they’re above the rest… in this 
enterprise we want to treat each other as equals, we are all equals! (Interview 31)” 
Of course, not every worker interviewed shared this opinion. Several of them supported 
salary ranks using educational level and degree of responsibility as a justification. Interestingly, 
even those with lower formal-education levels sometimes supported salary ranks, commenting 
that those who had acquired more education had made a ‘sacrifice’ and therefore deserved being 
paid more. Given these differing views, it is not surprising then that only two out of the three 
SPUs I visited had brought forward the integral worker proposition. And even then, only at one 
of the two SPUs where the proposition had been brought forward was it being considered 
seriously. The problem, according to one worker, is that management does not approve of the 
initiative. In the case of this SPU, this rift between the workers, who wanted a more egalitarian 
and democratic internal workplace organization, and management, who wanted to keep the status 
quo, was another of the driving forces behind the worker-led factory shutdown mentioned above. 
Another example of how class contradictions express themselves through conflict 
between workers and management is evident in the SPUs’ hiring process. As mentioned above, 
the SPUs’ democratic structure involves participation from its own workers, state managers, and 
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members of local communal councils. Participation by all three parties extends into the SPUs’ 
hiring process. Throughout this process one sees a tension between the SPUs’ goal of helping 
communities in need, and the logic of the market, which dictates that only those capable of 
generating the most surplus value should find employment. For example, for a new employee to 
be hired, he or she must first be nominated by the local communal councils who choose people 
on the basis of need. Once a number of candidates have been nominated by the communal 
councils, a hiring decision is made by the SPU. When discussing with Ina Perez (Interview 42) 
whether there exists a tension between hiring on the basis of need and hiring on the basis of 
qualifications, she responded: 
Yes… it depends on what we are hiring for… For example, if it is a mechanic, 
then he [the candidate] has to know about mechanics and if he has few resources 
we hire him quicker still. But if he doesn’t [have few resources] we bring on 
someone that knows, that has experience in that area [mechanics]. For other 
positions … like a general labourer [experience] does not matter (Interview 42). 
This tension between looking for a candidate’s capacities and also to his needs is present 
also during the job interview process. During an interview, as Eduardo Escamilla (Interview 39) 
explained, the SPU not only looks for a candidate’s particular capacities and how these will be 
suited for the job opening, but also for the candidate’s level of need. And this is why he calls the 
interview a ‘social interview’: 
We conduct a socioeconomic assessment. That’s why there is a sociopolitical 
interview. It is a technique, a social interview… “How many kids do you have, are 
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you a single mother or father?” things like that… if he lives with his parents. All 
of this is taken into account. That is a social interview (Interview 39). 
Once a new employee has been hired, the tension between capacities and needs again 
comes to the fore. As mentioned above, it is the SPU, specifically the coordinator who responds 
to the state, that makes the final hiring decision. And sometimes the communal councils are not 
happy with the decision made. As Alegre Ávila explained, the communal councils have the 
knowledge regarding who in the community has necessities, but the SPU’s decision-making 
model allows management to choose a person different from the one that the communal councils 
chose. The result of this has been many debates and disagreements between the SPU and the 
communal councils. As Alegre put it, “there hasn’t been much unity… as I told you, the 
communal council knows who needs, but those above [management] don’t. They just grab a 
curriculum but they don’t know if what the curriculum says is true.” Enrique Machado 
comments on the same issue: 
Because the SPU has the last word [on hiring], many people nominated by 
communal councils that were in need were not taken… we had tensions there that 
lasted a while because the communal councils complained that they were 
deceived because some of those who were hired were not nominated by them 
(Interview 35).  
When asked to expand, Enrique told me that even though his SPU has a ‘community 
committee’ that is responsible for communicating and responding to the communal councils, the 
one who makes the final hiring decision is not this committee but the office of human resources 
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at the SPU’s management level. But, as he put it, “the people in that office don’t know 
anything.” What happens then is that when human resources makes decisions that contradict the 
will of the communal councils, the communal councils blame the SPU’s community committee, 
which is the body responsible for interacting with them. In other words, the communal councils, 
according to this one participant, end up blaming the wrong people. This friction between the 
communal councils and SPUs around the issue of hiring reached a climax when several members 
of local communal councils physically occupied one SPU in protest at the hiring choices made 
by management.  
The Popular Economy and the Bolivarian State 
I started this Chapter by outlining what I took to be the most important theoretical 
innovations of 21st century socialism. Focusing on Venezuela, these innovations consist of an 
emphasis on human development through popular-economy initiatives, and the need to build 
popular power through the state, rather than by disregarding or fighting against it. After 
providing a brief background to Venezuela’s popular economy, I presented evidence on the 
newly emerging Socialist Production Units, as a case study from which to assess the central 
claims of the 21st century socialism approach, as well as its progress on the ground. 
My case study suggests that Venezuela’s state-supported popular economy is indeed a 
site of human development, in which participants challenge capitalist social relations while 
establishing new values and practices. As such, Venezuela’s popular economy is an example of a 
post-capitalist struggle, through which a future post-capitalist society becomes evident within the 
capitalist present. Specifically, I argued that participants are learning about their own needs and 
those of the community, collective management abilities, and active participation, or 
protagonism, therefore challenging the social division of labour and alienation in the workplace. 
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Importantly, much of this learning was acquired through the process of participatory democracy. 
These findings, I argue, are consistent with the views of Lebowitz and other supporters of 21st 
century socialism, namely that the state should be understood not simply as an instrument of the 
capitalist class, but also as the articulation of class forces, and that it can therefore be used to 
challenge capital. 
However, my case study also shows that holding the hand of human development is class 
struggle directed against the state, taking the form of struggles against the state bureaucracy. This 
reveals a central paradox in 21st century socialism, namely that the Venezuelan state nurtures 
human development while simultaneously cementing the class relation, thus emerging as an 
important barrier to continued transformations. This is in contrast to the case of ERTs in 
Argentina, in which it is the lack of state intervention (against the wishes of the movement) that 
keeps the sector in a precarious state. The Bolivarian state’s continued imposition of the class 
relation within the popular economy is therefore inconsistent with the views of many supporters 
of 21st century socialism. For example, although Lebowitz is explicit in making the connection 
between struggle and human development (Lebowitz, 2003, 2005, 2006) he does not highlight 
how this includes struggles against the Venezuelan state. A similar point can be made about 
Harnecker (2010) who argued that it was possible to speak of a “transition to” rather than a 
“struggle for” socialism in Venezuela (p. 62).  
These findings are also not wholly consistent with the view that, in Venezuela, we are 
witnessing a new form of dual power, in which the new state structures (i.e. the popular 
economy) stand in irreconcilable opposition to the old ones, forming some kind of parallel state. 
Indeed, if one takes this point of view, it becomes easy to downplay struggles within the popular 
economy (the new state) as a result of corruption, bureaucracy, or legacies of the old state, as is 
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often done. After all, why would there be class struggles taking place here if the popular 
economy is the expression of a new socialist state? However, what I have tried to show is that 
these struggles are fundamentally class struggles in which the existing state emerges as the 
central barrier to overcoming the class relation. In other words, if a new form of dual power 
exists through the state, it is one in which the old structures are deeply embedded within the new, 
and vice-versa. In other words, class struggle reveals the dialectical character of capitalist 
development, as the future comes into sharper relief against the present. In Venezuela we 
therefore see not two states, the old capitalist one and a new socialist one, but rather one 
capitalist state that articulates different class contradictions at different times and places within 
the Venezuelan process.  
From this point of view, what is unique about the popular economy is that, within the 
capitalist state, it articulates a sharpened class contradiction. Herein, new forms of struggle fuel 
new values and practices, while the old values and practices simultaneously emerge with greater 
clarity, relying on the state for their survival. This also reveals the position of the current 
Venezuelan state in relation to its historic role, caught somewhere between fulfilling its expected 
role of provider from above, and attempting to build new and endogenous labour capacities from 
below. These contradictions evident in SPUs means that struggles between popular-economy 
participants and the Venezuelan state cannot be avoided. Indeed, in the context of an emerging 
right wing in the country, these struggles will need to be fostered, although perhaps in new 
forms, if the project of 21st century socialism is to continue.  
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Chapter 5: The 2011 Chilean Student Movement and the Struggle 
for a New Left 
Following the 2008 economic crisis that began in the United States, the world has 
witnessed a resurgence of mass social movements (Occupy, Indignados, Arab Spring, etc.). 
Many of these movements brought forward demands and issues traditionally associated with the 
political left, such as democracy, inequality and use of public space. However, what is innovative 
about them is that their tactics, forms of organization and participants often depart from those of 
the traditional 20th century left, which gave labour unions and the top-down revolutionary party 
a prominent role. In this Chapter, I look at the Chilean student movement as an example of one 
such civil society struggle. I do so by tracing its relationship to the traditional Chilean left and 
the evolution of the country's education system. 
The Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile, or PCCh) has historically 
been the most important anti-capitalist political force in the Chile. Founded in 1912, the PCCh 
has actively promoted workers’ rights for over 100 years, and developed a strong base in unions, 
universities and working-class neighborhoods. In the 1930s, the PCCh adopted a Stalinist 
organizational structure, characterized by a vertical model through which the Central Committee 
dominates decision-making at all levels of the party (Bernard, 1978; Roberts, 1995, Furci, 2008). 
The Central Committee is elected in the national congress by delegates from local and regional 
branches, not by direct vote of the general membership, and is alone responsible for appointing 
the Secretary-General. 
In the 1960s, the PCCh became one of Salvador Allende's key allies in his short-lived 
socialist government. Following the coup against Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, the 
PCCh (along with other leftist groups and individuals) became the target of brutal repression by 
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the Pinochet dictatorship, a process that ended with the imprisonment, forced exile, torture and 
death of thousands of PCCh members or suspected sympathizers and allies (Sigmund, 1990; 
Roberts, 1995; Klein, 2007; Wright and Zúñiga, 2007). In 1977, the PCCh regrouped and led a 
clandestine resistance against the dictatorship, and in the 1980s, guided by a strategy known as 
Política de Rebelión Popular de Masas (Mass Popular Rebellion), it went on to become an 
important figure in the massive anti-Pinochet protests (Furci, 2008; Reyes Soriano, 2016).  
Parallel to this, a coalition led by Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democracy) is formed 
in the mid 1980s. This coalition led the successful campaign to end Augusto Pinochet's rule in 
the 1988 plebiscite, and subsequently took the name of the Concertación (Roberts, 1995). Also 
part of this coalition was what Leiva (2012) calls the ‘permitted left’, namely the Partido 
Socialista (Socialist Party), Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy) and the Partido 
Radical Social Democrata (Radical Social Democratic Party), ‘permitted’ because they accepted 
the military’s wishes to maintain Augusto Pinochet’s neoliberal framework for the country as a 
condition for the transition to democracy.  
Because of its support for the activities of the urban militia Frente Patriotico Manuel 
Rodriguez (Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front), the PCCh was left outside the Concertación. 
Nevertheless, they ultimately supported the vote against Augusto Pinochet. In 1989, Patricio 
Aylwin won the presidential elections, beginning a cycle of four Concertación governments, 
including the first presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). Throughout this period, the 
Concertación offers no more than to put a ‘human face’ on neoliberal policies, while conducting 
negotiations in a top-down manner, known popularly as cupulismo  (Carruthers and Rodriguez, 
2009). Indeed, as Leiva (2008) argues, through its four consecutive mandates, the Concertación 
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becomes the pioneer of Latin American neostructuralism, offering small social reforms while 
adhering to a neoliberal economic framework. 
Throughout the 1990s, the PCCh remained marginalized, running presidential candidates 
during elections, but ultimately supporting Concertación candidates to avoid a victory by the 
right. This strategy did not prevent the victory of President Sebastian Piñera in 2010, however. 
Then, in the context of the student mobilizations that began in 2011, the PCCh began to toy with 
the idea of ‘a new majority’ capable of forming a ‘new type of government’ (something the party 
began to publicly discuss in 2009). This idea would come to fruition in 2013 with the creation of 
the Nueva Mayoría (New Majority), the political coalition replacing the Concertación, now 
including the PCCh, as well as other left political parties and individuals. Led by the now 
President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, the Nueva Mayoría became the country's ruling 
government in 2014. This is the political backdrop that the Chilean student movement now finds 
itself articulated within.  
One of the debates about the student movement is whether it expresses something new 
within the country's political landscape, or whether it is simply a continuation of traditional 
demands and forms of organization of the historic left. Those emphasizing its traditional 
elements (see Guzmán-Concha, 2012)37 remind us that student activism has a long history in 
Chile, and that, indeed, there is nothing new about student bodies such as the Federación de 
Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (University of Chile Student Federation, or FECH) 
having a prominent role in the country's politics. They also point to the important role that the 
Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Chile (United Workers Central of Chile, or CUT), Chile's 
oldest union central, played during the mobilizations of 2011. Lastly, they highlight how the 
                                                
37 This article compares the Chilean student movement with recent movements, including Occupy Wall 
Street, the Indignados and the Arab Spring.  
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movement's most emblematic leader, Camila Vallejo, is a member of the PCCh, as well as how 
the memory of Salvador Allende became routinely honored on the streets through a variety of 
posters and costumes. 
I fully agree that the student movement is indeed very much the expression of Chile's 
particular left history. Indeed, its use of already established political organizations and 
institutions is an important point of contrast with the case of Brazil, as we will see. However, 
although certainly tied to Chile's particular left history, the student movement, I argue, 
simultaneously goes beyond it. By demanding free public education, public control of strategic 
domestic industries, and political reform, the movement stood in sharp opposition to both the 
Piñera government and the Concertación. However, the movement goes further than this. As we 
will see, by relying on an organizational approach that emphasizes participatory democracy, anti-
sectarianism and encourages working class convergence and solidarity in various spheres of civil 
society, the movement challenges the traditional practices of the country's anti-capitalist left. 
Indeed, the movement is not only anti-capitalist, but is best thought of as an example of a post-
capitalist struggle, giving us a glimpse of a post-capitalist future within the capitalist present. Not 
surprisingly, this has made the movement’s relationship to the PCCh particularly complex, at 
times accepting some of its positions and leaders, but at others rejecting them in favour of the 
Izquierda Autónoma (Autonomous Left, or IA). 
Although still emerging, the IA is an organized, anti-capitalist political current that 
practices direct democracy and horizontalism, and has a significant base in several of the 
country’s most important universities. As such, it is an important player within the student 
movement. Unlike the PCCh, which is committed to pursuing the electoral path, the IA, and the 
student movement more broadly, has an ambiguous and even contradictory relationship to 
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political parties and the state.  As we will see, this means that, while clear in its attempt to make 
inroads within the existing state structures, the movement nevertheless remains suspect of these.  
This contradictory posture the movements has taken toward the state can be understood 
to reflect the particularly pernicious way in which neoliberalism was entrenched within the state 
by the Pinochet dictatorship. Hence, on the one hand, the continuation of Augusto Pinochet’s 
1980 Constitution to this day makes the state a central target in the struggle to overcome 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, the authoritarian and exclusionary character acquired by the 
Chilean state during the dictatorship makes it an unappealing avenue for highly democratic 
movements to pursue. The result is that the movement is still struggling to reinvent the Chilean 
left in a way that can address this contradiction. Before discussing this in more depth, we look at 
how Chile's education system developed in recent decades. 
The Neoliberal Education System in Chile 
During the neoliberal period, the Chilean education system took a decisively neoliberal 
turn based on privatization, de-centralization, deregulation and cuts to the public sector (Torres 
and Schugurensky, 2002). 38 At the elementary and secondary levels this was accomplished via 
the transfer of fiscal responsibility from the national to the municipal level, and the creation of 
new state subsidized private schools. This model largely succeeded in expanding private 
education in the country. For example, in 1981, 78 per cent of students attended the public 
system, a figure that dropped to 50 per cent by 2004. This trend continued into the 
Concertación's last government so that, by 2008, enrollment in subsidized private schools 
actually surpassed that of public ones (Chovanec and Benitez, 2008; Burton, 2012). This is not 
                                                
38 As Torres and Schugurensky (2002) note, this was the case not only in Chile but throughout Latin 
America, only that in Chile neoliberal reforms to education took a particularly advanced form. 
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surprising given that the Concertación's education policies, though shifting somewhat over the 
years, nevertheless remained within the bounds of the Ley Orgánica Constitucional de 
Enseñanza (Constitutional Statutory Law of Education or LOCE) developed by the Pinochet 
regime (see Burton, 2012). Sensing a growing discontent with the education system in much of 
the population, the right wing government led by the billionaire, Sebastián Piñera, proceeded to 
deepen the privatization of the sector even further, particularly in primary and secondary 
schooling. 
A similar situation took place at the post-secondary level. Following aggressive cuts to 
public universities and the deregulation of the sector (Torres and Schugurensky, 2002), the ratio 
between students attending public vs. private institutions decreased dramatically in recent 
decades. Indeed, by 2010, the number of students attending private universities (305,769) for the 
first time surpassed those attending the public ones (281,528) (Aguayo Ormeño, 2011). In 
addition, the government has allowed a steady increase in tuition fees, 60 per cent in 12 years. In 
2011, the average annual tuition was US $6150.39 This made it the most expensive in the world, 
comprising no less than 40 per cent of the family income of those at the bottom three quintiles of 
the income ladder (Fontaine, 2011).  
At the heart of the problem is that the ratio between public and private spending in 
education dramatically tilted toward the latter, especially when compared to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average (Confederación de Estudiantes de 
Chile, 2011). In addition, Chile was spending merely 0.5 per cent of its GDP on post-secondary 
education, ranking lowest in the world (Castillo Melgarejo, 2012, p. 7). Indeed, in a comparative 
                                                
39 Tuition fees only vary slightly between private and public universities. For example, minimum and 
maximum tuitions at the public Universidad de Chile are approximately US $4400 (Arts) and US $9100 (Medicine), 
while at the private Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile they are US $4000 (Arts) and US $10,700 (Medicine). 
Some universities do offer specialized programs at lower tuition, such as Social Work at Universidad Internacional 
SEK, which costs approximately US $1380  (Ministerio de Educación, 2013). 
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study carried out by UNESCO, Chile is singled out for allowing the private sector to have 
excessive participation in the education system and for failing to meet the standards of ‘free 
education’, as outlined in Article 13 of the United Nation's International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Muñoz, 2011). In sum, the education system in Chile became a 
crucial sector for the systemic transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector, or the 
policies of  ‘accumulation by dispossession’. 
Deepening privatization, in turn, opened the door to transnational capitalists, particularly 
banks who have been more than happy to provide students with ample debt loads to finance their 
studies. As of 2011, approximately 350,000 Chileans held a student loan from a private financial 
institution and debt loads often reach US $30,000 for professional programs, such as engineering  
(do Rosario, 2012). Students can also get government-guaranteed loans from Crédito con Aval 
del Estado (State Guaranteed Loans) that, in response to the movement, recently lowered its 
interest rate from 5.8 per cent to 2 per cent (interest rates from private institutions are usually 
around 7 per cent). Debt loads can be so high, however, that loans can take several years to 
repay. Indeed, debt loads reached such a level that Chilean students began to migrate to 
neighboring countries in search for more accessible education. As a result of this ‘educational 
exile’, by 2011, 10,000 Chileans studied in Argentina (Marin, 2011).  
In addition, the post-secondary system is highly class-divided. At both the public and 
state-subsidized schools, working-class students receive a second-rate elementary and secondary 
education. Those that move on to post-secondary studies find themselves in underfunded public 
universities, or in poor quality private ones, in programs that offer highly uncertain opportunities 
in the labour market. Following graduation, the outcome for these students can often be 
unskilled, low-wage and precarious employment, if not unemployment. In contrast, upper-class 
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students attend private schools and universities where they are socialized to internalize the 
prevailing values of free markets and individual success. These students have a much better 
chance of obtaining a management position at a large corporation, or a prominent position in the 
public sector. 
The inequalities that developed in the education system are a reflection of Chile’s status 
as one of the most unequal Latin American societies. In fact, in 2011, Chile was the most 
unequal country in the OECD, with a Gini coefficient of 0.50  (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2011). Indeed, Using United Nations (UN) development 
indicators, one study shows that while 20 per cent of Chile's population has incomes comparable 
to those in ‘rich countries’, such the United States, two thirds of the population has incomes 
comparable to countries considered ‘very poor’, such as Angola (Guzmán, 2011). In addition, 
between 2006 and 2009, the level of poverty increased from 13.7 to 15.1 per cent, even as social 
spending was increased significantly by the administration of Michelle Bachelet (World Bank, 
2013; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010). Importantly, all this 
happened despite high levels of annual growth in Chile, indeed among the highest in Latin 
America during that period. Hence, while the so-called ‘Chilean miracle’ blessed the rich, it has 
been a curse for the popular classes, with students being some of the hardest hit. 
Students Fight Back 
Neoliberal education in Chile led to a growing consciousness among secondary and 
university students that the entire educational system needs to be radically changed in favour of a 
more inclusive and democratic public one. The first signs of this growing unrest occurred in 
2006, during the secondary student rebellions against the neoliberal education law originally 
created by Augusto Pinochet, and maintained by the Concertación governments. Importantly, 
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these took place in the context of wider social unrest, most notably, environmental and anti-
mining mobilizations led by citizens groups and Mapuche indigenous communities (Gordon and 
Webber, 2008; Carruthers and Rodriguez, 2009), but also subsequent mobilizations by 
subcontracted workers, and public transit activists  (Ruiz, 2012). The student movement, or 
‘Penguin Revolution’ (a reference to the students' uniform design) as it became known, caught 
most by surprise, including many Chilean intellectuals who argued that the youth in the country 
were only interested in parties and soccer (Valdebenito, 2009). 
The students began with two modest demands: a free bus pass to get to school and free 
mandatory tests for entering university (Torres, 2010). They organized themselves through the 
Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios  (Coordinating Assembly of High School 
Students), based on direct participation and the use of rotating spokespeople who were tasked 
with voicing the assembly's decisions (Gómez Leyton, 2006, p.113). This is very different from 
the traditional way democracy is practiced within the institutions of liberal democracy, such as 
parliaments, parties and unions, in which, once elected, political leaders can make decisions 
without consulting the base. In addition, the assemblies brought together students of diverse 
political backgrounds, allowing competing political visions to coexist (Valdebenito, 2009; 
Chovanec and Benitez, 2008). Importantly, these organizational features of the movement, were 
to continue during the mobilizations that began in 2011.  
As the movement developed, students quickly expanded their demands to include that 
education be considered a right, not a commodity, and an end to the subsidiary role of the state in 
its provision and delivery. In other words, students came to demand nothing less than the 
transformation of the neoliberal education system (Gómez Leyton, 2006, p.113). To this end, on 
May 30, 2006, close to a million students and supporters participated in a general strike that 
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combined street mobilizations and high school seizures, shaking the Bachelet government and 
forcing it to offer partial concessions (Torres, 2010, pp. 16-17). However, facing police 
repression and difficult negotiations with the government, the movement quickly faded in the 
following days (Torres, 2010, pp. 16-17). Nevertheless, the students forced the Bachelet 
administration to recognize the crisis in education was real, as well as the deeply authoritarian 
character of the education laws inherited from the military. 
In 2011, the second phase of the movement got underway. This occurred in the context of 
levels of social mobilization not seen since the 1990s by different sectors of the Chilean 
working-class, including struggles against poverty, labour flexibilization and hydroelectric 
development (Segovia and Gamboa, 2012, Leiva and Campos, 2013). Notably, on January 11th, 
in the southern province of Magallanes, communities declared a civil strike to protest the abrupt 
hike in gas prices, as decreed by the Piñera government. On this opportunity, twenty-four social 
organizations created the Asamblea Ciudadana de Magallanes (Magallanes Citizens Assembly). 
The Assembly, experimenting with new forms of democratic participation, took direct control of 
the main cities, blocking highways, building urban barricades, even declaring a curfew on 
vehicles and demanding the government to annul the price increase. For seven days, the 
Assembly operated independent of political parties, and was able to mobilize tens of thousands 
of people on a daily basis, asserting itself as a temporary government in Magallanes (Rodríguez 
and Rodríguez, 2011; Campos and Ruiz, 2011). 
Adding to the momentum, on May 12th, secondary and university students called a 
national day of protest against the poor quality of the education system (“Cronología”, 2011; 
Vera, 2013; “Cronología”, 2011). Coordinating through their respective student bodies and the 
use of social media, they took the streets on the main Chilean cities from Northern Arica to 
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Southern Punta Arenas. The mobilization received the support or endorsement of the CUT, the 
Colegio de Profesores de Chile (Teachers Association of Chile), the main university student 
federations, and the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (National Association of Public 
Servant) (“Cronología”, 2011). In Santiago alone, 30,000 demonstrators voiced their demands: 
an end to ‘market education’, reductions of student debts, increased funds for public universities, 
and the democratization of educational institutions (“Comunicado”, 2011; “Cronología”, 2011). 
It has been estimated that more than 100,000 students and supporters across the country 
participated in this day of protest (Vera, 2013; “Cronología”, 2011). 
Tired of waiting for a meaningful response by the government, the students proceeded to 
call a national strike for June 30th (Vera, 2013; “Cronología”, 2011). The mobilizations on this 
day occurred in the context of increased levels of militancy. In the run up to the march secondary 
students in Santiago seized more than 200 high schools (“Conoce la lista”, 2011), some of which 
continued to operate, only this time under the democratic management of teachers and students 
(“Colectivo Diatriba”, 2011; Suárez, 2016). In the capital alone, more than 200,000 people took 
to the streets while another 400,000 did the same in the rest of the country (Vera, 2013; 
“Cronología”, 2011).  
It is at this point that Camila Vallejo, president of the FECH and PCCh member, became 
the leading voice of the movement, garnering the attention of the national and international 
media. She was even named ‘person of the year’ by readers of the influential British paper The 
Guardian (Oliver, 2011). Her leadership role would reveal a complex relationship between her, 
the movement, and the PCCh. The relationship can be summarized as follows: the more she 
distanced herself from the PCCh and its traditional practices and politics, the more acceptance 
she received from the movement. However, the closer she moved to the PCCh, the less credible 
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she was considered. Hence, at the height of her popularity, she would often refuse to take 
ownership over the movement, and even publicly criticized the PCCh's leadership for sending 
condolences to the North Korean government after the death of Kim Jong Il (“Camila Vallejo”, 
2011). This relative distance she maintained from the party would prove difficult to sustain, as 
will be seen. 
In a matter of months, then, a struggle to improve education had quickly evolved into a 
movement that struck at the heart of the neoliberal model in Chile, namely its natural resource 
industries, which unambiguously favor foreign corporations  (Webber and Gordon, 2008). The 
student movement reached its first victory in July when Sebastián Piñera was forced to change 
his education minister, Joaquín Lavín, a former junior minister in the Pinochet governments and 
member of the Opus Dei, whose personal popularity had declined radically due to the student 
conflict (Labra, 2011; “CERC”, 2011). Lavín was supposed to be the next presidential candidate 
of the right wing alliance still in office then.  
More Than a Student Movement 
Since the return of liberal democracy to Chile, the country has witnessed what some have 
called ‘the neoliberalization of solidarity’  (Dockendorff et al., 2010), meaning the concept and 
practice has been progressively linked to the interests of the private sector via corporate social 
responsibility schemes and ‘social marketing’. With this in mind, another crucial achievement of 
the student movement was its ability to go beyond itself and garner support from broad sectors of 
the population, helping to re-articulate solidarity as a public and working-class value. Parents, 
teachers, and copper miners openly and actively expressed their support, recognizing that all 
their grievances against the neoliberal regime were being expressed in the student strike. In other 
words, the student struggle soon became the vehicle through which broad-based popular 
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dissatisfaction became articulated, successfully reducing the ‘x factor’, the degree of separation 
amongst the working class (Lebowitz, 2006b). 
The government responded quickly by threatening to declare an early winter break to the 
school year, and even its possible cancellation. In addition, the corporate media began its 
demonization campaign against the students, using isolated incidents of violence conducted by 
los encapuchados (the black bloc) to delegitimize the whole movement. Responding to these 
attacks, Camila Vallejo rejected these acts of violence, arguing that the encapuchados don’t 
‘represent the spirit of the majority of students’ (“Camila Vallejo Denuncia”, 2011). Furthermore 
she suggested that many of these groups were the target of infiltration and were paid to incite 
violence (“Camilla Vallejo Dice”, 2011). Indeed, adding to the suspicion, a group of 
encapuchados were found attempting to torch the central offices of the Colegio de Profesores 
(Candia, 2011), a staunch ally of the student movement. 
Between August 10th and 18th, gigantic demonstrations took place in Santiago and in the 
main Chilean cities (Vera, 2013; “Cronología”, 2011). Over 200,000 marched throughout the 
country during this week of actions, in which student's decided not to accept the government’s 
proposals for education reform (“Marcha de los Paraguas”, 2011). The week of actions ended 
with a demonstration in Santiago known as ‘la marcha de los paraguas’ (the march of the 
umbrellas), which attracted over 100,000 participants despite heavy rain (Vera, 2013; 
“Cronología”, 2011). Families with small children, artists, teachers and workers expressed their 
commitment to be part of this democratic movement that demands a democratic society and the 
end of 30 years of neoliberalism in the country. Even elite private secondary high school students 
joined the movement.  
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At the height of the movement, it was estimated that out of the 4 million students in 
Chile, 500,000 actively participated in the struggle. However, it is clear that many layers of 
society were also actively involved. For example, after facing heavy police repression at a 
demonstration, the movement's call for people to show their solidarity by banging pots and pans 
(cacerolazos) at night was taken up by entire neighborhoods who mobilized to public squares, 
streets and highways, bringing memories of the anti-Pinochet struggle in the 1980s (“Histórico 
Cacerolazo”, 2011). Further proof of the movement's wide appeal was evident during a meeting 
held by ‘families for education’ on August 21st in Santiago's main central park. The meeting 
attracted 1 million people in support of the students' demands. 
The next wave of actions unfolded on August 24 and 25 leading to the movement's first 
national strike, called by the CUT (Vera, 2013; “Cronología”, 2011). The strike was supported 
fully by 80 organizations, including student bodies, teachers, civil servants, human rights 
organizations, intellectuals, artisans, artists, shantytown dwellers, and physician associations 
(“Chile: Paro Nacional”, 2011; “Chile: 48 horas”, 2011). In addition to their more traditional 
demands of better salaries, a new labour code and an end to precarious jobs, the CUT also 
demanded free and quality education. The demonstrations were some of the largest yet, bringing 
together up to 600,000 people across the country (“Más de”, 2011). Despite heavy police 
repression and mass arrests, the organizers of the demonstrations called the events a great 
success and promised further actions if their demands were not met. The strike was particularly 
significant because it took the CUT out of the relatively narrow scope of action it had settled into 
since 1988, the year it was re-founded on a more reformist platform that fit more closely the 
Concertación's political goals (Drake, 2003). At the same time, the strike had a bureaucratic 
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character, lacking the creativity and audacity of the students, which shows some the CUT's limits 
in supporting the student struggle up to this point.  
Demonstrating a high level of intergenerational working-class solidarity, when the media 
asked the leaders of the student movement why they supported the CUT, they simply explained 
that much of the CUT’s membership are the students’ parents. The simplicity of this answer 
begins to make sense when we look back at the start of the movement. As Donna Chovanec and 
Alexandra Benitez (2008) note in their case study in the province of Arica, the sudden 
reemergence of social action in Chile during the first phase of the student movement in 2006 can 
be in part attributed to the intergenerational learning that took place as a result of the women's 
movement who fought against the Pinochet dictatorship, and passed on a ‘critical social 
consciousness’ to the new generation.40 In other words, although tensions between the younger 
students and the older generations may not completely be avoided, a thread of solidarity runs 
through, in part explaining the broad-based support for the movement. Empowered by this 
support, the students began to intensify their demands, calling for a constituent assembly through 
which to do away with Augusto Pinochet's education law, and strengthen the state's roll in the 
provision of education. 
The Struggle for a New Left 
One of the key features of the movement is its disdain for pre-established elite political 
institutions and parties (Núñez, 2012, p. 69), demonstrating its desire to create a politics that 
goes beyond the modes of organization and resistance of the traditional Chilean left. For 
example, during the mobilizations, students occupied the headquarters of both right wing and 
                                                
40 As Chovanec and Benitez suggest, this phenomenon is not to be taken as a full explanation for the 
reemergence of social action in Chile, but it does provide important clues for the continuity of social movements in 
the country. 
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socialist parties (“Universitarios”, 2011).  In addition, consistent with the democratic and 
participatory history of the movement, students debate and discuss through horizontal assemblies 
through which the leadership remains in constant consultation with the demands of the base 
(Pulgar, 2011; Avendaño, 2014). Another key organ of the struggle became the Mesa Social Por 
La Educación (Social Table for Education), an innovative traversal organization which for the 
first time brought together students, teachers, workers, and environmental and human rights 
organizations (Núñez, 2012, p. 68). 
Importantly, the assemblies bring together students of different socio-economic 
backgrounds, political stripes and even party affiliations (Avendaño, 2014), at times helping to 
break down sectarian tendencies. Assemblies are not held on fixed schedules, but when they are 
deemed needed by the movement. Hence, during periods of particular importance, several 
assemblies might be held in a single week. Although this format allows for large numbers of 
people to actively participate in decision-making, there are some disadvantages. First, it requires 
a great deal of stamina by the participants, something that may not always be available at a given 
point in the struggle. Second, the locations where the assemblies are held (tilted toward city 
centers) tend to exclude people living in the peripheries.  
Another example of the students' search for a new left was evident in their reworking of 
the historic chant, ‘El pueblo unido jamás sera vencido’, (The people united will never be 
defeated) modified to, ‘El pueblo unido avanza sin partidos’ (The people united advance without 
parties) (“El pueblo unido”, 2011; “Estimadas comunistas”, 2011). Indeed, later in the struggle, 
the students engaged in a successful anti-voting campaign, once again expressing their distrust of 
electoral politics. The editor of Le Monde Diplomatique Chile perhaps best captured the 
sentiment: “the youth trust only in their own strength" (de la Fuente, 2011, p. 5). The distaste for 
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the political class went beyond the student population, however. At this stage in the conflict, 
surveys showed the popularity of Sebastián Piñera, his government, and all major parties and 
institutions at historic lows (Segovia and Gamboa, 2012; “Partidos politicos”, 2012). Not 
surprisingly, students rejected calls for dialogue made by politicians from the Concertación, as 
well as the reform proposals presented by the Minister of Education. Faced with these co-
optation attempts, the students reiterated their demand for a radically different educational 
system that is linked to an alternative development model based on the recuperation of national 
resources and tax reform. 
The movement also displayed a remarkable level of tactical creativity. For example, as a 
response to the government's declaration of early holidays, the students took to the streets in 
bathing suits and snorkel equipment, that is, in the middle of winter! (“Chile Mobs”, 2011). The 
student movement turned whole sections of cities into surrealist carnivals that even the 
mainstream media could not resist. Some of the students' most memorable performances 
included el gagazo (“Gagazo”, 2011), a dance-a-thon to the music of Lady Gaga in the capital's 
central square, el besaton (“Manifestación estudiantes”, 2011) a mass kissing marathon, and 
flash mobs of mock suicides (“Suicidio masivo”, 2011). Some of these actions were coordinated 
with the help of social media, through the use of instructional dance videos (“Coreografía Judas”, 
2011), for example. Lastly, in response to the media's incorrect depiction of the movement as 
essentially violent, the students took the time to collect hundreds of teargas canisters and used 
them to form giant peace signs on the streets (“Dirigentes llevan”, 2011). Some students even 
took the time to repaint houses damaged during the protests and collect funds to compensate 
individuals whose cars had been torched by the encapuchados. These are tactics that have been 
traditionally difficult for both the union movement and left parties to implement.  
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By September 2011, the movement began to face stronger co-optation attempts by the 
government. The government agreed to meet with the Colegio de Profesores, the Consejo de 
Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas (Council of Chilean University Rectors), the national 
confederation of secondary students, and the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Student 
Confederation of Chile, or CONFECH), the student body representing the country's public 
universities, to initiate a round of talks. However, the dialogue proved that the government had 
no serious intention to consider the main demand of the students, namely free public education 
for all, making the ludicrous argument that it would be unfair if the taxes paid by the poor went 
to financing the education of the rich. Fearing a huge hole might be opened in the neoliberal 
edifice, Sebastián Piñera offered instead to increase the number of grants the state guarantees for 
student loans, write off low-income students’ debts, and increase funding for public universities. 
The students left the negotiation table feeling the government was not negotiating in good faith. 
By persistently rejecting the students' demands, the government attempted to prevent an 
avalanche of new related demands, such as the ‘re-nationalization’ of the copper industry (which 
since 1992 has featured extensive participation of multinationals through ‘joint ventures’ and 
other mechanisms), tax reform and a constituent assembly, all which had begun to enter the 
public debate as a result of the student movement. 
The opposition, the PCCh included, soon entered into Sebastián Piñera's negotiation 
tactics, submitting a counterproposal demanding free post-secondary education for only part of 
the student body, which was not what the CONFECH was demanding. In other words, the 
opposition attempted to co-opt the movement by presenting a watered-down version of the 
demands developed by the CONFECH, one of the key organs through which the university 
student movement democratically developed and expressed itself. By negotiating with the 
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opposition, the government succeeded in temporarily weakening the movement. Important to 
note is that, as revealed by Camilo Ballesteros (Interview 56), a prominent student leader at the 
time and member of the PCCh, the party's strategy or ‘formula’, as he called it, consists of 
utilizing all available political spaces, even those initiated by the government. Not in the 
formula, he explained during our interview, was the creation of parallel political forums, the 
approach preferred by the IA. 
Whatever one may think of it, the PCCh's willingness to negotiate with the government 
and attempt to represent the students' demands is far from the sentiment on the streets. This 
sentiment was nicely captured by Cristián Cuevas, former president of the Confederación de 
Trabajadores del Cobre (Confederation of Copper Workers) and PCCh member,41 who 
accurately noted that what is new about the movement is that it expresses people's desire to do 
away with political mediators, and be protagonists of their own history (Cuevas, 2011, p. 18). 
With this in mind, it is not surprising that, in a joint declaration, CONFECH, the Asamblea 
Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students, or 
ACES) and the Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios (National Coordinator of 
Secondary Students, or CONES) rejected both government and opposition proposals. This was 
an important moment of unity for the movement, in particular, for the two competing secondary 
education bodies.42 However, it was starting to be evident that the student movement was unable 
to break the stubborn, dogmatic ideology of the government. Sebastián Piñera's government went 
on the offensive by sending a bill to parliament that would make it more difficult for people to 
protest freely on the streets, obviously seeking to restrict student activism. Sebastián Piñera's 
                                                
41 That Cuevas is also a prominent PCCh member highlights the real tensions within the party as far as how 
it understands and relates to the movement, tensions that the PCCH publically downplays or denies. 
42 CONES coordinates the "prestigious schools" and is usually favored by the government, while ACES 
coordinates the more radical "underprivileged groups" (Pousadela, 2012). 
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strategy relied on the natural erosion of the already long student mobilization, which had become 
trapped in routine tactics, was facing the end of academic year, and had split in its position 
toward the parliamentarian commission discussing the budget.  
In addition, university student federations traditionally enter into an election period at the 
end of December. The fact that several of the most prominent student leaders belong to different 
political parties or groups, sometimes with contradictory visions of how to continue the struggle, 
generated deep tensions within the movement. These tensions came to the surface in the 2011 
elections at the emblematic Universidad de Chile (University of Chile). In the 2010 elections, 
united leftist groups won the majority in the FECH, electing Camila Vallejo as president. This 
demonstrated the capacity for various left currents to cooperate, an approach that the movement 
greatly favours over the traditional sectarian approach of the left. However, in late 2011, 
Juventudes Comunistas de Chile (Young Communists of Chile, or JJCC) decided to present 
Camila Vallejo’s candidature for the presidency in a separate bid from their former leftist allies. 
This was an attempt by the JJCC to capitalize on Vallejo’s popularity, which they thought would 
bring them certain victory in the elections. In other words, the JJCC attempted to take ownership 
over the movement, a move that ignited infighting among all the leftist groups. Reverting to their 
old practices, the left went into the election divided into seven separate slates (“Informativo”, 
2011).  
In a surprising result, Camila Vallejo, the most charismatic leader of the student 
movement, was defeated in the second round by Gabriel Boric, a member of the IA who was 
elected as the new president of the FECH (“FECH”, 2011). Vallejo settled for the vice 
presidency. Furthermore, the JJCC was also defeated in Universidad de Concepción (University 
of Concepción) and Universidad de Santiago (University of Santiago) (Avendaño, 2014). 
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Revealing of the tensions that exist within the movement, in our interview, Camilo Ballesteros 
downplayed Boric's victory, noting that the PCCh nevertheless received the majority of overall 
votes. Furthermore, he described the IA as an elite minority that is generally not well regarded by 
the popular classes. 
The result of these elections is less surprising, however, once we recognize that, unlike 
the PCCh, the IA did have its pulse on the student movement, and understood its desire for a new 
left politics. Francisco Figueroa Cerda, member of the IA and former vice-president of the 
FECH, demonstrates this in his criticism of what he sees as the PCCh's simplistic nostalgia for 
Salvador Allende, and its willingness to uncritically integrate themselves within the ‘political 
system’. For him, the real Salvador Allende lives in the building of a new politics adequate to the 
times, not as part of a sad wax museum that no longer represents those on the streets (Figueroa 
Cerda, 2011).  
Indeed, the IA once again captured the FECH presidency in 2012, this time with Andrés 
Fielbaum, demonstrating that their anti-systemic and anti-party stance has strong appeal in at 
least the university sector. Like Gabriel Boric, Fielbaum has emphasized the need for continued 
struggle and to reach out to students in the private universities, a task that began to bare fruit in a 
massive private student demonstration in March 2013 (Vila, 2013). Tellingly, the victory of the 
IA over the JJCC in late 2012 came at a time when several Communist student leaders, including 
Ballesteros, decided to pursue the electoral path in the municipal elections of October 2012. In 
addition, Camilla Vallejo had already begun to move closer to the PCCh traditional practices. 
For example, in April 2012, she was part of a delegation that traveled to Cuba for the 50th year 
anniversary celebration of the country's Unión de Jovenes Communistas (Young Communists 
League), where she was part of a three hour meeting with Fidel Castro (“Camilla Vallejo: 
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Castro”, 2012). Not surprisingly, soon after, she announced her congressional candidacy with the 
PCCh for the then upcoming national elections held in November 2013. 
Despite some of the movement's challenges, one thing was clear at this point in time: the 
movement had inflicted strategic blows against the Piñera government, challenged the system of 
inequalities, and in so doing attracted the support of the majority of Chileans. Never before had a 
social movement, directed by democratic assemblies from below, developed with such success. 
The question then became whether the movement could build on its momentum while avoiding 
co-optation by la Concertación. Indeed, signs of unrest persisted. In the Patagonian region of 
Aysen, citizens organized themselves in the transversal movement called Tu Problema es mi 
Problema (Your Problem is my Problem). In 2012, they temporarily paralyzed the region, 
demanding from the central government a reduction in fuel prices; an increase in the minimum 
regional salary; higher pensions for retirees; citizen participation through binding consultations; 
higher quotas for artisan fishermen; subsidies for electricity and drinking water; a regionalized 
food basket and a good quality public university for the region (“Declaración Pública”, 2012) 
In addition, important changes within the CUT began to take place. On August 23, 2012, 
the CUT elected Barbara Figueroa as president, the first time a woman has been elected to this 
position. Figueroa is a PCCh member and one of the leaders of the teacher's college. She is 
therefore well versed in the issues students are dealing with and has played a highly supportive 
role throughout the demonstrations. In addition, she recently proposed a major change within the 
CUT, namely that future elections are conducted by the direct vote of the membership, rather 
than the current delegate system. Figueroa has also proposed as urgent the need to increase union 
membership while building a strong, autonomous and independent union movement  (Becerra, 
2012).  
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These proposed changes were very much in the direction of the kind of democracy being 
practiced by the students, namely an active and participatory one. Indeed, on June 26, 2012, the 
copper workers and students successfully organized a national strike demanding the 
nationalization of the copper industry and free and quality education, an event supported by the 
CUT. At the same time, however, Figueroa, following the PCCh’s strategy, went on to openly 
support Michelle Bachelet’s candidature for the Nueva Mayoría, that is, even before knowing her 
presidential program. Hence, the question remains as to whether Figueroa's affiliation to the 
PCCh will at some point generate distance between her and the movement, as was the case with 
Vallejo, or conversely, whether it can lead to democratic renovation within the PCCh.  
The Nueva Mayoría and Beyond 
Beginning in May 2011, the Chilean student movement presented the neoliberal 
administration of Sebastián Piñera with a major political challenge. Their demand for free and 
quality education aims to overturn the neoliberal educational model first entrenched in the state 
by the Pinochet dictatorship, but it goes further than this. By proposing the re-nationalization of 
the copper industry as a way to fund public education, the movement, I argued, indeed strikes at 
the heart of Chilean neoliberalism, anchored in foreign control of natural resources industries 
facilitated by an authoritarian and exclusionary state. In addition, the student movement has 
developed a new sense of power that cuts across broad sectors of society, reestablishing 
solidarity as a popular, working-class value, rather than its neoliberal version that had developed 
over the last 20 years. Lastly, the movement is actively trying to articulate a new left politics in 
the country, one that highlights the necessity for active struggle, participatory democracy, and 
new political alliances as engines of social change. For these reasons, the movement can indeed 
be said to prefigure a post-capitalist future. 
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However, as mere prefiguration, the movement faces many obstacles and ambiguities. 
These have become evident in the outcome of the most recent municipal and congressional 
elections. The winner of the 2012 municipal elections was the Concertación. It defeated the 
Sebastián Piñera-led coalition by almost 6 points, 43.21 per cent to 37.52 per cent, while winning 
106 of 345 municipalities (Servel, 2012). PCCh candidates only managed to win 6 municipalities 
(Servel, 2012). The loss of 21 municipalities forced Sebastián Piñera to immediately shuffle his 
cabinet. However, the real story of the elections is that absenteeism reached a dramatic 57 per 
cent (Servel, 2012). This can partly be explained by the anti-voting campaign organized by 
several student bodies, expressing, once again, their rejection of the established political class, 
including the PCCh, which simultaneously engaged in a pro-voting campaign, once again 
revealing its disconnection from the movement’s base. In other words, the outcome of the 
election reflects the movement's commitment to extra-parliamentary politics, and the 
Concertación's ability to capitalize on the anti-Piñera sentiments of the voting population. In 
short, it is clear that the student movement, at this point, was not able (or was unwilling) to 
crystallize its demands and ambitions into a new political organ they can trust and, as a result, 
the neoliberal Concertación gained ground.  
On the other hand, after boycotting the June 30 primaries, the IA decided to run three 
congressional candidates in the 2013 parliamentary elections, namely Francisco Figueroa 
(Ñuñoa), Daniela López (Valparaíso), and Gabriel Boric (Magallanes). The three candidates 
were elected at the organization's general meeting held in January 2013. However, the candidates 
technically ran as independents, as the IA is not a party, but a political organization. 
Nevertheless, this expressed a major shift, indeed a step forward, in the IA's politics, a step that, 
as we will see, proved more difficult in the case of the Brazilian transit movement. 
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 However, the IA move into electoral politics also reflects the organization's continued 
ambiguity about its relationship to the state and political parties. On the one hand, the IA 
promotes a politics that is vehemently independent from the established ‘political system’, and 
based on direct and participatory democracy. Hence, they refuse to work with the Nueva 
Mayoría, and have endorsed only one of its candidates, namely Cristián Cuevas, one of the 
PCCh's most left wing members. As Boric (2012) puts it in his ‘manifesto’, "Nothing that is born 
out of the Concertación is born with life.” The IA also publicly criticized Camilo Ballesteros for 
cheerleading Michelle Bachelet's candidacy in 2013 primaries, revealing the increasing tensions 
at that time between them and the PCCh. 
On the other hand, the IA became open to electing candidates who are tasked with 
‘representing’ the organization within the ‘political system’. This ambiguity in their political 
identity is also expressed in their own documents, which display a heterodox Marxist approach 
with a degree of affinity for a number of political figures whose ideas are not easily reconcilable, 
including Che Guevara, Subcomandante Marcos, and Antonio Gramsci. Hence, it is not 
surprising that their demand for the formation of a constituent assembly remains vague, and sits 
(at least) somewhat uneasily with their proposal for political decentralization. Of the three 
congressional candidates they ran in November 2013, only one was victorious, namely Gabriel 
Boric. Three other student leaders were elected also: Camila Vallejo (PCCh), Karol Cariola 
(PCCh), and Giorgio Jackson of Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution). 
Overall, the results of the election were positive for the PCCh who doubled their seats in 
congress, going from 3 to 6 (Servel, 2012). However, the big winner was Michelle Bachelet and 
the Nueva Mayoría. Receiving 62.16 per cent of the vote during the second round of voting, 
Michelle Bachelet comfortably defeated Evelyn Matthei of the right wingAlianza (Alliance) 
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(Servel, 2012). However, abstention was even higher than in the 2012 municipal elections, 
reaching 58 per cent (Servel, 2012). This again shows widespread dissatisfaction with the 
political system among the population. Nevertheless, it is clear that Michelle Bachelet managed 
to capture the imagination of the voting population with a message of change. 
Michelle Bachelet's campaign promised reforms in three key areas: education, the 
constitution, and the taxation system. In the area of education, Michelle Bachelet promised to 
eliminate profit at all levels of the public education system. This means that only nonprofit 
educational institutions will receive government funding. In addition, education would become 
the responsibility of the national government rather than individual municipalities. Lastly, she 
promised to make post-secondary education free within six years. In the area of the Constitution, 
Michelle Bachelet most notable promise is to change the electoral system to proportional 
representation, from the current binomial system developed by the dictatorship. This change 
would have to be approved via a referendum. Importantly, she specifies that any proposed 
changes to the constitution would have to come from the National Congress, making no mention 
of a constituent assembly. Finally, Michelle Bachelet promised to reform the tax code so as to 
increase public funds available for social programs, in particular, the reforms to the education 
system. Specifically, the reform aims to raise total tax revenue by a sum equal to 3 per cent of 
the country's GDP (Bachelet, 2013). 
To date, Michelle Bachelet and the Nueva Mayoría are on track to meeting their promises 
and are therefore going some way in meeting the demands of the student movement. However, it 
is important to highlight how they also fall short. Free education is granted but it is pushed six 
years into the future, that is, two years past Michelle Bachelet's current presidential term. This 
can only leave a high degree of uncertainty as to her commitment to carry out reforms during her 
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current term as president. In other words, what will happen to education reform if she is not re-
elected in 2017? In addition, the person responsible for leading the proposed changes to the 
education system is Nicolás Eyzaguirre, designated by Michelle Bachelet as Minister of 
Education. Eyzaguirre is a former director of the IMF and was the architect of the Crédito con 
Aval del Estado, the student loan system, which, as mentioned above, was partly responsible for 
the mushrooming debt loads of the student population in Chile.  
Michelle Bachelet's promises in the areas of taxation and constitutional reform are also 
problematic. Michelle Bachelet promised to raise taxes to pay for education, certainly a step in 
the right direction. However, this leaves out the students' more radical proposal for how to fund 
free education, namely nationalizing the copper industry. Similarly, Michelle Bachelet's proposal 
for constitutional reform gives the initiative to the National Congress and is focused on electoral 
reform. All citizens would do in the end is approve or reject the proposal it comes up with via a 
referendum. The student movement's more radical proposal of a constituent assembly through 
which citizens themselves can develop a variety of proposals for constitutional change is left out. 
This is important because one of the students' key demands was to do away with the current 
education law developed by Augusto Pinochet. Michelle Bachelet's proposal for constitutional 
reform may not necessarily do away with it. 
The contradictory response of Michelle Bachelet and the Nueva Mayoría to the demands 
of the student movement is consistent with the politics of neostructuralism developed by the 
Concertación in previous decades. This means we can expect both continuities and changes to 
the politics of orthodox neoliberalism promoted by the Piñera government. Although it is unclear 
how the student movement will respond to a renewed neostructuralism in Chile, its desire to 
create a new politics has made its mark inside the Chilean state. For example, Gabriel Boric and 
  170 
Giorgio Jackson recently proposed a 50 per cent reduction in salary for elected parliamentarians, 
sparking fierce debates about the elite character of the Chilean parliament (“El Proyecto”, 2014).  
In addition, in 2014, at a parliamentary homage for Jaime Guzmán, a former senator and 
key ideologue during the Pinochet dictatorship, Camila Vallejo alone remained seated in protest 
(“Camilla Vallejo No Se Puso”, 2014). It is by combining these acts of dissent inside parliament 
with a new cycle of dissent outside it that a new Chilean left can continue to grow, and with it, 
the creative potential for a new post-capitalist future. However, an important challenge also 
remains for these new student leaders. Compared to the case of Raul Godoy and Alejandro 
Lopez in Argentina, these new student politicians are at a higher risk reproducing the division 
between mental and manual labour, which gives rise to the professional politician. To avoid this, 
these new student politicians will have to continue to develop new forms of representation and 
leadership through deeper connections to the working class. Given the labour movement’s near 
decimation to the hands of Augusto Pinochet, and its subsequent incorporation within the politics 
of the Concertación during the pro-democracy struggles, building closer ties with labour 
certainly presents a difficult challenge for the movement. However, 2011 has a promising legacy 
from which to build on. 
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Chapter 6: The 2013 Brazilian Free Transit Movement 
Like the Chilean student movement, the 2013 Brazilian transit movement took place in 
the context of a wave of global struggles that began following the global economic crisis in 
2008. The case of Brazil poses an interesting analytical challenge, however. Unlike the Occupy 
movement in the US, the Spanish Indignados, or many of the Arab Springs, which occurred in 
the context of deep political and economic uncertainty, the recent Brazilian uprising took place 
in the context of relative economic prosperity and political stability. In the decade leading up to 
2013, Brazil experienced some of the highest growth rates in the world, historic levels of 
employment, decreasing poverty and inequality, and rising real incomes, all while maintaining 
high levels of democratic legitimacy. Much of this has been the result of economic and social 
policy developed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party or PT) since taking power at 
the federal level in 2003 (Barbosa, 2013; Faria, 2010).   
Faced with the paradox between economic success and rising social tension in 2013, the 
PT tried to explain the latter as a result of the first, echoing the ‘creative tensions’ thesis 
developed by Gárcia Linera in the case of Bolivia. As Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil at the 
time, put it in a lengthy interview concerning the 2013 uprisings: ”Those demonstrations were 
the fruit of two processes: a process of democratization and also the processes of social inclusion 
and growth in salaries, employment, growth in social policy, that brought millions of people into 
the middle class” (Moreno, 2013). 43 
                                                
43 See also transcript of her widely viewed televised speech on June 21, 2013 (Rouseff, 2013). 
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Reflecting on the lessons that can be learned from the demonstrations, Dilma Rousseff 
then frames the social unrest as part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic between democracy and 
protest, making reference to social improvements under the PT government: 
I think that we can learn two things. First, we learn that when people have 
democracy, they always want more democracy. When they have social inclusion 
they want more social inclusion. In other words, that in politics and in 
government action when you obtain a goal you can be sure that this is only the 
start. Just as escaping misery is only the start. It is the start of other demands. This 
is what the protests demonstrate. Second, that a government has to listen to the 
voices of the streets. A government can't stay isolated listening to itself. It is 
intrinsic to democracy being capable of coexisting with demonstrations. It is not a 
fortuitous episode, or a point outside of the curve – it is the curve. It is the curve! 
(Moreno, 2013) 
Hence, for the then President, the protests were ultimately part of a continuous process moving 
toward progress and improvement, one in which the PT government was doing its part. Similar 
views were expressed by other prominent PT members and supporters.44 
Against the above-mentioned views, I argue that the 2013 protests were a reaction to (i) 
the neoliberal continuities in Brazil's political economy over the last decade and the specific 
contradictions posed by the 2010 global crisis, and (ii) the limits of the PT strategy for social 
transformation. However, the protest also went beyond this. By developing forms of organizing 
that emphasize active and participatory democracy, building new alliances between different 
                                                
44 For example, see interview with Flavio Koutzii, long-time PT leader, on July 1, 2013 (Weissheimer, 
2013) and discussion by Emir Sader (2013a), prominent PT supporter, on July 3, 2013. 
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social and political groups, and making incursions into the existing state structures, the free 
transit movement began to prefigure post-capitalist social relations. In other words, it is an 
example of a post-capitalist struggle.  
My interpretation of the protests as a post-capitalist struggle challenges some left wing 
analyzes that see them as yet another set of diffuse social movements with little or no political 
content to offer. For example, Alfredo Saad-Filho (2013) described the movement as  
‘amorphous’ and ‘infantile’, prone to easy manipulation by the right wing media (p. 664). For 
him, the protests ultimately showed that: “Without organization, dissatisfaction – however 
legitimate, wide and deeply felt it may be – tends to be fruitless, and that spontaneous mass 
movements with a mixed class base and fuelled by unfocused anger can be destabilizing without 
being constructive” (p. 664). 
For his part, Emir Sadr (2013) describes political currents within the movement that are 
critical of the PT as ‘ultra-leftist’, and goes on to criticize them for failing to offer an alternative 
program.45 As I will show through my case study, these interpretations of the movement are one-
sided and overly simplistic, relying on a superficial understanding of its dynamics on the ground. 
It is what leads Saad-Filho (2013) to also take an uncritical position of Brazil's PT, rejecting the 
movement's targeting of the former federal government based on the fear that it would ultimately 
empower the right wing (p. 664). 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, as mere prefiguration, the movement 
contained many tensions and contradictions. Most notably, it did not fully find the new forms of 
democratic participation that it sought. As a result, like the Chilean student movement discussed 
earlier, it remained caught somewhere between the negation of the existing Brazilian political 
                                                
45 Sadr did not specify who exactly he was referring to. However, it is safe to assume Sadr was referring to 
PSOL, PSTU and the autonomist organizations. 
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system and the affirmation of something fundamentally new. However, in comparison to the 
Chilean case, it remained even more tentative in its outlook toward the state and labour 
organizations. Part of the problem was that the Brazilian movement, under the influence of 
autonomism too readily dismissed the possibility of creating a political organ that might be 
consistent with its own values and practices, something that was partly overcome in the case of 
Chile through the use of more established institutions. 
In addition, the transit movement oversimplified the role of organized labour in the 
struggle for a post-capitalist future.46 Part of this can be explained by the fact that under the PT 
government, labour had achieved meaningful gains since 2003. Consequently, until 
approximately the beginning of the global crisis, organized labour displayed relatively low levels 
of struggle, something that made the creation of strong connections between labour and the 
transit movement in 2013 somewhat challenging. Lastly, as we will see, the ambiguities and 
contradictions of the movement also opened up spaces for the emerging right wing forces that in 
2016 successfully removed Dilma Rousseff from office. 
The PT, Neoliberal Continuities and Growing Frustrations 
Rather than taking the path of the old Latin American vanguardist left, in the form of the 
guerrilla movement, or the Stalinist party, Brazil's PT, decided to try something new. Strongly 
backed by organized labour and a variety of social movements, the PT's central strategic 
challenge became to somehow combine the institutions of liberal democracy with popular 
participation by communities and movements. As Tarso Genro (2002), one of the PT's 
intellectual founders and former Governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul put it: "It's about 
                                                
46 It is interesting to note that the work of Holloway (2010) was particularly influential in the movement. 
Indeed, a number of activists organized a reading group on one of his books, Crack Capitalism, translated into 
Portuguese by one of the organizers. Holloway himself even spoke via Skype at one of the meetings.  
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opening the possibility of an indeterminate future that combines the predictability of political 
representation with the original indeterminacy of direct democracy" (p. 32). For Genro (and 
important sections within the PT), the call for direct democracy was also meant to challenge the 
neoliberal ‘consumer citizen’ whose democratic participation is reduced to market choices. To 
operationalize their strategy, the PT created new institutional mechanisms for popular 
participation, the most emblematic of which became Participatory Budgeting (PB).  
Introduced in the city of Porto Alegre in 1989, PB was an innovative experiment in co-
management and de-centralization (Weyh, 2011). Spreading to over 100 municipalities, it 
allowed communities of diverse political stripes to democratically manage a small portion of 
their city's budget. Not only did this result in more and better services for poor communities, it 
also opened a space where people could learn new democratic skills and build new solidarities 
(Baiocchi, 2003; Weyh, 2011). In PB, a virtuous cycle of democracy was unleashed: the more 
people participated, the more people learned to participate. Add to this a number of poverty 
reducing programs at the national level, such as Bolsa Familia (Family Basket), and Minha Casa 
Minha Vida (My House, My Life), and new policies of full employment, and a new path to social 
transformation was seemingly created: peaceful, gradual and democratic. 
However, it wasn't long after the PT acquired power at the national level in 2003 that 
contradictions in its political strategy became more apparent. As is well documented, led by 
Lula, the PT adopted a mainstream macroeconomic approach that, as Perry Anderson (2011) 
notes, went beyond even what the IMF demanded. It was within this macroeconomic framework 
that the PT, in line with the neostructuralist model, then tried to introduce a number of 
redistributive measures, while increasing the state's regulatory capacities (Fortes, 2009). In other 
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words, the PT attempted to combine neoliberalism with a measure of equity, a new development 
approach that Leiva (2008) calls neostructuralism.  
The contradictions of the neostructuralist path pursued by the PT soon began to take a toll 
on many of the party's progressive initiatives and commitments. As Goldfrank (2012) notes, the 
PT lost some of its enthusiasm for PB and failed to extend it to the national level. In addition, 
municipal PB became more bureaucratic and in many cases more open to the participation of 
NGOs and the business sector. In other words, PB began shedding some of its original social 
movement and community focus. Using the case of Porto Alegre, Chavez (2008) describes this 
process as the ‘watering down’ of PB. Indeed, even the World Bank jumped on the PB 
bandwagon, praising it for encouraging transparency and minimizing corruption. After all, 
despite many of its progressive characteristics, PB fit nicely with neoliberal policies of 
decentralization and the downloading of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. 
Also problematic was how the PT dealt with the issue of agrarian reform. Agrarian 
reform, the key demand of one of its most important early allies, the Brazilian Landless Workers 
Movement (MST), was effectively dropped from the PT's program. More accurately, the PT re-
articulated the MST’s demand for agrarian reform by strengthening the productive capacities of 
existing MST lands, rather than addressing Brazil's highly unequal land ownership structure, in 
which the top 1 per cent own 50 per cent of the land. In other words, of the three key elements of 
the MSTs program, namely ‘occupy, resist, produce’, the PT opted to act only on the last point. It 
did so by opening avenues for the sale of MST products throughout the country. The PT's re-
articulation of the MST’s demands has created ongoing conflict between the government and the 
rural movement (Ferrero, 2012). 
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Traditionally, the PT had also found electoral support in the middle class, particularly in 
the Southeast and urban centers. This layer of PT supporters is highly educated and politically 
engaged, strongly identifying with the party's social justice platform (Bohn, 2011). Although 
benefiting from Brazil's strong growth record for over a decade, this middle class began to face 
growing economic uncertainty, particularly as it became evident the country was not immune to 
the 2008 global economic crash.47 This came at a time when the government was spending 
billions of dollars on the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, a decision difficult to justify 
on social justice grounds. 
Unions, another traditional bastion of PT support, also went on board with this anti-
World Cup sentiment, several of them threatening strike actions during the tournament if their 
demands were not met. The proactive stance many unions took in relation to the World Cup was 
more than just conjecture. Indeed, since 2008, Brazil has witnessed an upswing of strike activity, 
which culminated in a yearly average of 560 strikes by 2012, a record since 1998 (Ribeiro da 
Costa, 2013). This development could be interpreted as reflecting rising tensions in the labour 
movement model that developed in the 1990s under the right wing neoliberal administration of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (popularly known as FHC). 
Under FHC, the labour movement began to take on a more conciliatory and collaborative 
approach toward both capital and the state. This ‘social partnership’, as Andréia Galvão (2014) 
calls these new labour relations, was strengthened by the PT when it came to power in 2003, 
with the difference that this time it yielded concrete economic gains for labour. One can contrast 
this to the case of Argentina, in which the Kirchner administrations, despite holding up the 
                                                
47 After registering 7.6 per cent growth in 2010, surpassing even its pre-crash growth levels, the Brazilian 
economy once again began to slow down, registering 3.9 per cent growth in 2011 and only 1.8 per cent in 2012. 
After a small rebound in 2013 (2.7per cent), growth all but disappeared in 2014 (0.1 per cent). Nevertheless, 
compared to the rest of the world, Brazil shows one of the strongest growth records since 2004 (World Bank, 2015). 
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Peronist banner, did relatively little to strengthen the economic or organizational power of labour 
following the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. There was a price to pay for the economic and 
political gains made by Brazilian labour under the PT, however. As Antunes and Santana (2014) 
argue, in comparison to its ‘golden years’ of the 1980s, Brazil's labour movement had been re-
oriented away from its emphasis on union freedom and autonomy and toward institutionalized 
spaces with a bureaucratized union leadership (p. 18). How far the wave of labour action went in 
disrupting this ‘social partnership’ remains difficult to say, however.  
Precarious workers and marginalized groups also faced challenges in relation to the 
World Cup. For example, people living in favelas and indigenous groups were displaced around 
the country, as new stadiums and infrastructure were built. According to one report, 19,000 
families had been displaced in Rio de Janeiro to make way for construction projects (Gibson and 
Watts, 2013). The World Cup and the summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro also attracted a wave 
of speculative activity in the housing market, particularly in urban centers. In Rio, for example, 
foreign capitalists bought up favelas with the hope that the value of the land will go up as the 
government continues it’s ‘clean up’ of the city.48 
However, these mega events are merely the tip of the iceberg. In the lead up to these 
mega events, the country experienced a growing bubble in the housing market. In part, this was 
aided by the government program known as Minha Casa Minha Vida. Launched in 2009, Minha 
Casa Minha Vida was aimed at helping poor and middle-class people purchase their own homes. 
However, as Ermínia Maricato (2013) notes, the program was designed in conjunction with 
business leaders in the housing and construction sectors. The result was a massive growth in 
private investment in the residential housing market, from approximately $1 billion in 2002 to 
                                                
48 For an excellent journalistic account of how the World Cup was used as a vehicle for dispossession in 
Brazil, see Dave Zirin (2014). 
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$40 billion in 2011 (Maricato, 2013). Although the housing boom created a growth in 
employment in the construction sector and allowed a layer of the middle class to achieve 
homeownership, many have been left out and are now facing sharply rising housing prices. For 
example, in São Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro housing prices increased by 153 per cent and 183 
per cent respectively between 2009 and 2012 (Maricato, 2013).  
This housing boom also attracted a flow of foreign capital into the real estate market. 
Although investments in the more volatile mortgage-backed securities remain very low at the 
moment, these have been expected to grow once the government-subsidized savings program 
expires (Coppola and Brandt, 2012). In other words, what Brazil witnessed at that time was the 
start of what Harvey (2003) calls a ‘spatio-temporal fix’, meaning an outlet for highly mobile 
investments at a time of low growth and austerity elsewhere in the world. Indeed, for over a 
decade, Brazil has been one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investment in the world, an 
important reason why in 2013 the developing world, for the first time, surpassed the developed 
world in attracting global investment (UNCTAD, 2013).  
As housing prices in Brazilian cities began to rise, people flocked to the peripheries. 
However, unlike countries such as Spain or Greece, Brazil has in recent years been experiencing 
historically high levels of employment, a result of the concerted effort by the PT government to 
break from the neoliberal labour policies of the FHC government. Indeed, after merely one year 
of being in power, the PT, under the leadership of Lula, created as many jobs as FHC had created 
in eight, in part, the result of significant changes to the Ministry of Labour (Berzoini, 2010). 
Improvements in the labour market continued throughout Lula’s presidency. Under the PT's pro-
labour policies, by 2009, Brazil had generated a total of 12 million jobs in the formal sector, and 
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by 2012 the unemployment rate had reached a historic low of 5.5 per cent (Lupi, 2010; Barbosa, 
2013). 
The coincidence of a booming labour market and skyrocketing housing prices means 
large sections of the Brazilian working class have to commute in and out of the city in order to 
work, putting tremendous pressure onto an already fragile transit system. In other words, the 
global capitalist crisis expressed itself in Brazil as a specific ‘mutation’ (McNally, 2011), one in 
which urban mobility became central. For example, in São Paulo the average commute time in 
2007 was more than 2.5 hours. Yet, in 12 Brazilian cities, the number of motor vehicles doubled 
between 2001 and 2011 from approximately 20 million to approximately 40 million (Maricato, 
2013). In other words, in many Brazilian cities transportation has become truly chaotic.  
Importantly, not everyone is affected equally by the heavy traffic. In São Paulo, for 
example, it has become commonplace for the rich to commute by helicopter. That they do so 
without paying any extra taxes has only served to increase the outrage of the working classes and 
poor. Unlike the rich, workers face impossibly long commutes in a transportation system that is 
privately run by a few large companies. In addition, these companies are heavily subsidized by 
the state. Indeed, in São Paulo, two owners control 7000 buses, approximately 50 per cent of the 
city's fleet, and the transportation companies as a whole receive a 20 per cent subsidy from the 
city (Bava, 2013, "Mercadoria"; Bava, 2013, "Sem Catracas"). 
As reflected in progressive sectors of the Brazilian media, people also grew frustrated 
with the PT's ‘strategic alliances’ and concessions to the right wing and capitalist class. For 
example, despite the PT's constant complaining about the corporate media in the country, these 
two supposed foes developed what can be called a tacit alliance. As Magalhães (2003) tells us, 
beginning in the 1990s, the corporate media, sensing an eventual PT victory, decided to soften 
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their stance on Lula. Their hope was that, if elected, the PT would return the favor by rescuing 
the communications sector from the crisis it was experiencing at the time. The strategy worked. 
Lula won the 2002 elections and proceeded to rescue the industry through deregulation and the 
courting of foreign investment. However, since then, the corporate media only grew more 
powerful and, somewhat ironically, resumed its highly critical postion towards the PT. 
Similar concessions were made in the area of social policy. A recent example is the PT's 
decision in 2013 to allow Marco Feliciano to be chair of the Brazil's Human Rights Commission 
(“Pastor Marco”, 2013; Watts, 2013; “PSOL apresenta”, 2013). To the outrage of the LGBTQ 
community (and progressive sectors more generally), Feliciano led an initiative that encouraged 
gay people to undergo psychological treatment, the so-called ‘gay cure’ (Foreque and Falcão, 
2013). This concession to the homophobic right wing became an important rallying cry during 
the 2013 uprisings.  
In short, in 2013, a variety of sectors normally supportive of the PT had real reasons for 
being dissatisfied with the government's handling of a number of issues. This relatively 
widespread dissatisfaction coupled with the more passive role labour took under the PT, explains 
why the transit movement articulated itself primarily within civil society. As we will see, the 
movement also showed that, far from being part of a ‘post-neoliberal’ era of steady progress and 
inclusive development, as the PT and its supporters argue (Sader, 2013b), Brazil had been facing 
important contradictions rooted in neoliberal continuities. Not surprisingly, this resulted in 
growing frustrations. In June 2013, these contradictions began to the surface, revealing the limits 
of the PT's strategy for social transformation. 
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The June Revolt: Between Negation and Affirmation 
One of the key epicenters of the June revolts was the city of Porto Alegre. Although 
relatively small in comparison to other Brazilian cities, Porto Alegre remains, politically, one of 
the most important cities in the country. For example, Porto Alegre has hosted the World Social 
Forum five times and was the birthplace of participatory budgeting. Porto Alegre's home state, 
Rio Grande do Sul, is also where the MST's origins can be traced. Lastly, historically, it has been 
a bastion of support for the PT. For these reasons, the city has been considered an important 
international reference point for progressive politics. Not surprisingly, Porto Alegre played a 
leading role during the uprisings. 
To the surprise of many, Porto Alegre elected a right wing government in 2004, that is, 
after 16 consecutive years of PT rule. Since then, the municipal government has been less 
inclined to continue with the city's history of progressive experiments. In 2012, the city began a 
number of projects related to the World Cup. Among them was the privatization of some of the 
space surrounding the city's Mercado Publico (public market). In addition, a park near the 
Gasômetro, one of the city's most important public areas, was targeted by the city for 
modification so as to allow for the expansion of a highway. In both cases, relatively small groups 
of students occupied the spaces in order to stop the projects. However, their efforts failed and the 
projects went ahead. The actions did however manage to raise awareness about some of the 
negative impacts of the World Cup. 
Parallel to this, the Comitê Popular da Copa (World Cup Popular Committee), composed 
of several groups including the MST, began organizing against the football tournament and what 
they saw as the municipal government's mistaken priorities. For example, participatory 
budgeting was noticeably weakened. Indeed, by June of 2012, only 17 per cent of the money 
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allocated through the city's PB had actually been spent (“Prefeitura investiu”, 2012). This 
continued a trend of marked under-execution of PB projects in the city since 2005 (Chavez, 
2008). In addition, there was a growing discontent about the city's public transportation, resulting 
in large mobilizations in April 2013. These mobilizations were organized by the Bloco de Luta 
Pelo Transporte Público (Struggle Block for Public Transit), and managed to stop the scheduled 
20-cent hike in transit fares. This victory marked a qualitative shift in the movement. 
Inspired by the victory in Porto Alegre, the transit movement took root in São Paulo, 
where it grew quickly and became strengthened by the participation of the Subway Workers 
Union (Costa, 2013). The transit movement is led by Movimento Passe Livre (Free Fare 
Movement), or MPL. Formed in the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, and with roots 
also in the north of Brazil, the MPL considers itself a horizontal, autonomous, and non-partisan 
movement. The movement operates throughout the country but is strongest in São Paulo. 
Importantly, although non-partisan, the MPL does not consider itself anti-party, a distinction that 
became more meaningful in the movement as events progressed. Part of the MPL's success can 
be attributed to their clear demand, namely free public transit. This demand resonated throughout 
the country, posing a direct challenge to Brazil's private transit system (Gibb, 2013). 
The magnitude of the mobilizations caught the PT totally by surprise. Indeed, during the 
first large demonstrations on June 17, there was no visible PT presence in Porto Alegre. The 
demonstration was organized by Bloco de Luta, and greatly amplified via social media networks. 
About five to seven thousand people amassed at Prefeitura Municipal de Porto Alegre (City 
Hall). The mood was confident, energetic and inspiring. Youth between 15-25 years of age were 
in the majority. People freely experimented with various chants, including, ‘Sem partido’ 
(Without a party), ‘Não nos representam’ (They don’t represent us), ‘Brasil acordou’ (Brazil 
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woke up), ‘Acabou o amor, Brasil vai virar Turquia’, (The love is over, Brazil will turn into 
Turkey), ‘Vem pra rua’ (Come to the streets), and ‘Sem violencia’ (Without violence). Street 
slogans also appeared on Twitter in the form of #vemprarua and #PasseLivre, for example. 
Some people held Brazilian flags with the words, ‘primaveira brasilera’ (Brazilian 
spring) written on them, while others held up Turkish flags.49 Clearly, in addition to the national 
context, protestors had similar global revolts in mind. In other words, this sense of international 
solidarity wasn't simply spin developed by the Brazilian right wing media, as Saad-Filho argues 
(2013, 658). Finally, placards demanded better public education, health care and an end to the 
World Cup. Interestingly, despite an anti party sentiment in sections of the crowd, party flags 
were in plain view, including those of the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and 
Freedom Party, PSOL), and the Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (Unified 
Socialist Workers Party, PSTU), socialist parties to the left of the PT. As with all subsequent 
demonstrations, protestors were met with police repression, which included the use of tear gas 
and rubber bullets. 
The next demonstration took place on June 20, only this time it brought together close to 
10,000 people. Overall, over a million people took to the streets in over 100 cities that night. 
Reflecting their relatively slow reaction to the unfolding movement (when compared to broader 
layers of civil society), it was only at this point that unions had a significant presence in 
demonstrations in Porto Alegre. This included members of Sinidcato dos Municipários de Porto 
Alegre (Municipal Workers Union of Porto Alegre or SIMPA), representing the city's municipal 
workers. Also of note is that this time, few if any party flags were in view. This was also the case 
during the following demonstrations on June 24th and 27th. However, gone were also the anti-
                                                
49 A similar movement was unfolding in Turkey at exactly the same time. The Turkish movement began as 
a reaction to the attempted privatization of Gezi park in Istanbul. Interestingly, pictures of the Turkish protests 
circulating the internet at the time would sometimes feature Brazilian flags. 
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party chants. Interviews revealed that at this point in the mobilizations the movement began to 
recognize that the anti-party sentiments were being actively spread by the corporate media as a 
way to impose their own right wing agenda. As a result, the movement consciously dropped its 
simplistic anti-party position. Indeed, they recognized that a number of parties had been part of 
the initial organizing. 
The movement's rapid learning was evident at a student assembly held at Universidade 
Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, UFRGS) on June 27th, 
where activists from a variety of groups suggested that the way forward was to develop a more 
coherent political program. In addition, at the demonstration later that night, a mysterious plane 
or helicopter was flown over the protestors, projecting a number of political messages, including 
‘Sem partido’. It was widely suspected by activists present that night that the plane was owned 
by a media company who was attempting to spread right wing, libertarian ideas. For example, 
Paulo, a former member of PSOL and now independent transit activist, thought the phrase ‘Sem 
partido’ was little more than an empty slogan that was encouraged by the corporate media to 
discredit left wing parties that were part of the movement, and create a sense of political nihilism 
among the protesters. 
That night, the crowds responded to the anti-party sentiments being spread by the media 
by borrowing a slogan from the Spanish Indignados, which most accurately captures their 
political sentiment: ‘Não nos representam’ (They don’t represent us). Later, I asked Carla 
Fernandes (Interview 59), a former MST member and prominent transit activist, if this meant the 
movement was against political parties. Her response was: "I'm not against parties…parties are 
an important tool, they are part of a historic process…One can't ignore that. But the way in 
which they organize themselves today, the way they project themselves doesn't represent me." A 
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similar sentiment was expressed by Paulo Ferreira (Interview 62), whose skepticism of political 
parties was intermixed with recognition that they can sometimes be important tools for social 
change, citing the cases of Venezuela and Bolivia. He therefore remains strategically ambiguous: 
"I don't like to follow clear formulas for social change because they don't exist.”  
The ambiguity toward political parties evident in Paulo and Carla's comments explains 
why protesters ultimately transformed a simplistic ‘Sem partido’ to ‘Não nos representam’. In 
doing so, the movement avoided co-optation by the right while asserting their commitment to 
new forms of political participation, even if these remained only partially articulated. Bruno 
Cabral (Interview 72), a founding member of PSOL, best captures the movement's tentative steps 
forward: "It's consciousness in motion. The first thing is to negate. And it's important to negate. 
The next step, the step of affirmation, is in dispute.” In other words, the movement was caught 
somewhere between negation and affirmation. 
Although slow to respond to the mobilizations, in late June, organized labour began to 
prepare for a general strike. The call was made by the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified 
Workers' Central, CUT) and many of its affiliates. The CUT is the most important union in 
Brazil with a historic relationship to the PT. As Marcelo Da Costa (Interview 78) a union 
representative for CUT's secretary of health in Porto Alegre and long time labour activist put it, 
"The PT was born out of the CUT.” According to this CUT representative, the call for the 
general strike was motivated in part by the desire to give the protests a clearer political 
orientation and a recognizable leadership. The strike was also an opportunity for the CUT to 
forward a number of demands, both traditional (i.e. reduction of the work week and agrarian 
reform), and new (i.e. quality public transportation and new investments in health and 
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education). The first since 1991 (and the fourth in Brazil's history), the general strike took place 
on July 11, 2013, and successfully brought much of the country to a standstill.  
Diverse actions were undertaken throughout the country by both workers and social 
movements, including road blockades, building occupations, demonstrations and marches. Porto 
Alegre was one of the cities most affected by the strike. The public transportation system was 
almost completely paralyzed and practically all businesses were closed. The strike also featured 
an action organized by Bloco de Luta, namely the occupation (on the night of the 10th) of the 
Câmara Municipal (Municipal Chamber). The idea was to make the Municipal Chamber a 
meeting point for the marches scheduled by both the unions and Bloco de Luta the next day. As 
expected, on the 11th, hundreds of unionists gathered in several spots throughout the city and 
marched toward the city center. In the early afternoon, Bloco de Luta asked the unions to 
continue their march all the way to the Municipal Chamber, where the occupation was ongoing. 
Once under way, the march split downtown, with about 3000 people continuing to the Municipal 
Chamber and 2000 remaining near City Hall.  
Surprisingly, the number of people on the streets was lower than in previous marches and 
demonstrations. Although organized workers were much more visible than in previous days, it 
seems the vast majority decided to stay home rather than go out to the streets. The CUT's 
explanation for this low turn out on the streets was that the transit system was paralyzed (by the 
strike), making it difficult for many workers to commute downtown. However, turnout was also 
relatively low at the meeting points outside the downtown area. In addition, the 2000 unionists 
that stayed at City Hall staged a less than energetic demonstration that lasted only a couple of 
hours. It is no surprise that, when asked about the role of unions in the movement, one prominent 
activist from Bloco de Luta later complained that their marches were "beyond boring.” Clearly, 
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Bloco de Luta weren't content with the type of leadership the CUT was looking to provide. This 
became most evident in the following ten days. 
The Struggle for the Future 
In addition to being a reaction against neoliberal continuities in Brazil and the demands 
of global capital, the June uprisings displayed a high degree of political creativity, going beyond 
the forms organization and tactics of the traditional Brazilian left. In Porto Alegre, this was most 
evident in the ten-day occupation of the Câmara Municipal (Municipal Chamber).50 This is the 
place where municipal representatives pass legislation. As we will see, the occupation is an 
example of a post-capitalist struggle. As such, the occupation began to reconfigure left politics in 
the city, creating new alliances and carving new paths for the left to pursue. However, as merely 
a glimpse of the future, this process is necessarily ambiguous, contradictory and fraught with 
tensions. This is most evident in the movement's struggle to develop new forms of political 
participation, which attempt to redefine leadership and political representation.  
The occupation was organized by Bloco de Luta, an innovative anti-capitalist political 
body created in January 2013 in Porto Alegre. Bloco de Luta is comprised of individuals from a 
variety of left wing organizations and groups, labour unions, and political parties, as well as 
nonaffiliated activists. Political parties present within the organization include PSOL and PSTU. 
Although a few individuals from the PT (including elected municipal representatives) were also 
present at first, in July 2013, activists voted to formally ban the PT from further participation, 
citing examples of repression and co-optation of the movement by the party. Groups also present 
included Frente Autónomo (Autonomous Front) and Federação Anarquista Gaúcha. Although 
many individual union members were supportive of Bloco de Luta, union locals were hesitant to 
                                                
50 Following Porto Alegre's lead, several other cities also witnessed occupations of their municipal 
chambers. 
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give formal support. The one exception was SIMPA, the municipal workers union, which from 
the very beginning gave the Bloco de Luta access to free meeting space. 
Bloco de Luta was created as a response to a perceived need by the left to create an 
organization capable of facing the growing social and political challenges in the city. Sensing a 
growing discontent about the increasing cost of public transportation, Bloco de Luta decided to 
focus specifically on this issue. Their central demand became passe livre or free fare. However, 
other issues such as healthcare and education also became part of the organization's discourse. 
The most important area of political tension within Bloco de Luta was its relationship to political 
parties. Approximately half of the individuals in Bloco de Luta were members or supporters of 
political parties, while the other half remained suspicious or rejected them. Nevertheless, these 
two groups were able to coexist in relative peace. As one party skeptic participant put it, the two 
opposing positions canceled each other out to create what he called a ‘tense equilibrium’. 
Another pro party participant described the situation similarly, as one of ‘necessary tension’. 
Based on my observations, the majority of activists within Bloco de Luta were high 
school and university students. The gender composition of the organization was well-balanced, at 
times perhaps even slightly tilted toward women. Bloco de Luta’s politics were varied, 
encompassing the whole spectrum of anti-capitalist currents, from anarchism to communism. 
One of its strongest currents is autonomism. Reflecting this, Bloco de Luta organized itself 
through assemblies based on participatory democracy, meaning political representation is at least 
kept to a minimum. The size of the assemblies varies considerably, ranging from a couple of 
dozen people to close to 500. Decisions are made by attempting to reach consensus on a given 
issue. However, consensus building is not romanticized. As Carla put it, "my god, if it was only 
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consensus, we wouldn't get much accomplished!" Hence, once debate has been exhausted and 
consensus cannot be reached, the assembly moves to a vote. 
To allow for maximum participation and inclusivity, Bloco de Luta didn’t require formal 
membership. This means anybody can participate by showing up to an assembly. Although 
participants are often members of other organizations, they don't represent these, but rather 
participate as individuals. Nevertheless, affiliation to other groups or parties is not hidden, 
creating an interesting and fluid dynamic in individuals as they shift between identification with 
Bloco de Luta and their ‘home’ organizations. For example, Roberto Henriques (Interview 66), a 
member of the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party, PCB), told me how, 
while participating in Bloco de Luta, the PCB leadership told him to deliver the ‘party line’ on a 
number of issues. Rather than following their sectarian commands, Roberto grew frustrated and 
eventually told the party leadership that, if they wanted the party line delivered, they should join 
Bloco de Luta and do it themselves. As a result, Roberto was kicked out of the PCB. 
Roberto's example reveals how participation in Bloco de Luta has the effect of countering 
sectarian and vanguardist tendencies within the traditional left. Indeed, as Roberto revealed, the 
atmosphere within Bloco de Luta was such that, when he arrived at a meeting, people would joke 
around and say, "here comes the Stalinist" (a reference to his affiliation to the PCB). In most 
situations of this nature, this type of comment would have certainly been sufficient cause for a 
war of words, if not a fistfight! The fact that this was considered an affectionate joke by all 
(including Roberto), demonstrates the high-level of solidarity and trust developed by all the 
different organizations participating in Bloco de Luta. For Roberto, this process of collective 
learning was indeed the most important aspect of the organization.  
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Similarly, when I asked Carla about some of the most important things she learned as an 
activist within Bloco de Luta, she said: "Patience! Not everybody has the same experience and 
those that don't have it need to be helped so that they do. Those that are more advanced can't be 
allowed to run ahead because then the ones behind won't come along.” In other words, as an 
experienced activist, rather than playing the role of the vanguard, Carla had to learn to move at a 
more moderate pace, simultaneously slowing herself down and speeding up less experienced 
activists. For Carla, this process created a sense of unity in the organization. In her words: 
"Despite all the internal disputes that are there I saw that everybody was there with the feeling of 
trying to build something. The points of unity were strengthened. Where there was consensus 
things were strengthened.” 
Bloco de Luta does not elect representatives and many participants claim it to be 
leaderless. However, some participants disagreed, arguing that leadership exists in a informal 
manner, what one participant called ‘leaderless leaders’. Critics of this ‘informal leadership’ 
argue that this reflects poor democratic practice, as it can lead to a lack of accountability. Faced 
with this argument, supporters of Bloco de Luta’s organizational approach claim that what is 
perceived as an informal leadership is really a more fluid leadership style when compared to 
those of traditional parties and unions. Bruno tries to explain this approach to leadership: "When 
[Bloco de Luta] was formed, nobody could lift themselves up to be the leader of everyone. It was 
a very spontaneous process on the streets and therefore in order to be a leader you had to 
dialogue with that spontaneous sentiment." In other words, rather than rejecting all leadership, 
Bloco de Luta struggled to develop a new form of leadership, one that could adapt quickly and 
continuously to the changing conditions on the ground. Not surprisingly, as my observations also 
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showed, even at more important meetings, one could see a number of different individuals 
leading a conversation or debate.  
Bloco de Luta’s attempt to develop a more dynamic approach to leadership is also evident 
in how people participate within the smaller and relatively autonomous committees formed by 
the assembly. These include, communication, food, health, legal and organization. The 
committees are fluid, forming and dissolving themselves depending on the situation. Committee 
members are not elected. To form or join, one simply has to volunteer. For Danilo Campos 
(Interview 58), a self-described autonomist, the volunteer-based committees were part of the 
beauty of Bloco de Luta. As he told me, each person is able to assess his or her own skills and 
immediately contribute to the organization. This is the case even for politically sensitive tasks, 
such as communications, the area he chose to work within.  
According to Carla, the most important committee was the "organization committee.” 
This committee was responsible for developing the political direction of the assembly and 
consisted largely of more experienced activists who already belonged to political parties or other 
groups. Hence, as Carla noted, "It wouldn't be true to say that there is no leadership.” However, 
any of their proposals would have to be approved by the assembly. As Bruno makes clear, "The 
organization committee didn't have a mandate to decide things by majority...so internally it had a 
vision of consensus.” Once again, we see here the complexities and difficulties of attempting to 
create a new, albeit still under-developed democratic form. 
Reflecting on Bloco de Luta’s organizational approach, and overall politics, it is 
important to highlight one of its weaknesses, namely that, in trying to do away with the 
vanguardist approach of the revolutionary party, it may have simply created a new type of 
vanguard. Indeed, the number of people that participate within Bloco de Luta was relatively 
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small. In addition, those who participate are largely middle class students that are already 
politically engaged and live in the urban core. Lastly, its ‘fluid leadership’ style may, in practice, 
simply empower an even smaller group of highly politicized individuals from other political 
organizations. This small informal leadership would of course be unaccountable to not only 
Bloco de Luta but also the broader population. These are serious concerns for developing a 
democratic movement that in someway pre-figures a post-capitalist society. 
On the flipside, Bloco de Luta does differ from the classic vanguard party in an important 
way, namely that it does not see itself as the more advanced layer of society that has to deliver 
the party line to others. Hence, Bloco de Luta made significant attempts to expand participation 
beyond its student core. For example, Bloco de Luta organized several actions and meetings in 
the periphery of the city that addressed issues relevant in those areas, such as police repression. It 
also reached out to indigenous communities, and Afro-Brazilian groups. Based on my 
observations, the MST also played an important role, sending representatives to many meetings 
and making rural issues also part of the discussion. In other words, although the core of the 
organization was largely students from the city's downtown, this was largely seen as a 
deficiency. Attempting to correct this deficiency yielded positive results that made Bloco de 
Luta’s demands appealing not only to students, but to broader layers of the population, as I will 
discuss below. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the informal leadership working within the 
organization could become more accountable to the larger group. It is here that the greatest 
possibility of reproducing the vanguard lies. 
The occupation of the Municipal Chamber on July 10 was Bloco de Luta’s boldest action 
during these months. The Chamber is a large space (about the size of a lecture hall) that seats 
approximately 200 people and contains offices for each of the elected representatives. The 
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chamber is surrounded by a large garden, which leads to a single entrance guarded by security 
personnel. Bloco de Luta surprised the authorities by occupying the space late at night with about 
100 activists. Once inside, they mobilized supporters via social media. Given the high risk of 
police intervention, they knew the occupation depended on the participation of a large number of 
activists. Almost immediately, supporters began arriving at the chamber. Some stayed and others 
delivered supplies such as food and medicine. At this point, the challenge was to make it through 
the first night, and wait for reinforcements to arrive the next day (the day of the general strike). 
The activist's strategy worked. More supporters began arriving at the chamber in the 
morning of the 11th. As news of the occupation spread, supporters began to organize a march 
toward the Chamber that would coincide with the marches planned by the unions. Despite 
logistical problems, by approximately 5 p.m., about 5000 people headed toward the Municipal 
Chamber. Upon arrival, people flooded the garden and quickly began to pour into the main hall, 
now renamed, Casa do Povo (people's house). Immediately, activists began ‘redecorating’ the 
space. Dozens of posters containing a variety of messages, such as,‘Passe Livre’ (Free Fare), 
‘Vamos a Luta’ (Let's go to the struggle), were put up across all the main walls. One activist put 
up a cardboard poster at the entrance of the hall, next to the photographs of all the elected 
politicians. It read: ‘Não Nos Representam’ (They Don't Represent Us). It became clear that from 
the get-go activists wanted to do democracy differently. 
From the first day of the occupation, activists organized general assemblies. Through 
them, people democratically decided everything from the general political direction of the 
movement to logistical issues such as meals and cleaning. Anybody who arrived at the Municipal 
Chamber was welcome to participate. The format of assemblies was open and fluid. Individuals 
would volunteer to chair the meetings and everybody was allowed to speak in front of the 
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microphone. Typically, meetings would begin with report backs from the various committees 
formed. Often, these committees would present the room with decision-making opportunities. 
This would lead to a period of discussion through which consensus was developed. If consensus 
was not reached, voting would follow. To vote, individuals would simply raise their hands. 
However, as several participants revealed, situations in which voting was needed were somewhat 
rare. Assemblies would last 2 to 3 hours. At any given time there would be anywhere from 100 
to 500 activists occupying the Municipal Chamber. 
On day two or three of the occupation, Bloco de Luta decided to undertake what became 
its most important political project, namely the creation of a public transit law. To accomplish 
this, the general assembly decided to form specialized committees. As usual, everybody was 
welcome to participate. Demonstrating the movement's desire to include diverse sectors of 
society, talks were soon organized with university professors, union representatives, indigenous 
leaders, and community organizers with the purpose of assessing the possibilities for creating a 
new transit system in the city. For the next few days, the Municipal Chamber became a 
laboratory of ideas, proposals and plans. People quickly agreed on the idea of free transit, 
demonstrating the movement's capacity for political coherence and organization. The biggest 
point of contention became how to pay for it. There were two sides. The first wanted the city to 
pay for it through increased taxes. The second wanted the bus companies to pay for it. After 
much debate and discussion, the second side won, and on July 15, 2013, Lei Passe Livre  (Free 
Fare Law) was approved by the general assembly (“Projecto de Lei”, 2013) 
The law had two components to it. The first stipulated free transit in the city for students 
and the unemployed. Since the law was first drafted, and as a result of subsequent discussions, 
Bloco de Luta also added indigenous communities and quilombolas (slave descendent black 
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communities) to the list (Andrade, 2013). The law made clear that the money to pay for this must 
come from the profit margin of the bus companies, and that the regular bus fare cannot be 
increased. The law also prohibits the city from subsidizing bus companies to pay for the new 
service. In addition, the law creates a municipal mobility fund for the purpose of investing in 
collective transportation, including trains, subways and bicycle lanes. This has the longer-term 
goals of reducing the number of vehicles on the roads and preserving the environment. The 
money for this fund would be raised by increasing property taxes on shopping malls, parking 
lots, unused buildings, banks and real estate ventures. As we can see, although the law focuses 
on one issue (free transit), the way it approaches it also addresses other issues, such as the 
environment and tax reform. In addition, the law includes a number of vulnerable layers of 
society beyond Bloco de Luta’s student core. 
The second component of the law mandates that the accounts for all public transportation 
in the city be made public. The motivation behind this was to find out, to paraphrase one activist 
who spoke from the microphone at a demonstration, how much money was going to workers and 
how much was being spent by the owners on champagne. The law also states that if any 
transportation company does not make its accounts public, its concession will be revoked. The 
mechanism for this, the law states, should be a public meeting held at the Municipal Chamber 
that includes participation by workers, popular movements and youth that have been elected in 
grassroots assemblies. This meeting should have a deliberative character, which would allow 
participants to revoke concessions held by any transportation company. Any transportation 
company whose concession has been revoked would temporarily become administered by public 
transportation users (workers, popular movements and youth) elected in assemblies, and 
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participants of the public audience. Lastly, if irregularities surface in the accounts of any 
company, the city is to start the process of canceling those business licenses.  
Once developed, the new law was circulated through social media. It then became a 
bargaining chip for Bloco de Luta who promised to end the occupation if the law was formally 
read and approved in the Municipal Chamber immediately after the occupation ended. At this 
point, Thiago Duarte, the President of the Municipal Chamber, accused activists of being anti-
democratic and called the occupation a coup d'état (Fogliatto, 2013). However, as one activist 
posted on Facebook, "Never did that house [the Municipal Chamber] work so much and was so 
open to the people.” Indeed, many activists felt that the most important thing about developing 
this law was showing people that not only professional politicians were capable of doing this 
work. In other words, one of the important accomplishments of the occupation was breaking 
down the division between professional politician (intellectual labour) and worker (manual 
labour). 
The accusations launched by Thiago Duarte and other authorities against Bloco de Luta 
revealed that during the occupation, not one, but two municipal chambers existed. Outside the 
Municipal Chamber were the politicians, police and the corporate media, all calling for a return 
to ‘normal’, meaning representative democracy. Inside the occupied Municipal Chamber, on the 
other hand, hundreds of activists had taking politics into their own hands and began to redefine 
democratic participation. In doing so, activists had not only created a new law that addresses one 
of the key public problems to emerge as a result of neoliberal continuities in Brazil, they had also 
built new solidarities and new subjectivities that pre-figured a post-capitalist society. In other 
words, from within the old society, a glimpse of a new one came to the surface. 
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Yet, serious contradictions remained. Bruno, described the occupation as "more of a 
vanguardist measure,” an attempt by the more conscious sectors of the movement to keep the 
struggle going at a time when broader mobilizations appeared to be waning. The occupation also 
revealed the individualistic tendencies of certain autonomists currents. Bruno refers specifically 
to the actions of a small group of activists who took nude ‘selfies’ inside the Chamber as the 
occupation was ending. These pictures made the front page of every local paper the following 
day and made the whole of the movement an easy target for those who opposed it. For Bruno, 
this incident "took a bit of the shine from the victories accumulated”. Nevertheless, as a 
participant in the occupation, he also described the experience as "political education for the 
vanguard,” citing examples of cooperation among the different currents and groups. He also 
thought the occupation was a learning moment for the broader population, as it helped to unmask 
a "crisis of representation,” with the majority of elected politicians revealing themselves to be 
"quite absent from the political life of the city”. 
Facing growing threats of forcible removal by the municipal authorities, activists formed 
negotiation teams, which included activists from a variety of political currents, and progressive 
lawyers. Even anarchists and autonomists, usually not prone to negotiate with government, 
actively participated in this process, demonstrating a high level of maturity. As Bruno put it, 
"[They] negotiated very well...with confidence, clear lines. They could've in that moment ended 
up putting their feet in their mouths and accepted anything, but that wasn't the case.” A deal was 
reached. Activists agreed to end the occupation of the Municipal Chamber and the municipal 
authorities agreed to vote in the Free Fare Law. Parallel to this, Tarso Genro, Governor of the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul, began developing his own Free Fare Law. The law (passed 
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unanimously on September 17, 2013) gives free transit to students from low income families in 
63 municipalities in the state.  
Although the free fare law developed by Tarso Genro meets some of the activists' 
demands, it nevertheless leaves some out. First, not all students are covered by it. Second, the 
unemployed and marginalized communities are left out. Third, the law will be funded by the 
state's metropolitan transportation system, not by reducing the profit margin of the bus 
companies. Lastly, Tarso Genro's Law makes no mention of the activists' demand for public 
accountability of the transportation system. In other words, the PT managed to successfully re-
articulate the movement's demands, ending or at least cooling off the conflict.  
A similar strategy was employed by Thiago Duarte at the municipal level. Once the 
occupation was ended, he argued that a public accountability law similar to the one developed by 
activists had already been tabled in the Municipal Chamber and therefore had priority. However, 
the law Thiago Duarte referred to (PL 244/2013) simply stated that 30 days prior to a fare 
increase the bus companies should make public their fare calculations. In other words, the law 
lacked all of the democratic and participatory content of the original Free Fare Law and, if it had 
been approved, it would have automatically annuled the law developed by Bloco de Luta. As the 
movement slowed down over the following weeks and months, it seemed it had settled for partial 
victories. 
Beyond the PT? 
After a week of intense street protests, in late June 2013, Dilma Rousseff invited activists 
from the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) to a meeting in order to find a negotiated solution to the 
growing social unrest. This resulted in a number of proposals by the national government, with 
the two most important ones being: a popular plebiscite for a constitutional reform, and a public 
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transportation plan with 25 billion dollars of new funding. Of the two proposals, only the funding 
was approved by the government. The popular plebiscite, on the other hand, was rejected in 
favor of the formation of a ‘working table’ to discuss the issue in the future.51 
The outcome of the negotiations means that, unlike the right wing FHC administration of 
the 1990s, which focused on minimizing the role of the state in the country, the PT was indeed 
responsive to progressive social movements and capable of incorporating some of their demands 
into its political and economic program.52 This put the PT squarely within the neostructuralist 
framework. However, the outcome of the negotiations also makes clear that there are certain 
grievances and demands that it could not handle, namely those relating to democratic 
participation.  
Indeed, the PT didn’t seem to fully grasp the participatory character of the movement's 
democratic demands. For example, during the protests, Dilma Rousseff was interviewed as 
saying: "The streets are telling us that the country wants quality public services, more effective 
measures to combat corruption and responsive political representation." However, to say that the 
movement wants ‘responsive political representation’ does not quite capture the sentiment on the 
streets. As I have argued, the movement is not interested simply in better representation, but 
rather in developing new forms of democratic expression. Although still tentative, these new 
democratic forms certainly point to a more active and participatory democracy that attempts to 
redefine traditional meanings of leadership and representation. 
However, a new kind of democracy was not something the state institutions were able to 
provide at that time, not even the most progressive ones, such as participatory budgeting. Hence, 
when the mayor of Porto Alegre, José Fortunati, speaking at a participatory budgeting session 
                                                
51 To my knowledge, this working table never materialized. 
52 See also Levy (2012). 
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following the uprisings, made a call for the movement to bring their demands and concerns into 
PB, Paulo responded angrily when I spoke to him after the session. He perhaps best summed it 
up: "Of course the mayor wants us to go to PB, PB has not accomplished anything in three 
years.” Although an exaggeration on this person's part, his comments nevertheless reveal a deep 
dissatisfaction with how democracy is supposed to happen in the city. 
Not surprisingly, throughout the protests, support for the PT dropped considerably. A poll 
of Brazilian voters taken immediately after the protests shows Dilma Rousseff's ratings had 
dropped from 57 per cent to 30 per cent, while 81 per cent said they supported the protests 
(Cascione and Benson, 2013). Importantly though, as Le Monde reports, for 70 per cent of the 
youth on the streets, these protests were their first (Bava, “governo”). This means it will likely 
take many years for the movement to develop a fully cohesive set of politics. The danger here is 
that, in the meantime, this can create new spaces for the right wing to gain ground, a point made 
by the PT and its supporters at the time.  
Indeed, the rising strength of the right wing became evident in the outcome of the 2014 
elections. Although Dilma Rousseff was reelected President with 51.6 per cent of the vote, the 
right wing did make substantial gains at the National Congress and subnational levels. In 
addition, the right wing organized large anti-PT demonstrations throughout the country in 2014 
and 2015, some of them openly calling for a military coup. As I will further discuss in a later 
Chapter, this successful mobilization by the right eventually led to the ousting of Dilma Rousseff 
as President in 2016. 
Finally, it is also important to recognize the political innovations to the left of the PT that 
began to occur as a result of the 2013 mobilizations. For example, in São Paulo, PSOL and 
PTSU formed an alliance (“PSOL e PSTU”, 2014), something discussed in other cities as well. 
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Although presenting no immediate electoral threat, the alliance between these two parties could 
perhaps represent the germ of an alternative to the PT that can better express the anti-systemic 
sentiments of the movement. However, for this to happen, the movement and any political 
organizations involved would have to jointly refine the tentative new forms of democratic 
participation developed so far. 
Suggesting a new fusion between movement and party raises important challenges to the 
autonomist sections of the movement. It asks them to recognize that the existing Brazilian state 
(as evidenced by how the PT responded to the transit movement) has a significant capacity to re-
articulate popular demands, even when these became tilted toward the status quo. Hence, by 
choosing to work ‘independently’ of the state, autonomism practically guarantees merely partial 
victories. In addition, although partial, these victories are real and demonstrate the state’s 
capacity to express working class demands through its structures. Indeed, despite its autonomist 
tendencies, the movement at least tacitly understands the importance of the state in the process of 
social transformation. After all, activists occupied Municipal Chambers rather than shopping 
centers. They wrote a law rather than a manifesto. In other words, already implicit in the 
movement is the possibility of transforming the state. However, when comparing this to the case 
of Chile, the transit movement in Brazil had greater difficulties articulating its vision of free 
public transit through the state. This can partly be explained by the fact that in Chile the historic 
role the state has played in the entrenchment of neoliberalism in the country is crystal clear, 
whereas in Brazil the PT did manage to institute ove a decade’s worth of progressive reforms. 
Another challenge for autonomists is to better theorize the role of the organized working-
class in struggles for a post-capitalist future. As seen in this case study, the CUT supported the 
movement by organizing a general strike that included demands for better public transportation. 
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However, it did so under the assumption that its more vertical form of leadership would be 
accepted by the movement. In addition, the CUT also failed to mobilize significant number of 
workers to the Municipal Chamber occupation in Porto Alegre, choosing instead to organize a 
relatively small and short-lived demonstration the day of the strike. The CUT would have done 
well to take a cue from SIMPA, the municipal workers union in Porto Alegre, which supported 
the movement from its infancy. Another example is the transit workers union that went on strike 
on January 2014 demanding, among other things, free transit for the city (Paim, 2014).53 In other 
words, within the labour movement there are gaps in which genuine solidarity will need to be 
developed. 
Ultimately, the challenge for the movement will therefore be to develop a highly 
democratic, mass political organ that is capable of forwarding long term demands through the 
state, while simultaneously transforming it. This means questioning the anti-statist views held by 
many autonomists that largely reject the possibility of making significant gains within the 
existing state apparatus, including the creation of new spaces for the development of worker self-
governance. As my case study shows, the state is a crucial arena where class forces become 
articulated and re-articulated, and where gains can be made, even if these remain partial and 
contradictory. 
At the strategic level, the challenge for the movement will be to learn how to walk a 
political tightrope between further empowering the right, and politely sweeping under the rug 
legitimate criticisms of the PT. This means the movement will need to continue delivering an 
anti-neoliberal and anti-systemic message, even if this means criticizing the PT. However, given 
the relative weaknesses of the left outside the PT, the movement will need to deliver their anti-
                                                
53 Indeed, the bus drivers union (Sindicato Dos Trabalhadores Em Transportes Rodoviários) made 
citywide free transit a condition for ending their strike. Unfortunately, they were eventually legislated back to work. 
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systemic message in a way that steers the newly politicized away from the re-invigorated right 
wing. This might mean, at times, defending the PT against further right wing incursions. 
Building this kind of organization is a long-term project that will require the building of new 
solidarities and alliances between different sectors of the working class and political 
organizations committed to social transformation. It will also require continued patience, and 
humility as the movement experiments with new forms of democracy and continues the difficult 
journey from negation to affirmation. 
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Chapter 7: Post-capitalist Struggles, the Neostructuralist Bargin 
and the Emerging Right: Possibilities and Challenges  
After almost a decade and a half, Latin America’s pink tide is now encountering serious 
setbacks at the hands of the right wing. The most important setbacks have occurred in Brazil, 
Argentina and Venezuela (with notable setbacks also in Bolivia and Ecuador). In the Brazilian 
2014 general elections, the right wing made major gains in both the national and subnational 
levels and came within 2 per cent of defeating the incumbent President and PT candidate, Dilma 
Rousseff.  Her narrow victory triggered massive right wing mobilizations throughout the country 
calling for her impeachment. Despite subsequent mobilizations lead by the CUT in support of 
Dilma Roussef, by mid 2016, she was successfully removed from office, continuing a trend 
towards institutional coups in the region (Katz, 2015).54 Dilma Rouseff’s successor is the right 
wing Michel Temer (2016-2018). Lastly, in the 2016 local elections, the PT suffered serious 
defeats throughout the country, confirming the right wing swing. 
In Venezuela's 2015 parliamentary elections, Chavismo took a crushing defeat to the 
right wing Mesa de la Unidad (Unity Table, MUD), who now holds a super majority in the 
National Assembly. This victory occurred in the context of renewed right wing mobilizations. 
Their 2015 electoral success emboldened the right wing that subsequently attempted to remove 
President Nicolás Maduro from office via a recall referendum and renewed street mobilizations. 
Finally, in Argentina's 2015 presidential election, the right wing candidate, Mauricio Macri, 
defeated the Peronist candidate, Daniel Scioli, in a second round of voting. The defeat of Daniel 
Scioli came only months after massive national strikes that were highly critical of the incumbent 
leftist administration.  
                                                
54 Katz highlights three cases: Haiti in 2004, Paraguay in 2012 and Honduras in 2013. 
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Immediately upon assuming power, Presidents Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Michel 
Temer in Brazil began implementing aggressive neoliberal measures, including the dismissal of 
tens of thousands of public sector workers, reforms to labour laws, and new rounds of 
privatizations (Fabry, 2016; Saad-Filho, 2016). In Brazil, the stakes are particularly high as 
President Michel Temer has begun to set the stage for the full privatization of Petrobras. There is 
no doubt that this is the path the Venezuelan right will also take if it takes power in the country. 
In other words, Latin America is currently sitting at the brink of the biggest round of 
accumulation by dispossession since the 1990s.  
In recent months, a number of explanations for the rise of the right have emerged (Prieto, 
2015; Webber, 2015; Zibechi, 2015; Katz, 2016). First, it is argued that leftist governments have 
failed to overcome the region’s dependency on primary exports, and in some cases have even 
deepened this dependency. Consequently, the recent downturn in global commodity prices have 
undermined the capacity of these governments to continue providing the popular classes with the 
kind of material benefits that they have come to expect.  
Some cases are particularly acute, notably that of Venezuela. As Edgardo Lander argues 
in a recent interview, through massive public expenditures funded by oil revenues, the Chavista 
government simply reinforced the damaging rentier logic that has been part of the country’s 
DNA for over a century (Prieto, 2015, pp. 2-3). Not surprisingly, Lander continues, the fall of oil 
prices triggered highly individualistic and competitive responses from the popular classes, such 
as the bachaquero phenomenon (Prieto, 2015, p. 6), in which people make a living by buying 
and then reselling the now scarcer government subsidized goods at a profit. 
A second explanation given for the receding strength of the pink tide are the continued 
concessions given to the business-class by these governments, particularly following the recent 
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economic downturn in the region, and growing pressures from the right. Brazil is a notable 
example of this. Following over a decade of strong growth and economic stability, the country 
faced a sharp economic downturn beginning in 2014. In response to this, Dilma Rousseff, once 
reelected president in 2015, went back on her campaign promises and appointed the ‘ultra-
liberal’ Joaquim Levy as economic minister. Amidst mass right wing protests calling for her 
impeachment, what followed was the introduction of a series of orthodox austerity measures for 
the benefit of financiers and international markets (Katz, 2016, p. 4). 
A third explanation given is the top-down and sometimes even authoritarian elements 
present within some of the pink tide governments. Perhaps the most acute case of this is evident 
in Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez (a former military man) gave the military a prominent role in 
the government’s vision of 21st century socialism by, among other things, appointing it to 
manage the functioning of various social programs under the concept of civic-military unity. 
However, as Lander argues, the verticalism that the military, by definition, represents is not 
easily reconciled with the horizontal and participatory character of community organizations 
such as the communal councils (Prieto, 2015, p. 70).  
Lastly, the recent failures of the pink tide are attributed to their apparent disconnection to 
the demands and desires of the same social movements that helped to put them in power in the 
first place. As Katz (2016) notes, during the 2014-2015 national strikes in Argentina, the 
government along with progressive sectors of society denounced the workers as egotistic and 
under the influenced of the right (pp. 5-10). We have already seen a similar disconnection 
between the left in power and social movements at the base in the case of the 2013 transit 
uprisings in Brazil. Webber (2015) and Raúl Zibechi (2015, 2016) seperatley point to si
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disconnections evident in recent indigenous uprisings against various policies pursued by 
President Rafael Correa (2007-2017) in Ecuador. 
The significant setbacks experienced by the pink tide in the last three years force us to 
grapple with the question of how to understand the pink tide cycle as a whole, in particular, its 
limitations for social transformation. Reflecting on the pink tide’s shortcomings outlined above, 
some of the same commentators conclude that the last 15 years have been largely a failure for the 
working class and oppressed. In a recent intervew, Lander, for example, denounces the project of 
21st century socialism in Venezuela as the victory of a rigid logic in which the state tries to 
control and manage from above (Prieto, 2015, p. 5-6). For Zibechi (2016) the real winner during 
this period was extractivism, which left social movements weaker and more fragmented than 
before the pink tide arrived (p. 3). Similarly, for Webber (2015) the pink tide represents a 
‘passive revolution’ in which left governments coopted and then exhausted social movements to 
guarantee continued domination by capital (pp. 16-21). 
However, understanding the pink tide as simply a failure for exploited and oppressed 
workers and communities conceals just as much as it reveals, risking overly simplistic strategic 
prescriptions. These include calls for autonomous forms of local resistance independently of the 
state (Zibechi, 2007, 2015; Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2011), or the pursuit of a decisive rupture against 
the capitalist state through the creation of a revolutionary party (Webber, 2011). However, as my 
case studies show, the pink tide has at various moments been able to articulate, though certainly 
in a distorted and partial form, the demands of the popular classes. This reality undermines 
strategies that dismiss a battle through the capitalist state. 
Furthermore, workers and communities have made important advances independently of 
the reforms implemented by the pink tide governments. As I discussed throughout this thesis, 
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these consisted of prefiguring a post-capitalist future by articulating new forms of cooperation 
and democracy. In other words, these movements are building a post-capitalist future despite the 
lack of a revolutionary rupture. In addition, they are doing this, not by retreating into local forms 
of resistence or building a new vanguard, but by building new political capacities through the 
existing state. As ambigious and contradictory as these processes have been, they nevertheless 
represent an important qualitative advance for the radical left, as they point beyond the 
limitations of vanguardism, autonomism and social democracy. 
The partial and contradictory character of both post-capitalist struggles and pink tide 
governments is best understood through the concept of the neostructuralist bargain. Faced with 
post-capitalist struggles, the pink responded with a specific bargain. Consistent with the central 
goals of neostructuralism, as outlined in Chapter 2, this bargain consisted of the implementation 
of a number of economic reforms that successfully diminished poverty and inequality in the 
region, and therefore helped to incorporate into the new political project the more vulnerable 
sectors of the population. In other words, the neostructuralist bargain emerged as an important 
tactic through which the pink tide attempted to patch up the contradictions inherent in the 
neostructuralist model, or as Leiva (2008) puts it, an attempt to extend neostructuralism’s ‘shelf 
life’ by closing the gap between political rhetoric and economic reality (p. xxxii). 
However, given the contradictory character of neostructuralism, this political bargain 
generated a number of fault lines and therefore by no means guaranteed continued legitimacy for 
the pink tide. Indeed, as Cavooris (2017) suggests, the ambivalence and moderation of pink tide 
governments became an important factor behind the rise of the right (p. 14). This becomes 
clearer once we understand the divisive character of the neostructuralist bargain pursued by the 
pink tide. In this bargain, the most vulnerable received small material gains, while the radical 
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alternatives beyond liberal democracy demanded by post-capitalist struggles were sidelined. In 
short, some got more of what they already knew, while others faced the disappointment of unmet 
demands and expectations. This is of course the opposite of a productive dialectic based on 
‘creative tensions’ between movements and left governments (Gárcia Linera, 2011).  
The Neostructuralist Bargain 
The fault lines created by the divisive and partial character of the neostructuralist bargain 
varied depending on the country and demanded that pink tide governments walk a delicate 
political tight rope in order to stay in power. This political tight rope, I argue, is the key to 
understanding both the advances the Latin American right has made recently, as well as the 
possibilities and challenges post-capitalist struggles faced under the pink tide and continue to 
experience in the current conjuncture. We can see this political tightrope at work in the cases of 
Chile, Brazil and Argentina (I discuss Venezuela separately). 
Brazil 
In Brazil, the neostructuralist bargain was evident in how the PT government responded 
to the transit movement. Through the Lei Passe Livre  (Free Transit Law), developed by Bloco 
de Luta during its City Hall occupation, the transit movement in Porto Alegre combined a 
material demand, free public transportation in the city for students and oppressed communities, 
with a political demand, the democratization of the transit system via the use of a popular 
assembly based on participatory democracy. Similar demands were made by the transit 
movement in other cities as well. The demands of the transit movement represented a direct 
challenge to the market-based logic of neoliberalism, while simultaneously pointing to a post-
capitalist future. 
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Of the demands developed by the movement, the PT partially met the first one. At the 
state level, the PT governor, Tarso Genro, drafted a new transit law that gave free transit to low 
income students in 63 cities, to be paid for through the state's transportation fund. At the national 
level, then President Dilma Rousseff approved US$25 billion of new funding for urban 
transportation. However, the PT did not make any movement on the demand to democratize the 
transit system and Dilma Rousseff's proposal of constitutional reform via popular plebiscite was 
postponed. The moves made by the PT were successful in temporarily ending the conflict. In 
other words, the PT was able to successfully manage a political bargain: those most in need 
would see a better standard of living. In return, the existing institutions of liberal democracy 
were protected as a result of the legitimacy acquired by their capacity to meet some popular 
demands. 
The reelection of Dilma Rousseff (51.6 per cent of the vote) in 2014 confirmed the 
success of the neostructuralist bargain and the PT’s capacity to extend neostructuralism’s ‘shelf 
life’ in the short-term. However, the narrow margin of Dilma Rousseff’s victory, as well as the 
subsequent right wing mobilizations showed the fragility of the bargain struck. Dilma Rousseff’s 
reelection was clinched by the more impoverished north of the country, while the PTs traditional 
base in the south continued to gravitate to the right (with small movement also to the left). 
Indeed, the 2014 election re-affirms the progressive shift in the PTs social base since coming to 
power (Katz, 2015, p. 27). The election also shows the dangers of the divisive and partial 
character of the bargain struck. 
To better manage this political bargain, the PT would have had to solidify its base in the 
north of Brazil by quickly expanding national pro-poor programs such as Bolsa Familia, Mais 
Médicos and Minha Casa Minha Vida, which target low income populations. However, this 
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became increasingly difficult as the economic conditions for neostructuralism (commodities 
boom, high growth, and a relatively high exchange rate) rapidly worsened. In addition, the 
middle class, highly susceptible to right wing ideology, began mobilizing against the PT and its 
pro-poor programs, mistakenly equating these with Venezuelan Bolivarianism. 
In short, from 2013 to 2015, the PT struggled to walk the fragile political tight rope 
between the popular classes, a section of which slowly gravitated to parties to the left of the PT, 
and the new middle classes who are rapidly gravitating toward the right. Just how fragile this 
tight rope became was evident during the massive right wing protests that took place in March 
2015 and again in early 2016. The right wing movement called for the impeachment of Dilma 
Rousseff, the arrest of Lula, and sections of it even openly called for military intervention against 
the PT. This phenomenon demonstrates the rapid growth of extreme right wing sectors since they 
became relatively more visible during the uprisings in 2013.  
The right wing upheaval that began in early 2015 also demonstrates the PT's incapacity to 
sufficiently adapt neostructuralism to provide longer-term progressive solutions Brazil's ongoing 
political and economic problems. Hence, facing growing right wing critique, the PT responded 
by implementing fiscal austerity measures (Romero, 2015). These measures disproportionately 
hurt the working class, something that likely further undermined the PT's left-wing base, but also 
failed to appease the right wing middle class that, looking to restore orthodox neoliberalism, 
continued to antagonize the PT. Consequently, in 2016, it was the right wing that was able to 
break through the contradictions of the neostructuralist bargain, successfully removing Dilma 
Rousseff from power via a parliamentary coup, and later making further electoral gains in the 
2016 local elections. 
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Given the PTs inability to find progressive solutions to Brazil's current political and 
economic conjuncture means that these will have to be found elsewhere. Unfortunately, despite 
recent small electoral gains by PSOL and PSTU as well as some attempts of cooperation 
between these two anti-capitalist parties, the left outside of the PT remains extremely weak. 
Their weakness can be explained by the continued historic alliance between the PT and labour, 
which leaves the radical left having to appeal to more diffuse and inexperienced movements in 
civil society. Furthermore its interpretation of the recent political situation seems out right 
baffling, with PSOL's leadership tacitly supporting the anti-PT demonstrations on the grounds 
that they represent a ‘que se vayan todos’ (everyone must go) moment in Brazil (Assuncão, 
2016). It is therefore difficult to see how further right wing victories in the country can be 
avoided in the coming years. 
Chile 
In Chile, the new Nueva Mayoría government, led by Michelle Bachelet, expresses a 
similar political bargain. The 2011 student movement demanded free education, to be funded 
through nationalization of the copper industry. The movement also included a political demand, 
namely a constituent assembly. For the movement, this implied the opportunity to repeal the 
existing education law originally developed by the Pinochet regime as part of the 1980 
constitution. However, a constituent assembly would also open up the possibility for potentially 
far-reaching reforms and transformations to the political system in the country. Responding to 
these demands, in her election campaign, Michelle Bachelet promised three things: tax reform, 
electoral reform, and free education by 2019. To date all three promises have been kept. 
This means that the Bachelet government has succeeded in meeting some, but 
importantly, not all of the student movement's demands. Left out from the reforms implemented 
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is the demand for a constituent assembly. Instead, Michelle Bachelet will implement electoral 
reform, specifically, a switch to proportional representation. Although this reform breaks from 
the binomial system developed by Augusto Pinochet, which disproportionately favors right wing 
parties, other changes to the constitution, including the elimination of Augusto Pinochet's 
education law, are not addressed. 
 Also left out from the bargain is the demand for the nationalization of the copper 
industry, as a way to pay for free education. This is replaced by progressive tax reform. In short, 
the Bachelet government is making a neostructuralist bargain: material improvements to some of 
those most affected by neoliberalism in return for the safeguarding of existing liberal democratic 
institutions. Paradoxically, however, to safeguard the existing democratic institutions in Chile is 
to legitimize the highly authoritarian character of Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution. 
At first glance, Chile's neostructuralist bargain is more stable in comparison to Brazil's. 
The Nueva Mayoría convincingly defeated the right wing in the 2013 elections (Michelle 
Bachelet won with 62 per cent of the vote). This suggests that, unlike the PT in Brazil, the Nueva 
Mayoría has successfully extended neostructuralism’s shelf life, at least in the short term. 
However, a closer look reveals a more complex situation. Michelle Bachelet's victory occurred in 
the context of shocking degrees of electoral absenteeism (58 per cent), largely a result of the 
deep mistrust the student movement has of electoral politics, and the state more generally. 
Michelle Bachelet's biggest immediate threat is therefore not the almost completely discredited 
right wing, but the possibility of further alienating the student movement and triggering another 
cycle of mass mobilizations. However, without a clear and viable political alternative to the 
Nueva Mayoría, it is difficult to see what could come of this.  
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On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, the outcome of the 2013 elections 
witnessed important changes that could give the anti-capitalist left new opportunities within the 
state. Most notably, unlike previous center left coalitions, such as la Concertación, the Nueva 
Mayoría now includes the Communist Party. In addition a number of young student movement 
leaders were elected to parliament, most notably, Camila Vallejo (PCCh) and Gabriel Boric, who 
ran as an independent as part of a political group called Izquierda Autónoma (Autonomist Left).  
It is perhaps through these new left forces within parliament, working alongside 
movements outside it, that a better articulated anti-capitalist left can eventually emerge. 
However, for this to happen, the Izquierda Autónoma will have to develop a base beyond its 
current student core, or else it risks reproducing the capitalist division between mental and 
manual labour, in which it is educated intellectuals, rather than workers, that become political 
leaders within the state structures. 
Argentina 
In Argentina, looking at the Kirchner administrations in relation to the ERT movement 
also reveals a neostructuralist bargain, one in which material gains trump demands for new forms 
of democracy and collective participation. The upsurge in grassroots democracy throughout the 
country following the 2001 political and economic collapse expressed a tentative alternative to 
the institutions of liberal democracy, the most lasting of which became the ERT movement. 
Specifically, their struggle for the expropriation of bankrupted firms and the formation of a 
collective workplace is a direct challenge to the liberal institution of private property. 
Although the new bankruptcy law passed in 2011 is supposed to help workers form 
cooperatives at firms threatening bankruptcy, its implementation has actually benefited workers 
in merely a fraction of disputed cases (Ruggeri, 2014). Additionally, it only addresses new cases, 
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leaving out those ERTs that have already been formed and continue to exist in a precarious legal 
status. The 2011 bankruptcy law can therefore in no way be interpreted as a transformation in the 
institution of private property within the state. At best, it represents a small opening for workers 
under threat of unemployment to pursue legal battles they are not likely to win. At worst, 
because it only applies to new cases, it actually legitimizes the precarious legal status of already 
existing ERTs, meaning it ultimately reinforces the notion of private property the movement 
challenges. 
The Kirchner government made two more changes in relation to the ERT movement. 
First, it created a new division within the Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social 
(National Institute for Associations and the Social Economy or INAES) that is responsible solely 
for the ERT movement. This new division provides the ERT movement legal assistance, small 
subsidies and education on the formation of cooperatives. Given that INAES oversees the 
solidarity economy as a whole in the country, the creation of this new division to oversee a small 
fraction of this sector is not insignificant. However, the support that INAES provides the ERT 
movement is of course bound by the 2011 bankruptcy law and therefore expresses all of its 
limitations.  
Second, before its defeat to current President Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) in 2015, the 
Kirchner government began to propose modifications to the public pension system that would 
allow cooperative workers easier access to it. This is a demand the ERT movement has been 
fighting for sometime and in theory would give individual ERT workers important material gains 
while also giving a material incentive to prospective ERTs. However, these changes to the 
pension system are likely to never materialize under President Mauricio Macri. 
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More broadly, the Kirchner administrations, like all other pink tide governments, engaged 
in number of economic reforms aimed at the unemployed, poor and marginalized. These include 
subsidies through a number of social programs, such as Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados, Programa de Capacitación y Empleo and Plan Manos a la Obra. The result of 
these programs has been twofold: small material gains for the most vulnerable sections of the 
population and also containment of the social unrest that exploded in 2001.  
However, as Féliz (2012) argues, these small economic reforms have been coupled with 
the continuation and intensification of precarious labour as the basis for accumulation, a posture 
that directly undermines classic Peronist principles. In other words, the application of the 
neostructuralist bargain sowed a division between Kirchnerism’s own base of support, namely 
labour and more marginalized sectors. However, in the short/medium term the result was 
nevertheless a growth in the popularity of Kirchnerism, reaching its peak in 2011 when Christina 
Kirchner was elected President with 54 per cent of the vote.  
 The overwhelming skepticism of the political system that Argentinians held in 2001 had 
no doubt dissipated by 2011. The neostructuralist bargain had worked: the lives of some of the 
most vulnerable were improved while the institutions of liberal democracy acquired a new 
legitimacy. As the economic conditions for neostructuralism began to weaken, the appeal of 
Kirchnerism would also start to wane, however. In the 2013 parliamentary elections, both the 
right wing and the left outside of Kirchnerism made important gains, demonstrating the Cristina 
Kirchner government’s inability to sufficiently adapt neostructuralism to changing 
circumstances. National strikes critical of the Kirchner government in 2014 would confirm the 
long-term dangers of the divisions sown by the neostructuralist bargain in the previous decade.  
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Where might progressive alternatives to Kirchnerism emerge from in the current 
Argentinan context? As Pozzi and Nigra (2015) argue, the Argentine electorate is divided into 
three parts: 30 per cent pro Kirchner, 30 per cent center-right and a 30 per cent heterogeneous 
anti-Peronist left. It is within this latter third that a new left capable of articulating an alternative 
to capitalism could emerge. Particularly notable is the Workers Left Front in Neuquén. The 
Workers Left Front has been drawing on the experiences of the recuperated factory movement to 
build a new kind of party based on the values of cooperation and participatory democracy, values 
that redefine classic Peronism. However, its relative small size will likely require alliances with 
other left parties in the coming years. In the meantime, it was the right that capitalized the most 
on the waning popularity of Kirchnerism, evidenced by the presidential victory of right wing 
candidate Mauricio Macri in 2015.  
Beyond Neostructuralism: Venezuela and 21st Century Socialism 
As mentioned above, the case of Venezuela departs from the three previous cases. In the 
last 15 years, Chavismo has not only strengthened the institutions of liberal democracy through, 
for example, the increased use of referenda and plebiscites, it has also tried to transform them. It 
has done so by actively supporting experiments in participatory democracy, such as cooperatives, 
co-managed enterprises and communal councils. In recent years, these have consolidated into the 
creation of communes, new political economic entities that seek to replace the traditional 
political institutions of liberal democracy. Today these communes amount to 1620 throughout 
the country (Pearson, 2016).  
In addition, Chavismo has delivered significant material gains to the working classes 
through a variety of misiones (missions) in areas such as health, education, food and housing. 
The funds for all of these new initiatives come from the country's oil sector, re-nationalized 
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under Hugo Chávez for the purpose of distributing wealth to the poor. The result has been a 
dramatic decrease in poverty and inequality in the country. For all of these reasons, Venezuela 
can be said to be the only one of my cases to go beyond the neostructuralist model. 
On the other hand, the Chavista government has encountered important structural and 
political limits to further transformations in Venezuela. Structurally, despite its efforts, the 
Venezuelan government has not been able to break, or even significantly reduce, the country's 
import dependency. In other words, as a whole, its efforts in creating a new endogenous 
economic model that breaks from the legacy of the magical state have largely failed.  
In addition, the new spaces for popular democratic participation remain embedded within 
the structures of the capitalist state, which continues to promote capitalist accumulation. As such, 
they simultaneously promote human development and cement the logic of technocracy and 
modernization as part the project for 21st century socialism. In other words, these new popular 
power institutions only partially break from the Venezuelan state’s legacy of ambitious 
modernization projects from above. It is therefore not surprising that the emerging ‘communal 
state’ in the country has become increasingly subject to bureaucratic, authoritarian and 
militaristic tendencies within the Chavista government and the Partido Socialista Unido de 
Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV) (Maya, 2014). Indeed, as Striffler (2017) 
notes, significant sections of the state remain hostile to communal power (p. 19).55 
The coexistence of an embryonic socialist future with the capitalist present within the 
state makes Venezuela the most volatile of my case studies. Venezuela's extreme import 
dependency means that economic stability is in turn dependent on a highly unstable global oil 
market. The plunge of oil prices in recent years has unleashed economic chaos in the country, as 
                                                
55 For this reason, the post-capitalist phase seems to be coming to an end in Venezuela. However, traces of 
post-capitalism are still present and it remains unclear how these might re-emerge in future struggles. 
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the government struggles to acquire the foreign currency needed to pay for its social programs 
and the middle class struggles to maintain its consumption patterns based on imported goods. 
This is all aggraveated by the right wing’s campaign of economic sabotage, including the 
reduction of production and/or the limiting of imports for the domestic market (Striffler, 2017, p. 
12). 
This economic chaos has forced the government into a constant cycle of drastic currency 
devaluations, which have only increased currency speculation in the country. The result has been 
the erosion of the government's Chavista base and the political empowerment of the capitalist 
and middle classes. This became evident in the 2012 national elections in which Chavismo won 
by the narrowest margins yet, electing Nicolás Maduro (2013-2018) as President with 51 per 
cent of the vote. However, Chavismo recovered in 2013, winning the parliamentary elections 
with 56 per cent of the popular vote. The result was in part due to President Nicolás Maduro's 
progressive popular measures in the face of a sinking local currency, including significant price 
regulation and a temporary takeover of businesses deemed to be engaged in speculation 
(Striffler, 2017). 
Nicolás Maduro’s, victory, however, only intensified Venezuela's volatile political 
climate, triggering one the most significant right wing demonstrations yet, in late 2013 and early 
2014. Led by the middle class in the state of Merida, historically a bastion of right wing support, 
the demonstrations spread to other provinces and cities, including the capital. Although the 
demonstrations eventually subsided, the plunge in oil prices that began in late 2014 unleashed 
another cycle of political volatility, this time including a renewed coup attempt led by retired 
generals that was thwarted by the government. Adding to the volatility, the United States 
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temporarily categorized Venezuela as a threat to national security, raising the possibility of an 
intervention similar to the failed coup of 2002.  
Facing a growing political crisis and the growing possibility of electoral defeat, some 
currents within Chavismo came to embrace the Golpe de Timón (Change of Course) strategy 
developed by former President Hugo Chávez, which calls for a direct confrontation with the 
capitalist class (“Golpe de Timón”, 2015). However these forces remain small. Consequently, in 
the 2015 parliamentary elections, it became clear that right wing had the momentum, as the 
MUD convincingly defeated Chavismo and began leading a campaign (to this date unsussesful) 
to remove President Nicolás Maduro from office via a recall referendum.     
Despite these recent right wing victories in Venezuela, the Bolivarian Revolution has 
shown that building an alternative to neoliberalism, and indeed capitalism, is possible and that 
the state is central for accomplishing this. Venezuela is the only case in which the popular 
classes not only got more from the state, but in which the state also opened new avenues through 
which horizons beyond capitalism could be pursued. The case of Venezuela therefore reinforces 
the position that the left cannot adhere to a functionalist view of the state, meaning one in which 
state action is always seen as functional to the reproduction of capital and therefore needs to be 
either smashed by a vanguard or altogether avoided. The case of Venezuela best demonstrates 
that the state is the articulation of class forces (even when tilted in favor of capital). As 
Poulantzas (2000) put it: 
The state takes into account the relationship of forces with the dominated classes 
as well as their specific resistances. But within this framework, it adopts essential 
measures in favor of expanded reproduction of capital, elaborating them in a 
political manner such that, through certain concessions to the dominated classes 
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(popular conquests), they may guarantee the reproduction of the class hegemony 
and domination exercised by the bourgeoisie as a whole over the popular masses. 
(p. 185) 
For Poulantzas, the strategic implication of this for the dominated classes was the need to 
develop an alliance between left governments and social movements in what he called a 
‘democratic road to socialism’. This strategy pushes us to think about what kind of parties and 
movements are needed in the process of social transformation, something Poulantzas was 
ultimately not able to do. However, the cases I have presented here, of which Venezuela is 
particularly notable, allow us to think through some of the silences left by Poulantzas on this 
issue.  
As I have argued in this thesis, the seeds of a post-capitalist future can be found in the 
present, in struggles against various forms of dispossession that are simultaneously able to 
articulate the powers of the collective worker through new forms of cooperation and democracy. 
In addition, we saw how an important aspect of these struggles was their ability to articulate, to 
various degrees of success, new forms of political organization that can contest state power while 
challenging traditional forms of leadership and representation.  
In other words, Poulanzas’s ‘alliance’ between left government and movement can be 
best thought of as a fusion between them, one in which it is post-capitalist struggles that emerge 
as central to the task of transforming the state. Therefore, to echo Robert Cavooris (2017), it is 
by drawing on forces that express new forms of reproducing their material lives that the divisions 
held and reproduced by the capitalist state can be overcome. This is what a ‘new democratic road 
to socialism’ would have to consist of. Unfortunately, the increasingly authoritarian character of 
the Chavista government and the PSUV is greatly limiting this path.  
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Possibilities and Challenges on the Road to Socialism 
In this section, I draw on my case studies to discuss the possibilities and challenges of 
how a ‘new democratic road to socialism’ could be built in Latin America in the current 
conjuncture. As I argued earlier in this Chapter, the neostructuralist bargain’s partial and divisive 
character created a delicate political tight rope for the pink tide, a situation that opened the doors 
for the right wing.  
The ability of the right to more successfully break through this bargain forces us to also 
reflect on the internal weaknesses and challenges of the movements discussed, which restricted 
their ability to resolve their ambiguities and tensions in their struggle for a post-capitalist future. 
However, as will be seen, these weaknesses and tensions are intertwined with new possibilities 
for greater unity and cohesion. Given these contradictions, in the context of the current historical 
moment in Latin America, a ‘new democratic road to socialism’ must necessarily remain a 
tentative proposition.  
As my case studies show, post-capitalist struggles experience challenges and weaknesses 
in the areas of leadership, democratic participation and political representation. In addition, my 
case studies reveal important differences and challenges relating to where movements originate 
as well as their social and political composition. These include the speed at which movements 
can develop significant political cohesion in relation to opposing forces and the institutional 
stability through which fragmentation and division can be overcome. In what remains of this 
chapter, I address each of these themes.           
Democratic Participation: Representative or Direct?        
One of the areas of tension evident in my case studies is the relationship between 
representative and direct or participatory democracy. Representative democracy refers to the 
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process in which individual leaders are elected to politically represent a group. Once elected, 
leaders are free to make decisions for the group without the need for further consultation with the 
group that elected them. Representative democracy is therefore relatively vertical as decisions 
made at the top are supposed to be followed by the bottom with little or no further discussion. In 
addition, a number of formal processes are associated with representative democracy. These 
include competitive elections and voting. Lastly, representative democracy tends to rely on fixed 
dates and preplanning for elections. On the other hand, direct democracy means people make 
decisions directly without the need of a representative. It is therefore a more horizontal form of 
democracy. In addition, rather than using elections and voting, it often on voluntary spokes 
people and consensus building. Direct democracy also tends to happen more spontaneously, with 
dates and locations being more fluid. 
All of my case studies demonstrate that although tensions often exist between direct and 
representative democracy, it is possible to combine them. In addition, the tensions that exist 
between these two forms of democracy can be productive and lead to unity, even if fragile and 
contradictory at times. In Venezuela, workers at SPUs practiced participatory democracy within 
a workplace that is owned and partially managed by a representative state. In Argentina, the 
productive combination of direct and representative democracy was even more marked. Workers 
at recuperated factories made decisions directly through assemblies, but they often also elected 
leaders to different positions of increased responsibility. In one case, Zanon, elections of the 
leadership even took place through competing slates that resemble traditional partisan politics. 
Workers at Zanon even went as far as electing one member, Raúl Godoy, to run for the 
provincial legislature, a position Godoy won and went on to share with other coworkers while 
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retaining his status as worker at the factory. In other words, at Zanon, we see the unusual 
combination of direct workplace democracy with representative democracy through the state. 
We see a similar situation outside of the workplace. In Chile, the student movement 
combined relatively spontaneous popular assemblies on the streets or at university campuses 
with the formal representational mechanisms of the university student bodies. In other words, the 
president of the CONFECH could on the same day be making decisions for the students that 
elected him or her for that position, and participating in campus assemblies based on direct 
democracy. This mix between representative and direct democracy is also evident in the 
Autonomous Left, a political group (not exactly a party) that promotes horizontal politics but 
nevertheless helped elect one of its members, Gabriel Borich, to the CONFECH presidency and 
later to the Chilean national Parliament. In Brazil, Bloco de Luta expressed a mix of 
representational politics and horizontality that yielded a ‘tense equilibrium’ through which clear 
demands were pursued that resulted in victories. Rather than rejecting all leadership, activists 
struggled with developing new forms of leadership and representation. Party members 
commingled with party skeptics. At assemblies, activists developed consensus and voted. Their 
demand for public accountability of the city's transit system included the call for a popular 
assembly, to be comprised in part by representatives from key sectors. 
The often-productive combination of representative with more direct forms of democracy 
means that debates that try to polarize and mutually exclude the two are problematic. We can see 
this polarization in much of the autonomist literature. For example, in a left forum on Venezuela 
published in Historical Materialism, Motta emphasizes the need to create forms of self-
government through which to overcome alienation and the dualisms, which internally divide the 
proletariat. Doing this, Motta continues, would involve: “transcending 'old' forms of politics 
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based on relationships of representation in which people's intellectual and political powers are 
delegated to a minority in a party or the state, and instead forming processes of mass-
intellectuality” (Spronk et al., 2011, p. 239). As my research suggests, positing self-governance 
and the overcoming of alienation against forms of political representation through a party or state 
is too simplistic. Instead, what my research suggests is that we ask, what mix of each form of 
democracy is most adequate to a given situation so that positive tensions and political coherence 
can be maximized? We can begin to answer this question by making a distinction between 
homogeneous and heterogeneous political spaces. 
Homogeneity or Heterogeneity? 
When a space is relatively homogeneous, I mean that its participants closely share a 
political framework and possess similar characteristics in terms of race, gender, age, occupation 
etc. A relatively homogeneous space is, in theory, therefore more united and expresses fewer 
differences. It also tends to be smaller. In contrast, a heterogeneous space displays more 
differences along the same categories and also tends to be larger in size. My two cases on 
workplace democracy (Argentina and Venezuela) can be said to be relatively homogeneous. In 
both cases, participants united around a clear political ideology. This was most noticeable in the 
case of Venezuela, where most SPU workers at each workplace tended to have very favorable 
opinions toward Chavismo. Indeed, in some cases, SPUs became sites from which pro Chávez 
political campaigns were conducted. The case of Argentina is slightly more complex. In most 
cases, workers at recovered Enterprises described themselves as Peronist and showed some 
degree of support for the government of Cristina Kirchner. However, in comparison to 
Chavismo, it is important to recognize that Peronism is much more diverse. In addition, at one 
particular ERT, Zanon, most workers favored the Workers United Front over any Peronist party. 
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Of course, this makes Zanon, just as politically homogeneous and perhaps even more so than 
other ERTs. 
ERTs and SPUs are also relatively homogeneous from a demographic perspective. This is 
most evident in Argentina. ERT participants are overwhelmingly middle-aged, white and male. 
The exception is Bruckman, which is comprised of mostly women. Of course, this doesn't make 
Bruckman any less homogeneous in terms of gender. At each workplace, most workers have the 
same occupation (ceramicists, woodworkers, seamstress etc.) and very similar levels of 
education (usually, high school). Workers overwhelmingly come from a working class 
background. The Venezuelan case displays slightly more diversity. The gender and racial 
composition is more balanced. There is more variety in education levels, with a slightly bigger 
layer of university-educated workers. However, like in ERTs, socioeconomic background in 
SPUs is mostly working class. Occupational differences are also minimal within each SPU, with 
differences mostly in the types of tasks carried out by different workers. 
By comparison, my case studies of Chile and Brazil, which take place primarily in civil 
society, can be described as relatively more heterogeneous. This is not surprising given that these 
two cases are mass movements comprised of wider layers of the population in each country. In 
addition, the spaces for democratic participation in each case were more public (the streets, 
universities, City Hall). Heterogeneity is more pronounced in the Brazilian case. Spaces for 
democratic deliberation were, in principle, completely open. In other words, anybody who 
showed up to a meeting was allowed to participate, no questions asked. However, it is important 
to note that, in practice, to attend a meeting, one had to know where and when it was happening, 
and this information was not necessarily easily available.  
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The most public place where this information was available was social media 
(specifically Facebook). In addition, the information was usually posted with a few days notice 
(sometimes less) and locations and times could often change with little notice. Lastly, most 
meetings were held in the urban core. All these factors amounted to a bias toward middle class 
white students, most of who live downtown, are highly connected and have flexible schedules. 
However, the open format of the meetings ensured that, despite this bias, often, meetings 
featured the participation of diverse sectors of society. In other words, at various times, in 
addition to students, meetings included unionized workers, indigenous communities, Afro 
Brazilian groups, University professors, rural workers and more. Not surprisingly, this social 
diversity meant significant political diversity also. In Brazil, it would be impossible to point to a 
unifying political ideology in the movement akin to Chavismo or Peronism. 
The case of Chile was slightly more homogeneous. This is because decision-making 
mostly took place through the established universities bodies. This of course makes sense since 
this was explicitly a student movement. This means the movement was less diverse in some 
categories, particularly age, occupation, class background and race. However, given its size, the 
student population displays significant political diversity, that is, despite its relative social 
homogeneity. Indeed, elections at a number of student bodies often featured the participation of a 
number of different political slates. In other words, although slightly more homogeneous than the 
Brazilian case, in the Chilean student movement one is also not able to find a stable and unifying 
political ideology. Indeed, the movement featured a sharp division between autonomists and 
Communists. In addition, autonomism in Chile (and Brazil) is a highly unstable political 
category, evidenced by its ambiguous position toward parties and the state. 
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What do these differences between heterogeneity and homogeneity in my case studies tell 
us about democracy in post-capitalist struggles? First, they tell us that, the more homogeneous a 
political space is, the easier it is to combine direct and representative democracy. On the other 
hand, the more heterogeneous the political space is, the more likely these two forms of 
democracy will produce an increased level of tension. To expand, in relatively homogeneous 
spaces, direct democracy tends to create a certain level of political unity, which makes the use of 
representative democracy in these same spaces relatively uncontroversial. Hence, in both 
Argentina and Venezuela, SPUs and ERTs are spaces where factory floor assemblies combine 
relatively smoothly with electoral campaigns at various levels in the two countries. Particularly 
notable is the case of Zanon in Argentina who helped elect one of its workers into the provincial 
legislature as part of the Workers Left Front, an innovative coalition of three radical parties in 
the province. This is not to say that political differences at SPUs or ERTs do not exist. However, 
these are less pronounced and therefore allow for more cohesive political action.  
In contrast, in Chile and Brazil, the use of direct democracy tends to produce significant 
political tensions and ambiguities, which make the use of representative democracy relatively 
more suspect among its participants. Hence, the movements in Chile and Brazil, despite 
important advances, are having a more difficult time trying to articulate some kind of coherent 
political program and are more suspect of the possibility of forming a political organ capable of 
forwarding long-term demands through the state. In other words, in these cases, the combination 
of heterogeneity and significant use of direct democracy tend to produce differences that are 
more difficult to overcome. This makes the time span of social movements an important factor 
here. Hence, in Chile, where the student movement has managed a certain level of continuity 
over a number of years, we can see evidence of political progress in the Autonomist Left, a 
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pseudo-party that produced Gabriel Borich, who now sits in the national Parliament. In contrast, 
the Brazilian case seems to be more short-lived and therefore political progress is more limited. 
This should not be taken as an argument for homogeneity over heterogeneity in the 
construction of democratic political spaces. Neither should it be taken as an argument for or 
against either form of democracy. However, a comparison of these four cases reveals important 
political implications. Because relatively heterogeneous struggles that rely heavily on direct 
democracy have a harder time articulating a coherent political program, they open a space for 
more established political forces. In Chile, the student movement totally discredited the country's 
right wing, which resulted in the eventual election of the centre-left Nueva Mayoría, comprised 
of the country's historic left parties. In Brazil, the opposite occurred. The right wing was 
strengthened at the expense of the centre-left PT. The implications of this are that heterogeneous 
struggles that rely heavily on direct democracy in the context of a left government will have to 
develop the capacities to defend the existing left government if the right wing seems to be 
gaining considerable strength. By comparison, the same kind of struggles in the context of a right 
wing government have more room to be uncompromising. 
Institutional Continuity 
Another important insight that we can draw when comparing these cases is that post-
capitalist struggles benefit from some kind of institutional continuity. In the cases of Venezuela 
and Argentina, this institutional continuity is itself part of the inherent purpose of ERTs and 
SPUs. In Venezuela, SPUs are part of the government's goal of 21st century socialism. As a 
result, the state provides significant funding and political leadership. In Argentina, the original 
and continuing purpose of ERTs was to keep workers working. In other words, the continuity of 
ERTs as institutions that provide ongoing work is in many ways their raison d'être. In addition, 
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the ERT movement has created institutions that represent the movement as a whole. These 
organizations provide a variety of services, including legal and technical help, and also political 
support for the movement. They also work with INAES, the state agency that oversees the 
solidarity economy in general and the ERT sector specifically. All this means that the ERT 
movement has the institutional capacities and continuities that have helped its political 
development. 
In contrast, the cases of Chile and Brazil display relatively less institutional continuity 
and capacities. This is particularly so in the case of the transit movement in Brazil that, unlike 
the student movement in Chile, relied almost exclusively on improvised and ad hoc forms of 
organization. Indeed, the transit movement continues to operate more or less spontaneously with 
its most visible presence outside of particular demonstrations being its website and related social 
media pages. More importantly, the lack of institutional capacities means that transit activists 
don't themselves have the space for ongoing, collective political development. The relatively 
slow pace of political development in the transit movement became apparent in 2015 and 2016, 
when it did relatively little to mobilize against the right wing forces that went on to successfully 
impeach Dilma Rousseff. In other words, it did not develop the political sophistication to see 
Brazil's right wing, part of which openly calls for a return to dictatorship, as a bigger threat to its 
own goals than the PT. 
The Chilean case is somewhat different. Institutional continuity is provided by the 
student bodies at universities. These student bodies have existed for decades and are the go to 
spaces for students to get involved in campus politics. They have also historically been the 
recruitment grounds for a variety of political parties (particularly those on the left). For this 
reason, student bodies are institutions where left parties compete for recruitment and influence. 
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This pattern was broken in 2011 when the left presented a united slate that brought together the 
different currents within the campus around a clear set of demands, most notably, free tuition. 
This proved to be a rare and historic moment however, as the following year featured no less 
than seven different competing slates. In other words, although these student bodies are 
important spaces where the student movement can develop political capacities and coherent 
political programs, they may need to be complemented by new spaces that are less influenced by 
the competing interests of different left currents or parties which tend to fragment political will. 
Production or Reproduction? 
As discussed earlier, one of the axes that post-capitalist struggles go through is that 
between the sphere of production and reproduction. What my case studies show is that we cannot 
make a rigid division between the two. Indeed, as Lebowitz (2003) argues, each circuit forms 
part of capitalism's organic whole. Not surprisingly, in moments of significant struggle, the one 
tends to reach out to the other. In Chile, student strike combined with general strike and proposed 
solutions to the neoliberal education system included the nationalization of the copper industry, 
an industry students have seemingly no direct connection to. Similarly, in Brazil, demands for 
free transit on the streets fueled a general strike and workers joined students in the occupation of 
public space. In addition, to a certain extent, the union movement even internalized the transit 
movement's demand for free transit, a demand that was totally foreign to the union movement 
until then. 
In Venezuela, workplace transformations at SPUs included within their framework 
participation from surrounding communities. Communities participated in the hiring process at 
each SPU, in identifying community needs to be met by the enterprise and in the organization of 
small producers that work with the SPU. Not only did community participation help 
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communities, it is also what helped redefine each workplace. In Argentina, ERTs would simply 
not have gotten off the ground without community support, which included not only political 
support but also material support. Once more fully established, ERTs became ‘open factories’, 
undertaking initiatives such as community high schools and cafeterias, and opening their doors to 
academic conferences and community meetings. This was not only a way to give back to the 
communities that supported them, it was also a strategy to acquire legitimacy from the broader 
public, legitimacy that was essential given the precarious legal status of ERTs. 
This positive relationship between the circuits of production and reproduction is evident 
in my case studies suggests that Holloway's view that the labour movement is simply a 
movement of abstract labour and therefore cannot contribute anything to post-capitalist struggles 
is too simplistic. Indeed, even in the case of Argentina's ERTs whose workers in many cases had 
to fight the old union structures before transforming their workplaces, the workers that led these 
struggles were long time unionists. Furthermore, in the case of Zanon, the union structures were 
not removed, but rather transformed to better fit the needs of the cooperative. Although 
autonomists relying on Holloway can now praise ERTs for being post-capitalist, their framework 
would not have allowed us to see the potential inherent in those unionized workplaces before 
they were transformed to cooperatives.  
Conversely, it is also not possible, based on my case studies, to hold on to the view of 
some, such as Saad Filho (2013) or Sader (2013a), for whom the transit movement in Brazil was 
seen merely as largely a destabilizing force, mostly lacking any constructive qualities. It is true, 
the combination of heterogeneity, strong reliance on direct democracy, short lifespan and 
institutional weakness, means movements in the sphere of reproduction can sometimes open 
significant space for the right wing to maneuver in. However, as we have seen, this is only part 
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of the story. Just as crucial is that these movements are also capable of creating new spaces for 
the left, spaces where leadership and participation can begin to be redefined. Hence, to call those 
who engage in these democratic experiments ‘elitist’, to use Ballesteros (PCCh) reference to the 
Autonomist Left in Chile, misses the opportunity to begin to break from vanguardist and 
bureaucratic tendencies of the traditional left. No doubt, given the characteristics of movements 
in the circuit of reproduction, building a new left that can articulate the values of a post-capitalist 
society in a sufficiently coherent fashion so as to not get absorbed by right wing maneuvering 
will be almost impossible without reaching out to movements that originate at the point of 
production.  
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Conclusion 
With the aim of better understanding the possibilities and challenges to social 
transformation in Latin America, this dissertation examined four social movements: Argentina's 
recuperated factory movement, Venezuela's socialist enterprises, the Chilean student movement 
and the Brazilian transit movement. I argued that these movements should be thought of as 
examples of post-capitalist struggles. In other words, not only do they express struggles against 
capital, they also give us a glimpse of a post-capitalist future by expressing the latent powers of 
what Marx called the collective worker. Post-capitalist struggles are therefore those situations in 
which the working class begins to learn new social relations that go beyond the fragmentation 
and alienation imposed by capital. These new relations are those that emphasize values and 
practices, such as cooperation, inclusivity and solidarity. 
The existence of post-capitalist struggles within capitalism forces us to rethink linear and 
stagist interpretations of capitalist development evident in both pro-capitalist modernization 
theory and strains of Marxism. Indeed, my case studies reveal the dialectical character of 
capitalist development in which its origins and future are recurring aspects within the present. 
Central to this dialectic is the process of dispossession, which deepens the fragmentation and 
alienation of the working class, yet simultaneously creates the conditions out of which the 
dispossessed can begin to build a new society. This means that capitalism’s future negation 
depends on the recurring assertion of its origins, a paradox that reveals both the enormous 
challenges and immanent possibilities of building a new society. 
The concept of post-capitalist struggles also challenges the two dominant approaches to 
social transformation in the 20th century, social democracy and dual power. Relying on a 
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vanguard, in the form of either bureaucrats or a revolutionary political elite, social democracy 
and dual power excluded the masses from participating in the process of transformation. In other 
words, in these two approaches to social transformation, the vanguard acts for the masses. Post-
capitalist struggles rather emphasize the creation of new forms of democratic participation 
through which workers and communities themselves, rather than the vanguard, become the 
leading agents of change. However, this does not mean simply doing away with leadership and 
representation, but rather that these are redefined to ensure that leaders act not for the oppressed, 
but with them. 
Importantly, unlike similar arguments in favour of more direct and participatory forms of 
democracy offered by autonomism and Analytical Marxism, the concept of post-capitalist 
struggles acknowledges that the state is both central to the reproduction of capitalism and to 
moving beyond it. This is because the capitalist state is itself an expression of the contradictory 
character of capitalist social relations. Specifically, the capitalist state incarnates the division 
between mental and manual labour by separating the worker (manual labour) from the politician 
(intellectual labour). In addition, in the hands of capital, the state can become a powerful tool 
capable of overwhelming any challenge to its rule. 
 In other words, for a post-capitalist future to develop beyond short-lived and localized 
experiences, the working class will need to both capture and transform the state. This will require 
developing new political parties that can express the new values and practices created by workers 
and communities from below, a process I refer to as a ‘new democratic road to socialism’. This 
new path to social transformation differs from the one outlined by Poulantzas in that it requires 
not simply an alliance between left government and movements, but rather a new fusion between 
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them. It is also a path that, in contrast to autonomism, emphasizes the need for the dispossessed 
to converge with more organized sectors of the working class.  
In the struggle for a post-capitalist future, Latin America occupies a particularly 
important place. This is because the region has been on the receiving end of aggressive policies 
of dispossession demanded by the contradictions inherent in neoliberal globalization. These 
policies, which reached their apex in the 1990s in the form of structural adjustment, then 
triggered a wave of popular resistance of unprecedented dimensions in the region. Importantly, 
these struggles not only challenged dispossession but also began to articulate new social relations 
that point beyond capitalism. Indeed, not long after the turn of the century, Latin America had 
become ground zero in the battle against neoliberalism, and indeed for ‘another world’. 
The wave of resistance unleashed by neoliberal dispossession in Latin America soon 
translated into unprecedented electoral victories for the region's left. This new left responded to 
the demands and struggles of movements by pursuing a new model of development known as 
neostructuralism. This new model of development sought to mix elements of neoliberalism, most 
notably an export drive and alliances with transnational capital, with new policies of equity and 
participatory governance (Leiva, 2008). Although highly contradictory this new model 
nevertheless achieved achieved high levels of economic growth and notable improvement in a 
number of social indicators. 
A key feature of this new model analyzed in this thesis was its ability to strike a specific 
bargain with social movements. In this bargain, movements were granted small but meaningful 
material gains targeted to the most vulnerable sectors of the working class. However, with the 
aim of reinforcing the existing institutions of liberal democracy movements were asked to, in 
return, give up their demands for more direct and horizontal forms of democratic participation 
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that pointed to a post-capitalist future. These two sides of the bargain explain both the relative 
stability of neostructuralism and the continuation of struggles within this 15-year cycle of 
development. 
Recognizing this bargain allows us to see how the pink tide broke from the neoliberal 
model in two key respects. First, neoliberalism had little or no concern for equity policies, 
reducing society to market outcomes only. Second, neoliberalism showed little concern for the 
institutions and principles of liberal democracy, often disregarding human rights principles and 
sometimes even relying on dictatorship to promote its agenda (Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2007; 
Grandin, 2008). In other words, under neoliberalism the state did not actively seek to legitimate 
its policies (Saad-Filho et al, 2017).  
However, given the contradictory character of neostructuralism, the specific bargains 
developed between the pink tide and social movements took on a highly divisive and partial 
character that in many cases compromised the new left’s own social base. In other words, this 
bargain became a far cry from what these left governments, if interested in pursuing a 
transformative project, would’ve had to do in the face of movements from below, namely 
persuade and organize them to occupy and transform the state, while creating new sources of 
popular power (Striffler, 2017, p. 7). 
Instead, the neostructuralist bargain forced the pink tide to walk a delicate tight rope 
between merely appeasing its base with partial reforms and triggering a reaction by the right 
wing who wanted nothing less than a return to orthodox neoliberalism. However, as the 
conditions for neostructuralism (commodity boom, high exchange rates, and steady growth) 
began to deteriorate, managing this political tightrope became increasingly difficult. The result 
was that new avenues were opened for the right wing. 
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The pink tide’s failure to manage this political tightrope only partially explains the rise of 
the right, however. The ambiguities, contradictions and weaknesses of post-capitalist struggles 
are the other half of this equation. Specifically, their difficulties in developing a coherent 
political bloc or pole with sufficient institutional continuities meant that their capacities to 
contest state power remained insufficient, being limited to relatively small groupings in 
comparison to the traditional left. These difficulties, as we have seen, varied depending on the 
case. Hence, it is useful here to reflect on the analytical matrix presented in the introduction. 
The movements that experienced the most difficulties and challenges were those that 
made demands in the sphere of capitalist reproduction and expressed themselves primarily in 
civil society. These movements tended to rely more exclusively on direct democracy and had a 
highly heterogeneous social composition. Brazil is the best example of this case. The transit 
movement’s deep ambiguities about the state and its inability to make inroads into the PTs 
historic relationship with labour greatly limited its ability to extend its most radical ambitions to 
broad layers of the population. This resulted in major victories by the country’s right.  
Although similar, the Chilean case featured a greater engagement with the state. This can 
be explained by the fact that the country’s education system is the direct outgrowth of Pinochet’s 
1980 Constitution, which entrenched neoliberalism into every corner of the Chilean state. In 
addition the Chilean student movement relied on a more balanced combination of direct and 
representative democracy, utilizing both new and more traditional spaces for student activism. 
These differences go a along way to explain the greater success of the student movement in 
comparison to the Brazilian case. 
Unlike the case of Brazil and Chile, the ERT movement in Argentina articulates itself 
primarily in the sphere of production. Its relatively homogeneous social composition and smooth 
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combination of participatory and representative forms of democracy helped it to better articulate 
itself politically through new representative bodies. However, the movement faced a significant 
political conundrum. On the one hand, its re-vindication of the values of labour gave it a path 
through which to reach out to more traditional sectors of labour under attack by the Kirchner 
government. On the other hand, the ERT movement’s challenge to Peronism made connections 
with traditional labour inherently difficult, a reality the right wing easily capitalized on.  
Finally, in contrast to the other cases, Venezuela’s popular economy is, to a significant 
degree, the direct outgrowth of public policy. As a phenomenon primarily emerging in the 
workplace, SPUs are relatively more homogenous than Chilean and Brazilian cases, and also 
featured a more balanced combination of representative and participatory democracy. 
Consequently, SPUs (along with related popular economy organizations) have progressed into an 
impressive network of communes. However, the country’s popular economy remains hampered 
by Venezuela’s legacy of ‘magical’ oil-dependent development from above, a legacy that 
expresses itself in continued struggles for deeper forms of democracy against the Bolivarian state 
and, more broadly, the economic chaos that ensued following the collapse of oil prices.  
The new rounds of attacks that workers and communities are now facing in Latin 
America at the hands of a reinvigorated right wing will likely result in massive resistance. I thus 
fully concord with Zibechi (2015) who predicts that the new right in Latin America will not be 
able to govern with even minimal consensus (p. 2). This means that, as in the 1990s, these 
struggles will open new post-capitalist windows. The difference is that this time, they will have a 
clearer path to build on. This path, albeit still tentative and uncertain, is the positive legacy left 
by post-capitalist struggles over the last decade and a half, even when its existence will now 
coincide with the threats posed to it by an ascending right. 
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Will the new mass of unemployed workers in Argentina be able to connect with the ERT 
movement? Will the ERT movement, in turn, make a decisive break from Peronism? Will the 
popular base of Chavismo use the democratic and cooperative organs created in the last 15 years 
to challenge the right as well as the rising authoritarianism and persistent class contradictions 
within the Bolivarian state? Will the democratic struggles of the newly dispossessed in Brazil 
find expression in new radical political alliances outside of the PT? These are the key questions 
revealed by the contradictory character of the neostructuralist baragain and, in turn, demanded by 
the prospect of a ‘new democratic road to socialism’. As such, they are an important part of the 
legacy left by both the successes and failures of post-capitalist struggles during the pink tide 
cycle. Along with these questions, a more ominous one also comes to the fore in this present 
conjuncture: will the new right successfully fragment or destroy these movements in its pursuit 
of new forms of accumulation?  
However, it is important to also recognize that this right wing resurgence in the region is 
still in contestation. Upcoming presidential elections in Brazil and Venezuela will surely be 
decisive in the balance of forces. However, even if the right emerges victorious in these 
countries, a right wing wave is unlikely to be uniform (just as the pink tide was not). The Nueva 
Mayoría in Chile is a case in point. The Nueva Mayoria is currently governing in the context of a 
disarticulated and largely de-legitimized right wing. Furthermore, the Nueva Mayoría has 
promised to fulfill the student movement’s demand for free education. Lastly, for the first time 
since the coup against Salvador Allende, radical political forces are now present in government, 
both within and outside the Nueva Mayoría. 
However, how will the Nueva Mayoría fulfill its promises in the context of the fall of 
commodity prices? Could neostructuralism be capable of re-articulating itself in Chile to extend 
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its ‘shelf-life’? If so, what might be the mechanisms through which it accomplishes this, and the 
contradictions this process might face? Looking at the response from the student movement will 
also be critical. As 2011 demonstrated, through the student movement, broad sectors of Chilean 
society have become deeply dissatisfied with the neoliberal and authoritarian character of 
Augusto Pinochet’s 1980 constitution, still in effect today. Might unfulfilled promises by the 
Nueva Mayoría trigger a new wave of mobilizations by the student movement? Given’s Chile’s 
historic role both in the development and struggle against neoliberalism, the country provides a 
key entry point to study Latin America’s current fragile political conjuncture. 
 
  243 
References 
Aguayo Ormeño, I. (2011). Evolución en el número de matrículas del sistema de educación 
superior, 1983-2010. Santiago, Biblioteco del Congreso Nacional de Chile. 
Albert, M. (2008, July 4). Which way Venezuela? ZNET. Retrieved from https://zcomm.org. 
Albo, G. (2002). Neoliberalism, the state, and the left: A Canadian perspective. Monthly Review, 
54(1), 46. 
Alvarado Chacín, N. (2009). Las estrategias de inclusión social en Venezuela: Un acercamiento a 
la experiencia de las misiones. Convergencia, 16(51), 85-128. 
Álvarez, V. (2007). Guía teórico-práctica para la creación de EPS. Venezuela: Banco Industrial 
de Venezuela. 
Anderson, P. (2011). Lula’s Brazil. London Review of Books, 33(7), 3-12. 
Andersson, K., and Van Laerhoven, F. (2007). From local strongman to facilitator: Institutional 
incentives for participatory municipal governance in Latin America. Comparative 
Political Studies, 40(9), 1085-1111. 
Andrade, B. (2013, July 22). Em primeiro ato após ocupação, Bloco de Luta reúne 600 
manifestantes na Prefeitura de Porto Alegre. Jornalismo B. Retrieved from 
https://jornalismobnoticias.wordpress.com. 
Antunes, R., and Santana, M. A. (2014). The dilemmas of the new unionism in Brazil breaks and 
continuities. Latin American Perspectives, 41(5), 10-21. 
Assunção, D. (2016, March 13). Luciana Genro e a esquerda ’lava-jato’. Esquerda Diário. 
Retrieved from http://www.esquerdadiario.com.br. 
Avendaño, O. (2014). Fracturas y representación política en el movimiento estudiantil: Chile 
2011. Ultima década, 22(41), 41-68. 
Azzellini, D. (2011). Workers’ control under Venezuela’s Bolivarian revolution. In D. Azzellini 
and I. Ness (Eds.), Ours to master and to own (pp. 382-399). Chicago: Haymarket Press. 
Bachelet, M. (2013, October). Programa de gobierno. Retrieved from http://michellebachelet.cl. 
Baiocchi, G. (2003). Radicals in power: The Workers' Party and experiments in urban 
democracy in Brazil. In G. Baiocchi (Ed.), Radicals in power. (p. 1-26). London, UK and 
New York, US: Zed Books. 
Barbosa, N. (2013). Dez anos de política econômica. In E. Sadr (Ed.), Lula E Dilma 10 anos de 
governos pos-neoliberais no Brasil (pp. 69-102). São Paulo: Boitempo. 
  244 
Barcelli, A. (1957). Medio siglo de luchas sindicales revolucionarias en Bolivia, 1905-1955. 
Editorial del Estado. 
Bárcena, A. (2010). Structural constraints on development in Latin America and the Caribbean: a 
post-crisis reflection. ECLAC Review, 100(1), 7-27. 
Bárcena, A. (2011). Spreading the wealth. Finance and Development, 48(1), 20-21. 
Bava, S. (2013). A cidade como mercadoria. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, 7(73), 4-5. 
Bava, S. (2013). Para onde vai o governo. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, 6(72), 3. 
Bava, S. (2013). Um Brasil sem catracas. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, 6(72), 6. 
Becerra, M.R. (2012, September 10) Bárbara Figueroa, presidenta de la CUT: Vamos a poner la 
agenda de los trabajadores sobre la mesa. El Ciudadano. Retrieved from 
http://www.elciudadano.cl. 
Becker, M. (2011). Correa, indigenous movements, and the writing of a new constitution in 
Ecuador. Latin American Perspectives, 38(1), 47-62. 
Becker, M. (2013). The stormy relations between Rafael Correa and social movements in 
Ecuador. Latin American Perspectives, 40(3), 43-62. 
Benclowicz, J. D. (2011). Repensando los orígenes del movimiento piquetero: Miseria y 
experiencias de lucha antes de las contrarreformas de la década de 1990 en el norte 
argentino. Latin American Research Review, 46(2), 79-103. 
Berg, B. (2004). Qualitative research methods. New York: Pearson. 
Berzoini, R. (2010). A superacão das politicas neoliberais na previdencia e no trabalho. In 
Fundação Perseu Abramo (Ed.), 2003-2010 o Brasil em transformação v2 (pp. 45-52). 
São Paulo: Perseu Abramo. 
Bhambra, G. K. (2014). Connected sociologies. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Blaut, J.M. (1996). Robert brenner in the tunnel of time. Antipode, 26(4), 351-374. 
Bloch, E. (1986). The principle of hope volume one. Cambridge: MIT press. 
Bohn, S. R. (2011). Social policy and vote in Brazil: Bolsa Família and the shifts in Lula's 
electoral base. Latin American Research Review, 46(1), 54-79. 
Boric, G. (2012, May 6). Mi manifiesto: Gabriel Boric, presidente de la FECH. El Semanal. 
Retrieved from http://diario.latercera.com. 
Borras Jr, S. M., Kay, C., Gómez, S., and Wilkinson, J. (2012). Land grabbing and global 
capitalist accumulation: key features in Latin America. Canadian Journal of 
Development Studies/Revue Canadienne D'études du Développement, 33(4), 402-416. 
  245 
Braverman, H. (1974). Labour and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twentieth 
century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Brenner, R. (1986). The social basis of economic development. In J. Roemer (Ed.), Analytical 
marxism (pp. 23-53). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2008). The Dutch disease and its neutralization: a Ricardian approach. 
Revista de Economia Política, 28(1), 47-71. 
Bruce, I. (2008). The real Venezuela: Making socialism in the 21st century. London: Pluto. 
Bulmer-Thomas, V. (2014). The economic history of Latin America since independence. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Burawoy, M. (1985). The politics of production: factory regimes under capitalism and socialism. 
London: Routledge. 
Burbach, R., and Piñeiro, C. (2007). Venezuela's participatory socialism. Socialism and 
Democracy, 21(3), 181-200. 
Burton, G. (2012). Hegemony and frustration: education policy making in Chile under the 
Concertación, 1990–2010. Latin American Perspectives, 39(4), 34-52. 
Camila Vallejo denuncia "infiltrados pagados "para hacer destrozos. (2011, June 29). 
Publimetro. Retrieved from http://www.publimetro.cl. 
Camila Vallejo dice que encapuchados reciben dinero para hacer destrozos. (2011, June 29). 
Ahora Noticias. Retrieved from http://www.ahoranoticias.cl. 
Camila Vallejo no se puso de pie en homenaje a Jaime Guzmán. (2014, April 1). Emol. Retrieved 
from http://www.emol.com. 
Camila Vallejo: “Me choca” condolencias de PC por muerte de Kim Jong Il. (2011, December 
22). DiarioUChile. Retrieved from http://radio.uchile.cl. 
Camila Vallejo: Castro es uno de los liderazgos más importantes del mundo. (2012, April 5). 
Emol. Retrieved from http://www.emol.com. 
Campione, D., and Rajland, B. (2006). Piqueteros y trabajadores ocupados en la Argentina de 
2001 en adelante: Novedades y continuidades en su participación y organización en los 
conflictos. In Gerardo Caetano (Ed.). Sujetos sociales y nuevas formas de protesta en la 
historia reciente de América Latina (pp. 297-330). Buenos Aires: Consejo 
Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLASCO). 
Campos, M. J., and Ruiz, C. O. (2011). Conflicto por el gas en Magallanes, Chile: movimiento 
social y recursos naturales. REBELA-Revista Brasileira de Estudos Latino-
Americanos, 1(2), 180-200. 
Candia, J. (2011, Noviembre 25). Colegio de Profesores denuncia ataques contra la sede luego de 
las jornadas de marchas. DiarioUChile. Retrieved from http://radio.uchile.cl. 
  246 
Cárdenas, E., Ocampo, J. A., and Thorp, R. (2000). An economic history of twentieth-century 
Latin America. Houdsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Oxford: Palgrave. 
Cardoso, F. H., and Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and development in Latin America. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Carranza, M. E. (2005). Poster child or victim of imperialist globalization? Explaining 
Argentina's December 2001 political crisis and economic collapse. Latin American 
Perspectives, 32(6), 65-89. 
Carruthers, D., and Rodriguez, P. (2009). Mapuche protest, environmental conflict and social 
movement linkage in Chile. Third World Quarterly, 30(4), 743-760. 
Carter, M. (2010). The landless rural workers movement and democracy in Brazil. Latin 
American Research Review, 45(4), 186-217. 
Cascione, S. and Benson, T. (2013, June 29). Rousseff’s popularity plummets in wake of Brazil 
protests. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com. 
Castañeda, J. G. (2006). Latin America’s left turn. Foreign Affairs, 85(3), 28-43. 
Castells M. (2010). The rise of the network society. The information age: economy, society, and 
culture volume 1. West Sussex: Blackwell. 
Castillo Melgarejo. C. (2012). Chile: El paraiso del mercado educativo. Le Monde Diplomatique 
Chile, 7. 
Cavooris, R. (2017). Turning the tide: revolutionary potential and the limits of Bolivia’s process 
of change. Socialist Register. Forthcoming. 
CERC: Aprobación a Piñera cae a 35% y rechazo sube a 53%. (2011, July 5). Emol. Retrieved 
from http://www.emol.com. 
Chavez, D. (2008). The watering down of participatory budgeting and people power in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil. Participatory Learning and Action, 57. 
Chávez, H. (2012). Propuesta del candidato de la patria comandante hugo chávez para la gestión 
bolivariana socialista 2013–2019. Retrieved from http://blog.chavez.org.ve. 
Chiasson-LeBel, T. (2016). Neo-extractivism in Venezuela and Ecuador: A weapon of class 
conflict. The Extractive Industries and Society, 3(4), 888-901. 
Chile Mobs - Vamos a la playa!!! por la educación. (2011, July 6). [Video File]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com. 
Chile: 48 horas de tension. (2011, August 23). El Economista. Retrieved from 
http://eleconomista.com.mx. 
Chile: Paro nacional 23 y 24 de agosto 2011. Instructivo de la CUT. (2011, August 23). Correo 
de los Trabajadores. Retrieved from http://cctt.cl. 
  247 
Chovanec, D. M., and Benitez, A. (2008). The penguin revolution in Chile: Exploring 
intergenerational learning in social movements. Journal of Contemporary Issues in 
Education, 3(1), 39-57. 
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2007). Dual power in the Venezuelan revolution. Monthly Review, 59(4), 
42-56. 
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2013). Constituent moments, constitutional processes social movements 
and the new latin american left. Latin American Perspectives, 40(3), 126-145. 
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2014). Building the commune: Insurgent government, communal state. 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 113(4), 791-806. 
Colectivo Diatriba. (2011). Trazas de utopía. La experiencia de autogestión de cuatro liceos 
chilenos durante 2011. Santiago: Opech/Centro de Alerta. 
Collins, J., and Lear, J. (1995). Chile's free-market miracle: A second look. Oakland, California: 
Food First. 
Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH). (2011). Reforma educación superior 2011. 
Retrieved from http://confech.files.wordpress.com. 
Conoce la lista de los 232 colegios metropolitanos que se mantienen en toma (2011, June 28). La 
Tercera. Retrieved from http://www.latercera.com. 
Coppola, G., and Brandt, N. (2012, April 10). Brazil housing boom forcing switch to private 
market mortgages. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com. 
Coreografía Judas para gaga-so por la Educación. (2011, July 6). [Video File]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com. 
Cornia, G. A. (2010). Income distribution under Latin America’s new left regimes. Journal of 
Human Development and Capabilities, 11(1), 85-114. 
Coronil, F. (1997). The magical state: Nature, money, and modernity in Venezuela. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Corporación Venezolana Agraria. (n.d, a). ¡Sembrando la patria socialista! Barquisimeto, 
Venezuela: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Agricultura y Tierras. 
Corporación Venezolana Agraria. (n.d, b). Agrotiendas socialistas. Barquisimeto, Venezuela: 
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Agricultura y Tierras. 
Corporación Venezolana Agraria. (n.d, c). Empresa socialista “Pedro Camejo”. Caracas, 
Venezuela: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Agricultura y Tierras. 
Costa, C. (2013, July 1). Brazilian demonstrators fill the streets, unions join in. Retrieved from 
http://www.labornotes.org. 
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
traditions. Sage publications. 
  248 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Sage publications. 
Cronología del movimiento por la educación pública en Chile. (2011, September 9) 
Internacional de la Educación para América Latina. Retrieved from http://www.ei-ie-
al.org. 
Crotty, J. (2000). Structural contradictions of the global neoliberal regime. Amherst, MA: 
Political Economy Research Institute. 
Cuevas, C. (2011). Tiempos de tranformar y transformarnos. In Aún Creemos en los Sueños 
(Ed.), Otro Chile es posible (pp. 15-20). Santiago: Le Monde Diplomatique Chile. 
D'Arcy, S. (2009). Strategy, meta-strategy and anti-capitalist activism: Rethinking Leninism by 
re-reading Lenin. Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes, 5(2). 
De Angelis, M. (2007). The beginning of history. London: Pluto. 
de la Fuente, V. H. (2011). Otro Chile es possible. In Aún Creemos en los Sueños (Ed.), Otro 
Chile es posible (pp. 5-10). Santiago: Le Monde Diplomatique Chile. 
Declaración Pública Coordinadora Regional Anti Represas de Aysén. (2012, June 21). Tu 
Problema es Mi Problema. Retrieved from http://despiertaaysen.blogspot.ca/ . 
Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1991). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press. 
Devine, P. (1988). Democracy and economic planning. Cambridge: Polity. 
Díaz, B. (2006). Políticas públicas para la promoción de cooperativas en Venezuela (1999-
2006). Cayapa. Revista Venezolana de Economía Social, 6(11), 149-183. 
Dicapua, M., and Perbellini, M. (2010). Identidades construidas en la lucha femenina por la 
recuperación de empresas. Revista Org and Demo, 11(2), 5-22. 
Dinerstein, A. C. (2003a). ¡Que se vayan todos! Popular insurrection and the asambleas barriales 
in Argentina. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 22(2), 187-200. 
Dinerstein, A. C. (2003b). Power or counter power? The dilemma of the Piquetero movement in 
Argentina post-crisis. Capital and Class, 27(3), 1-8. 
Dinerstein, A. C. (2013). Empleo o trabajo digno? Crítica e imaginación en las organizaciones 
piqueteras. In A. C. Dinerstein (Ed.), Movimientos sociales y autonomía colectiva (pp. 
69-92). Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual. 
Dinerstein, A. C., Ghiotto, L., Pascual, R. (2013). ¿Municipio libre o comunidad autónoma 
rebelde? Los zapatistas y la construcción del “nosotros revolucionario”. In A. C. 
Dinerstein (Ed.), Movimientos sociales y autonomía colectiva (pp. 116-146). Buenos 
Aires: Capital Intelectual. 
  249 
Dirigentes llevan a La Moneda restos de bombas lacrimógenas. (2011, August 11). Ahora 
Noticias. Retrieved from http://www.ahoranoticias.cl. 
do Rosario, J. (2012, May 16). Chile: Así enfrentan los jóvenes profesionales su deuda 
universitaria. Infobae. Retrieved from http://www.infobae.com. 
Dockendorff, C., Brugnoli, J. A. R., and Sprovera, M. A. E. (2010). La neoliberalización de la 
solidaridad en el Chile democrático: Una mirada comparativa sobre discursos solidarios 
en 1991 y 2006. Latin American Research Review, 45(1), 189-202. 
Documentos para la historia del movimiento obrero argentino: declaración de principios del 
partido laborista (1945). Miseria. Retrieved from: 
http://miseriadelasociologia.blogspot.ca. 
Dos Santos, T. (1968). La crisis de la teoría del desarrollo y las relaciones de dependencia en 
América Latina. In H. Jaguaribe (Ed.), La dependiencia poítica-económica de América 
Latina. Mexico City: Siglo XXI. 
Drake, P. W. (2003). El movimiento obrero en Chile: De la Unidad Popular a la 
Concertación. Revista De Ciencia Política, 23(2), 148-158. 
Eastwood, J. (2011). Introduction: The revolution in Venezuela. In J. Eastwood and T. Ponniah, 
Revolution in Venezuela: social and political change under Chávez (pp. 1-34). Harvard 
University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean. (2010). Social panorama of latin 
america 2009. Retrieved from http://www.eclac.cl. 
El proyecto de Giorgio Jackson y Gabriel Boric para reducir el sueldo de los parlamentarios. (9 
April 14). Radio Cooperativa. http://www.cooperativa.cl. 
El pueblo unido avanza sin partido/metiendo ruido [Video File]. (2011, July 4). Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com. 
El Troudi, H. (2005). El salto adelante: La nueva etapa de la revolución bolivariana. Caracas: 
Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República. 
Ellner, S. (2009). A new model with rough edges: Venezuela’s community councils. NACLA 
Report on the Americas, 42(3), 11-14. 
Ellner, S. (2010). The perennial debate over socialist goals played out in Venezuela. Science and 
Society, 74(1), 63-84. 
Ellner, S. (2013). Latin america’s radical left in power complexities and challenges in the 
twenty-first century. Latin American Perspectives, 40(3), 5-25. 
Empresas de Propriedad Social. (n.d). Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela. 
En Argentina hay 350 empresas recuperadas, con 25 mil empleados. (2013, May 1). Telam. 
Retrieved from http://www.telam.com.ar. 
  250 
Eraut, M. (2004). Informal learning in the workplace. Studies in Continuing Education, 26(2), 
247-273. 
Estimadas comunistas increpan a estudiantes por lienzo!! [Video File]. (2011, October 6). 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com. 
Fabry, Adam. (2016, March 4). Argentina’s New Order. Jacobin. Retrieved from 
https://www.jacobinmag.com. 
Fair, H. (2008). El Plan de Convertibilidad y el sindicalismo durante la primera presidencia de 
Menem. Trabajo y sociedad, (10)5, 1-17. 
Faria, G. (2010) O governo Lula e o novo papel do estado brasileiro. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora 
Fundação Perseu Abramo. 
FECH: Oficializan derrota de Camila Vallejo frente a Gabriel Boric. (2011, December 7). Emol. 
Retrieved from http://www.emol.com. 
Fedozzi, L. (2001). Orçamento participativo. Reflexões sobre a experiência de Porto Alegre. 
Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial. 
Féliz, M. (2012). Neo-developmentalism: Beyond neoliberalism? Capitalist crisis and 
Argentina’s development since the 1990s. Historical Materialism, 20(2), 105-123. 
Fernández Álvarez, M. I., and Partenio, F. (2010). Empresas recuperadas en Argentina: 
producciones, espacios y tiempos de género. Tabula Rasa, (12), 119-135. 
Ferrero, J. P. (2012). Agronegocio o soberanía Alimentaria? El MST y La Otra Reforma Agraria, 
Brasil. In A. C. Dinerstein (Ed.), Movimientos sociales y autonomía colectiva (pp. 95-
116). Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual. 
Figueroa Cerda, F. (2011). El Allende que necesitamos. In Aún Creemos en los Sueños (Ed.), 
Otro Chile es posible (pp. 23-25). Santiago: Le Monde Diplomatique Chile. 
Fogliatto, D. (2013, July 15). Thiago Duarte chama ocupação de “golpe” do PT e do PSOL e não 
recebe manifestantes. Sul 21. Retrieved from http://www.sul21.com.br. 
Foley, G. (1999). Learning and social action. New York: Zed Books. 
Fontaine, A. (2011, November 17). El lucro sí importa. CIPER Chile. Retrieved from 
http://ciperchile.cl. 
Ford, A. (2008). Experimentos democráticos: Asambleas barriales y presupuesto participativo en 
Rosario, 2002-2005. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from  
http://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec. 
Foreque, F., and Falcão, M. (2013, June 18). Proposta sobre 'cura gay' é aprovada em comissao 
presidida por Feliciano. Folha De S. Paulo. Retrieved from 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br. 
  251 
Fortes, A. (2009). In search of a post-neoliberal paradigm: The Brazilian Left and Lula’s 
government. International Labor and Working-Class History, 75(1), 109-125. 
Frank, A. G. (1971). Latin America: Underdevelopment or revolution. New York: Monthly 
Review Press. 
Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed, New York: Continuum. 
French, J. D., and Fortes, A. (2005). Another world is possible: The rise of the Brazilian workers' 
party and the prospects for Lula's government. Labor, 2(3), 13-31. 
Friedman, E. J. (2009). Re(gion)alizing women's human rights in Latin America. Politics and 
Gender, 5(03), 349-375. 
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: The Free Press. 
Fung, A., and Wright, E. O. (2001). Deepening democracy: innovations in empowered 
participatory governance. Politics and Society, 29(1), 5-42. 
Fung, A., and Wright, E. O. (2003). Deepening democracy: Institutional innovations in 
empowered participatory governance. New York: Verso. 
Furci, C. (2008). El Partido Comunista de Chile y la vía al socialismo. Santiago: Ariadna. 
Furtado, C. (1964). Development and underdevelopment. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Furtado, C. (1976). Economic development of Latin America: Historical background and 
contemporary problems (2nd ed.). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gagazo Lady Gaga - Judas (flashmob por la educación en Chile). (2011, July 15). [Video File]. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com. 
Galvão, A. (2004). La CUT en la encrucijada: impactos del neoliberalismo sobre el movimiento 
sindical combativo. Revista venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, 10(1), 219-39. 
Gambini, H. (1983). La primera presidencia de perón. Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Política 
Argentina. 
García Linera, Á. (2001). La estructura de los movimientos sociales en Bolivia. Revista del 
Observatorio Social de América Latina, (5), 1-4. 
García Linera, Á. (2011). Las tensiones creativas de la revolución, la quinta fase del proceso de 
cambio. La Paz: Vicepresidencia del Estado. 
Genro, T. (2002). Crise da democracia. Petropolis: Vozes. 
Gibb, E. (2013, June 26). Brazil: Private transit, public protests. The Bullet.  Retrieved from 
http://www.socialistproject.ca. 
  252 
Gibson, O and Watts, J. (2013, December 5). World Cup: Rio favelas being 'socially cleansed' in 
runup to sporting events. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com. 
Gimenez, D. M. (2005). Gender, pensions and social citizenship in Latin America (Vol. 46). 
United Nations Publications. 
Glyn, A. (2006). Capitalism unleashed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goldfrank, B. (2012). The world bank and the globalization of participatory budgeting. Journal 
of Public Deliberation, 8(2), 1-16. 
Golpe de Timón. (2015, November 7). Marea Socialista. Retrieved from 
http://mareasocialista.com.ve/?p=368.	  
Gómez Leyton, J. C. (2006). La rebelión de las y los estudiantes secundarios en Chile Protesta 
social y política en una sociedad neoliberal triunfante. Revista del Observatorio Social de 
América Latina, 7(20), 107-116. 
Gordon, T., and Webber, J. R. (2008). Imperialism and resistance: Canadian mining companies 
in Latin America. Third World Quarterly, 29(1), 63-87. 
Gowan, P. (1999). The global gamble: Washington's Faustian bid for world dominance. New 
York: Verso. 
Grandin, G. (2007). Empire's workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the rise of the 
new imperialism. New York: Metropolitan/Owl Books. 
Graterol, Y. and Díaz, B. (2007). Situación económica y balance social de las cooperativas que 
participan en la gestión del servicio público de agua potable en el Estado Trujillo, 
Venezuela. Revista Venezolana de Economía Social, 7(13), 30-58. 
Grosfoguel, R. (2000). Developmentalism, modernity, and dependency theory in Latin 
America. Nepantla: Views from South, 1(2), 347-374. 
Grugel, J., and Riggirozzi, P. (2012). Post‐neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and 
reclaiming the State after crisis. Development and Change, 43(1), 1-21. 
Gudynas, E. (2009). Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. In Centro Andina de 
Acción Popular (CAAP) and Centro Latinoamericano de Ecología Social (CLAES) 
(Eds.), Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad, (pp.187-225). Quito: CAAP and CLAES. 
Guzmán-Concha, C. (2012). The students' rebellion in Chile: occupy protest or classic social 
movement?. Social Movement Studies, 11(3-4), 408-415. 
Guzmán, P. (2011, November 7). En el planeta de la desigualdad, Chile bate records. 
Movimiento Generación 80. Retrieved from: 
http://g80.cl/noticias/columna_completa.php. 
Gwynne, R. N., and Kay, C. (2000). Views from the periphery: Futures of neoliberalism in Latin 
America. Third World Quarterly, 21(1), 141-156. 
  253 
Hall, A. (2006). From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social policies and poverty alleviation under 
Lula. Journal of Latin American Studies, 38(04), 689-709. 
Hall, A. (2008). Brazil's Bolsa Família: A double‐edged sword?. Development and 
Change, 39(5), 799-822. 
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic 
policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3), 275-296. 
Harnecker, C. P. (2007). Workplace democracy and collective consciousness: An empirical 
study of Venezuelan cooperatives. Monthly Review, 59(6), 27-40. 
Harnecker, M. (2003). The Venezuelan military: the making of an anomaly. Monthly Review, 
55(4), 14-21. 
Harnecker, M. (2010). Latin America and twenty-first century socialism: Inventing to avoid 
mistakes. Monthly Review, 62(3), 1. 
Harris, R. L. (2003). Popular resistance to globalization and neoliberalism in Latin 
America. Journal of Developing Societies, 19(2-3), 365-426. 
Hart, J. M. (1989). Revolutionary Mexico: The coming and process of the Mexican Revolution. 
Oakland: University of California Press. 
Harvey, D. (2003). The new imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2010). The enigma of capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haynes, J. (1996). Third world politics: A concise introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Pub. 
Hintze, S. (2003). Trueque y economía solidaria. Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de 
General Sarmiento, UNDP and Prometeo Libros. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1968). The political economy of import-substituting industrialization in Latin 
America. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82(1), 1-32. 
Histórico “Cacerolazo” en apoyo a los estudiantes. (2011, August 4). DiarioUChile. Retrieved 
from http://radio.uchile.cl. 
Holloway, J. (2002). Change the world without taking power: The meaning of revolution today. 
New York: Pluto Press. 
Holloway, J. (2010). Crack capitalism. New York: Pluto Press. 
Informativo elecciones FECh 2011-2012. (2011, November 27). Info Derecho. Retrieved from 
http://infoderechouchile.blogspot.ca. 
  254 
Itzigsohn, J., and Rebón, J. (2015). The recuperation of enterprises: Defending workers’ 
lifeworld, creating new tools of contention. Latin American Research Review, 50(4), 178-
196. 
Katz, C. (2004). El porvenir del socialismo. Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi. 
Katz, C. (2008). El agro-capitalismo de la soja. Anuario EDI, 4, 65-75. 
Katz, C. (2015). Dualities of Latin America. Latin American Perspectives, 42(4), 10-42. 
Katz, C. (2016, January 25). Desenlaces del ciclo progresista. Pagina Oficial de Claudio Katz. 
Retrieved from http://katz.lahaine.org. 
Kay, C. (2008). Reflections on Latin American rural studies in the neoliberal globalization 
period: a new rurality? Development and Change, 39(6), 915-943. 
Kellogg, P. (2007). Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to 
Neoliberalism? 1. New Political Science, 29(2), 187-209. 
Klein, N. (2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. New York: Macmillan. 
Kowalczyk, A. M. (2013). Indigenous peoples and modernity mapuche mobilizations in Chile. 
Latin American Perspectives, 40(4), 121-135. 
Labra, A. (2011, July 18). Lavín deja Educación y se traslada a Mideplan en medio de conflicto 
estudiantil. La Tercera. Retrieved from http://www.latercera.com. 
Lander, E. (2005). Venezuelan social conflict in a global context. Latin American 
Perspectives, 32(2), 20-38. 
Larrañaga, O., and Contreras, D. (2010). Chile solidario y combate a la pobreza. Documento de 
Trabajo, 1. 
Lebowitz, M. (2003). Beyond capital. New York: Palgrave. 
Lebowitz, M. (2005). Holloway's scream: Full of sound and fury. Historical Materialism, 13(4), 
217-231. 
Lebowitz, M. (2006a). Build it now. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Lebowitz, M. (2006b). The politics of assumption, the assumption of politics. Historical 
Materialism, 14(2), 29-47. 
Lebowitz, M. (2007). Venezuela: A good example of the bad left of Latin America. Monthly 
Review, 59(3), 38-54. 
Lebowitz, M. (2010, February 20). Socialism: The goal, the paths and the compass. The Bullet. 
Retrieved from http://www.socialistproject.ca. 
Lebowitz, M. (2012). The contradictions of real socialism. New York: MonthlyReview Press. 
Leiva, F. I. (2008). Latin American neostructuralism. London: University of Minnesota Press. 
  255 
Leiva, F. I. (2012). The Chilean left after 1990: An izquierda permitida championing 
transnational capital, a historical left ensnared in the past, and a new radical left in 
gestation. In J. R. Webber and B. Carr (Eds.), The new Latin American left: Cracks in the 
empire (pp. 299-327). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Leiva, S., and Campos, A. (2013). Movimiento social de trabajadores subcontratados en la 
minería privada del cobre en Chile. Psicoperspectivas, 12(2), 51-61. 
Lerner, J., and Schugurensky, D. (2007). Who learns what in participatory democracy? 
Participatory budgeting in Rosario, Argentina. In R. Van der Veen, D. Wildermeersch, J. 
Youngblood and V. Marsick (Eds.), Democratic practices as learning opportunities, (pp. 
85-100). Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. 
Levy, C. (2012). Social movements and political parties in Brazil: expanding democracy, the 
‘struggle for the possible’ and the reproduction of power structures. Globalizations, 9(6), 
783-798. 
Llerena, M. (2006). Empresas sociales y política de competencia. Boletim Latino-Americano De 
Concorrência, 15(33), 82-90. 
Llosa, A. V. (2007). The return of the idiot. Foreign Policy, (160), 54. 
López, B.H. (2012, February 9). Los certeros avances de la economía bolivariana. Aporrea. 
Retrieved from http://www.aporrea.org. 
Lucena, H., and Carmona, H. (2006). Empresas recuperadas: Posibilidades y limitaciones a partir 
de da experiencia con INVEPAL. In II jornadas de la sección de estudios venezolanos. 
Caracas: Asociación de Estudios Latinoamericanos LASA. Retreived from 
http://svs.osu.edu. 
Lukács, G. (1968). History and class consciousness. Cambridge: MIT press. 
Lupi, C. (2010). Em 2009, doze milhoes de empregos formais a mais do que em 2003. In 2003-
2010 o Brasil em transformação v2 (pp. 63-68). São Paulo: Perseu Abramo. 
Lustig, N., Lopez-Calva, L. F., and Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2013). Declining inequality in Latin 
America in the 2000s: The cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. World 
Development, 44, 129-141. 
Magalhães, L. A. (2003). O governo Lula e os meios de comunicação. Margem Esquerda, 
Ensaios Marxistas, (1), 66-72. 
Manifestación estudiantes chilenos 2011 - besatón por la educación. (2011, July 6). [Video File]. 
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com. 
Marcha de los paraguas: Manifestantes estiman 100 mil asistentes y Gobierno, 50 mil. (2011, 
August 18). Emol. Retrieved from  http://www.emol.com. 
  256 
Maricato, E. (2013). É a questão urbana, estúpido! In E. Maricato (Ed.) Cidades rebeldes. Passe 
livre e as manifestações que tomaram as ruas do Brasil (pp. 19-23). Sao Paulo: 
Boitempo. 
Marin, F. (2011, August 20). Chile: la rebelión de la clase media. Proceso. Retrieved from 
http://www.proceso.com.mx. 
Martínez, C., Fox, M., and Farrell, J. (2010). Venezuela speaks!: Voices from the grassroots. 
Oakland: PM Press. 
Martínez, J. H. (2008). Causas e interpretaciones del Caracazo. Historia Actual Online, (16), 85-
92. 
Marx, K. (1976a). Capital volume 1. London: Penguin Books. 
Marx, K. (1976b). Capital volume 3. New York: International Publishers. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1970). The german ideology. New York: International Publishers. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1994). The communist manifesto. In S. H. Lawrence (Ed.), Karl Marx 
Selected Writings (pp. 157-186). Cambridge: Hackett publishing. 
Más de 170.000 chilenos marchan otra vez contra Piñera. (2011, August 25). El Mundo. 
Retrieved from http://www.elmundo.es. 
Maya, M. L. (2008). Venezuela: Hugo Chávez y el bolivarianismo. Revista Venezolana de 
Economía y Ciencias Sociales, 14(3), 55-82. 
Maya, M. L. (2014). Venezuela: the political crisis of post-Chavismo. Social Justice, 40(4), 68. 
McMichael, P. (1990). Incorporating comparison within a world-historical perspective: An 
alternative comparative method. American Sociological Review, 385-397. 
McNally, D. (2004). The dual form of labour in capitalist society and the struggle over meaning: 
Comments on Postone. Historical Materialism, 12(3), 189-208. 
McNally, D. (2011). Global slump: The economics and politics of crisis and resistance. Oakland, 
CA : Black Point, N.S.: PM Press. 
 Mészáros, I. (2005). Marx's theory of alienation. London: Merlin press. 
Ministerio de Educación. (2013). Aranceles de referencia 2013, Ministerio de educación. 
Retrieved from http://www.mineduc.cl. 
Moreno-Brid, J. C., and Paunovic, I. (2006). Old wine in new bottles? Economic policymaking 
in left-of-center governments in Latin America. Revista–Harvard Review of Latin 
America, Spring/Summer, 44-47. 
Moreno, J. (2013, November 26). Os protestos mostram que sair da miséria é o início de mais 
reivindicações. El Pais. Retrieved from http://brasil.elpais.com. 
  257 
Moreno, M. (2011). La comuna de buenos aires. Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual. 
Motta, S. C. (2011). Notes towards pre-figurative epistemologies. In S. C. Motta and A. G. 
Nilsen (Eds.), Social Movements in the Global South (pp. 178-199). New York: Palgrave. 
Motta, S. C. (2013). “We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For” The Feminization of 
Resistance in Venezuela. Latin American Perspectives, 40(4), 35-54. 
Munck, R. (2015). Karl Polanyi for Latin America: markets, society and development. Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement, 36(4), 
425-441. 
Muñoz, V. (2011). El derecho a la educación: una mirada comparativa. Santiago de Chile. 
Retrieved from http://portal.unesco.org. 
Murillo, M. V. (2000). From populism to neoliberalism: labor unions and market reforms in 
Latin America. World Politics, 52(02), 135-168. 
Murmis, M., and Portantiero, J. C. (2011). Estudios sobre los orígenes del peronismo. Buenos 
Aires: Siglo Veintiuno. 
Myers, D. (1990). The politics of liberty, justice and distribution? In Wiarda, H. and Kline, H. 
(Eds.), Latin American politics and development (pp. 283-320). Boulder: Westview. 
Núñez, D. (2012). Proyecciones políticas del movimiento social por la educación en 
Chile. Revista del Observatorio Social de América Latina, 18(31), 61-70. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Oliver, L. (2011, December 16). Person of the year 2011 - your vote. The Guardian. Retrieved 
from https://www.theguardian.com. 
Olivera, O., and Lewis, T. (2004). Cochabamba!: water war in Bolivia. Cambridge, Mass.: 
South End Press. 
Ollman, B. (2003). Dance of the dialectic. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011). 0.5 el coeficiente Gini de 
Chile, la desigualdad más alta entre los países de la OCDE. Retrieved from: 
http://www.oecd.org. 
Ospina, P., and Lalander, R. (2012). Razones de un distanciamiento político: el Movimiento 
Indígena ecuatoriano y la Revolución Ciudadana. Revista del Observatorio Social de 
América Latina, 13(32), 117-134. 
Paim, L. (2014, February 1). Rodoviários mantêm greve e propõem passe livre a partir de 
segunda-feira". Sul 21. Retrieved from http://www.sul21.com.br. 
Palomino, H. (2005). Los sindicatos y los movimientos sociales emergentes del colapso 
neoliberal en Argentina. In E. de la Garza Toledo (Ed.), Sindicatos y nuevos movimientos 
  258 
sociales en América Latina, (pp.19-52). Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de 
Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO). 
Panitch, L. (2000). The new imperial state. New Left Review, 2(March-April), 5-20. 
Panitch, L., and Gindin, S. (2005). Superintending global capital. New Left Review, 
35(September-October), 101-123. 
Parker, D. (2005). Chávez and the search for an alternative to neoliberalism. Latin American 
Perspectives, 32(2), 39-50. 
Partidos políticos y el Congreso terminaron el 2011 con niveles históricos de rechazo ciudadano. 
(2012, January 3). El Mostrador. Retrieved from http://www.elmostrador.cl. 
Pastor Marco Feliciano é eleito para presidir Comissão de Direitos Humanos. (2013, July 3). 
Carta Capital. Retrieved from http://www.cartacapital.com.br. 
Pastor, D. (2004). Origins of the Chilean binominal election system. Revista de ciencia 
política, 24(1), 38-57. 
Patroni, V. (2004). Disciplining labour, producing poverty: Neoliberal structural reforms and the 
political conflict in argentina. Research in Political Economy, 21, 91-120. 
Pautassi, L. (2004). Beneficios y beneficiarias: Análisis del Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados de Argentina. In M. E. Valenzuela (Ed.), Políticas de Empleo para Superar 
la Pobreza, (pp. 59-110). Santiago de Chile: International Labour Organization. 
PDVSA. (2006). Anexo 12 guía general corporativa para la implantación programa EPS en 
PDVSA. Retrieved from: 
http://200.5.41.139/reps/doc/Ficha_Descriptiva_Programa_EPS.doc. 
Pearson, T. (2016, October 27). Venezuela’s communes form the front line of a difficult 
revolutionary struggle. Green Left Weekly. Retrieved from https://www.greenleft.org.au. 
Peña, K. (2016). Social movements, the state, and the making of food sovereignty in Ecuador. 
Latin American Perspectives, 43(1), 221-237. 
 Pérez Bancalari, H., Ferretti, L., Calcagno, A. M. and Piccini, P. (2008). Las mujeres en las 
empresas recuperadas - ¿protagonistas y/o subordinadas? Paper Presented at XV 
Jornadas de Investigación y Cuarto Encuentro de Investigadores en Psicología del 
Mercosur. Facultad de Psicología - Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires. 
Pérez, G. J., and Natalucci, A. (2010). La matriz movimientista de acción colectiva en Argentina: 
la experiencia del espacio militante kirchnerista. América Latina Hoy, 54(11), 97-112. 
Petras, J., and Veltmeyer, H. (2001). Are Latin American peasant movements still a force for 
change? Some new paradigms revisited. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 28(2), 83-118. 
Petras, J., and Veltmeyer, H. (2006). Social movements and the state: Political power dynamics 
in Latin America. Critical sociology, 32(1), 83-104. 
  259 
Pinnington, E., and Shugurensky, D. (2009). Civic learning and political engagement through 
participatory budgeting: The case of Guelph, Canada. In K. Daly, D. Schugurensky and 
K. Lopes (Eds.), Learning democracy by doing: Alternative practices in citizenship 
learning and participatory democracy, (pp.706-720). Toronto, Canada: Transformative 
Learning Centre, Ontario Instutite for Studies in Education, University of Toronto. 
Polanyi, K. (1957). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon press. 
Popovitch, A. (2014). Althusserianism and the political culture of the Argentine new left. Latin 
American Research Review, 49(1), 203-222. 
Portes, A. (1997). Neoliberalism and the sociology of development: emerging trends and 
unanticipated facts. Population and Development Review, 22(June), 229-259. 
Portes, A., and Hoffman, K. (2003). Latin American class structures: Their composition and 
change during the neoliberal era. Latin American Research Review, 38(1), 41-82. 
Postone, M. (1996). Time, labour, and social domination. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Postone, M. (2004). Critique and historical transformation. Historical Materialism, 12(3), 53-72. 
Poulantzas, N. (2000.) State, power, socialism. London: Verso. 
Pousadela, I. M. (2012). The Chilean student movement: An expanding space for civil society. In 
Crossroads Initiative Conference, (pp. 1-44). New Delhi: Society for Participatory 
Research in Asia. 
Pozzi, P., and Nigra, F. (2015). Argentina a Decade after the Collapse Old and New Social 
Movements. Latin American Perspectives, 42(2), 3-11. 
Prefeitura investiu em seis meses apenas 17% do previsto. (2012, September). De Olho Na 
Cidade, 15(33), 4. 
Prieto, H. (2015, August 11). Entrevista con el sociólogo venezolano Edgardo Lander: "El 
proceso de transformación de la sociedad venezolana en lo fundamental fracas". 
Rebelión. Retrieved from http://www.aporrea.org. 
Projecto de Lei-Passe Livre. (2013, July 15). Retrieved from https://blocodeluta.noblogs.org. 
PSOL apresenta hoje representacao contra marco Feliciano. (2013, April 3). Folha De S. Paulo. 
Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br. 
PSOL e PSTU formam aliança em São Paulo. (2014, June 4). Carta Capital. Retrieved from 
http://www.cartacapital.com.br. 
Pulgar, C. (2011, September 20). La revolución en el Chile del 2011 y el movimiento social por 
la educación. DiarioUChile. Retrieved from http://radio.uchile.cl. 
Quarter, J., and Midha, H. (2001). Informal learning processes in a worker co-operative. 
(Working Paper No. 37). The Research Network on New Approaches to Lifelong 
Learning (NALL) Retrieved from http://uwcc.wisc.edu. 
  260 
Quijano, A. (1966). Notas sobre el concepto de marginalidad social. Santiago: ECLAC. 
Rapley, J. (2002). Understanding development: Theory and practice in the third world. Boulder, 
Colorado.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Reyes Soriano, J. (2016). La autodefensa de masas y las Milicias Rodriguistas: aprendizajes, 
experiencias y consolidación del trabajo militar de masas del Partido Comunista de Chile, 
1982-1987. Izquierdas, (26), 67-94. 
Ribeiro da Costa, L. A., Demarchi Bellan, A. C., Linhares, R. e Soares Pagani, V.G., O 
movimento recente das greves. (2013). Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, 6(72), 9. 
Punctuation? Pages?. 
Roberts, K. M. (1995). From the barricades to the ballot box: Redemocratization and political 
realignment in the Chilean left. Politics & Society, 23(4), 495-519. 
Robinson, W. I. (2008). Latin America and global capitalism: A critical globalization 
perspective. JHU Press. 
Rodríguez, A., and Rodríguez, P. (2011). El primer año de las políticas urbanas de Sebastián 
Piñera: El monólogo auto-elogioso. In Barómetro de política y equidad, (pp.118-137). 
Santiago: Fundación Equitas and Fundación Friedrich Ebert. 
Rodriguez, C. (2006, March 15). Entrevista a los trabajadores despedidos de invepal maracay. 
Aporrea. Retrieved from http://www.aporrea.org. 
Romero, S. (2015, October 2). Brazil’s President takes steps on austerity. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. 
Rosales, A. (2013). Going underground: The political economy of the ‘left turn’in South 
America. Third World Quarterly, 34(8), 1443-1457. 
Ross, M. L. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics, 51(02), 297-
322. 
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rousseff, D. (2013, June 21). Dilma se pronuncia sobre os protestos no Brasil; leia a íntegra do 
discurso. Veja. Retrieved from http://veja.abril.com.br. 
Rowbotham, M. (2000). Goodbye America!: Globalisation, debt, and the dollar empire. 
Concord, MA: J. Carpenter. 
Ruggeri, A. (2014). Informe del IV relevamiento de empresas recuperadas en la Argentina. Las 
empresas recuperadas en el período 2010–2014. Buenos Aires: Cooperativa Chilavert 
Artes Gráficas. Retrieved from http://www.recuperadasdoc.com.ar. 
Ruiz, C. (2012). New social conflicts under Bachelet. Latin American Perspectives, 39(4), 71-84. 
  261 
Saad Filho, A., Iannini, F. and Molinari, E. J. (2007) Neoliberalism and democracy in Argentina 
and Brazil. In Arestis, Philip and Sawyer, Malcolm, (Eds.), political economy of latin 
america: recent issues and performance. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-35. 
Saad-Filho, A. (2013). Mass protests under ‘left neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 2013. Critical 
Sociology, 39(5), 657-669. 
Saad-Filho, A. (2016, September 15). Brazil's new president presents neoliberal economic plan. 
The Real News. Retrieved from http://therealnews.com. 
Sader, E. (2013, July 3a). O Brasil se reinventa, contra as aves de rapina. Carta Maior. Retrieved 
from http://www.cartamaior.com.br. 
Sader, E. (2013b). A construção da hegemonia pós-neoliberal. In E. Sader (Ed.), Lula E Dilma 
10 anos de governos pos-neoliberais no Brasil (pp. 135-143). São Paulo: Boitempo. 
Samuels, D. (2004). From socialism to social democracy party organization and the 
transformation of the workers’ party in Brazil. Comparative Political Studies, 37(9), 999-
1024. 
Sarkar, P., and Singer, H. W. (1992). Debt crisis, commodity prices, transfer burden, and debt 
relief. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Sawchuk, P. H. (2006). ‘Use-value’and the re-thinking of skills, learning and the labour process. 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(5), 593-617. 
Schoening, J. (2006). Cooperative entrepreneurialism: Reconciling democratic values with 
business demands at a worker-owned firm. Research in Sociology of Work, 16, 293-315. 
Schugurensky, D. (2006). This is our school of citizenship: Informal learning in local 
democracy. Counterpoints, 249, 163-182. 
Segovia, C., and Gamboa, R. (2012). Chile: El año en que salimos a la calle. Revista de Ciencia 
Política, 32(1), 65-85. 
Sen, A. (2001). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford Paperbacks. 
Sen, A. (2012). Development as capability expansion In J. DeFilippis and S. Saegert (Eds.), The 
community development Reader (pp. 319-327). New York: Routledge. 
Sens, A. G., and Stoett, P. J. (2002). Global politics: origins, currents, directions. Toronto: 
Nelson Thomson Learning. 
Serrano, C. (2005). Familia como unidad de intervención de políticas sociales. Notas sobre el 
Programa Puente–Chile Solidario. Paper presented at Reunión de Expertos: Políticas 
Hacia las Familias, Protección e Inclusión Sociales, Santiago: Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Carribean. 
Servel. (2012). Sitio histórico electoral. [Data Set]. Retreived from 
http://ww2.servel.cl/index.html. 
  262 
Sigmund, P. E. (1990), Chile: Alternative approaches to development. In Wiarda, H. and Kline, 
H. (Eds.), Latin American politics and development (pp.129-166). Boulder: Westview. 
Silva, E. (2007). The import-substitution model chile in comparative perspective. Latin 
American Perspectives, 34(3), 67-90. 
Sitrin, M. (2006). Horizontalism: voices of popular power in argentina. Oakland, California: AK 
Press, 2006. 
Sitrin, M. (2011). Fuelling the flames of dignity: From rupture to revolution in Argentina. In S. 
Motta and A. Gunvald Nilsen (Eds.), Social movements in the global south (pp. 250-274). 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. Retreived from http://link.springer.com. 
Smith, A. (2007). Wealth of nations. New York: Cosimo Classics. 
Snow, P. and Wynia, G. (1990). Argentina: politics in a conflict society. In Wiarda, H. and 
Kline, H. (Eds.), Latin American politics and development (pp.129-166). Boulder: 
Westview. 
Soederberg, S. (2003). The international dimensions of the Argentine default: The case of the 
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Canadian Journal of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies, 28(55-56), 97-125. 
Soederberg, S. (2005). The transnational debt architecture and emerging markets: the politics of 
paradoxes and punishment. Third World Quarterly, 26(6), 927-949. 
Spronk, S. (2007). Roots of resistance to urban water privatization in Bolivia: The “New 
Working Class,” the crisis of neoliberalism, and public services. International Labor and 
Working-Class History, 71(1), 8-28. 
Spronk, S., Webber, J. R., Ciccariello-Maher, G., Denis, R., Ellner, S., Fernandes, S., Motta, S. 
and Purcell, T. (2011). The Bolivarian process in Venezuela: A left forum. Historical 
Materialism, 19(1), 233-270. 
Striffler, S. (2017). Something left in Latin America: Venezuela and the struggle for twenty-first 
century socialism. Socialist Register, Forthcoming. 
Suárez, A. (2016, June, 15). A cinco años del Liceo A-90, autogestionado por alumnos, 
profesores y apoderados. La Izquierda Diario. Retrieved from 
http://www.laizquierdadiario.cl. 
Suicidio masivo por la educación (Concepción, Chile). (2011, June 28). [Video File]. Retrieved 
from https://www.youtube.com. 
Svampa, M. (2011). Extractivismo neodesarrollista, gobiernos y movimientos sociales en 
América Latina. Revista Problèmes de lAmérique Latine, 81, 103-128. 
Svampa, M. (2012). Consenso de los commodities, giro ecoterritorial y pensamiento crítico en 
América Latina. Revista del Observatorio Social de América Latina, 13(32), 15-38. 
  263 
Svampa, M. (2013). Consenso de los Commodities y lenguajes de valoración en América Latina. 
Nueva Sociedad, 244, 30-46. 
Tavares, M. D. C. (1964). The growth and decline of import substitution in Brazil. Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, 9(1), 1-60. 
Thompson, E. P. (1967). Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism. Past and Present, 
(38), 56-97. 
Thompson, E. P. (1971). The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century. 
Past & Present, (50), 76-136. 
Torres, C. A., and Schugurensky, D. (2002). The political economy of higher education in the era 
of neoliberal globalization: Latin America in comparative perspective. Higher 
Education, 43(4), 429-455. 
Torres, R. (2010, June). Juventud, resistencia y cambio social: el movimiento de estudiantes 
secundarios como un “actor político” en la sociedad chilena post-Pinochet (1986-2006). 
Paper presented at VI Congreso CEISAL 2010: Independencias-Dependencias-
Interdependencias, Toulouse, France. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2013). World investment report 2013: 
global value chains: Investment and trade for development. Retrieved from 
http://unctad.org. 
United Nations Development Programme. (1999). Human development report 1999. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Universitarios se toman sedes del PS y la UDI y escalan conflicto hasta la clase política. (2011, 
June 30). El Mostrador. Retrieved from http://www.elmostrador.cl. 
Valdebenito, L. N. (2009). Lo reversivo en la revolución de los secundarios en Chile. Quórum 
Académico, 6(1), 121-135. 
Vanden, H. E. (2003). Globalization in a time of neoliberalism: Politicized social movements 
and the Latin American response. Journal of Developing Societies, 19(2-3), 308-333. 
Varesi, G. Á. (2016). Accumulation and hegemony in Argentina in the age of Kirchnerism. 
Revista Latinoamericana de Economía, 47(187). 
Vera, S. (2013). Cronología del conflicto: El movimiento estudiantil en Chile, 2011. Anuario del 
Conflicto Social, 1(1), 247-251. 
Vieta, M. (2014). Learning in struggle: Argentina’s new worker cooperatives as transformative 
learning organizations. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 69(1), 186-218. 
Vieta, M. and Ruggeri, A. (2009). The worker-recuperated enterprises as workers’ cooperatives: 
The conjunctures, challenges, and innovations of self-management in Argentina and 
Latin America. In J.J. McMurtry and D. Reed (Eds.), Co-operatives in a global economy: 
  264 
The challenges of co-operation across borders (pp. 178-221). Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Press. 
Vila, N. (2013, March 28). Andrés Fielbaum y masiva marcha de Ues privadas: “Es un gran paso 
para el movimiento estudiantil”. DiarioUchile. Retrieved from http://radio.uchile.cl. 
Vilas, C. M. (2006). Neoliberal meltdown and social protest: Argentina 2001-2002. Critical 
Sociology, 32(1), 163-186. 
Wainwright, H. (1994). Arguments for a new left. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Watts, J. (2013, April 5). Head of Brazil's equality body accused of homophobia and racism. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com. 
Webber, J. R. (2011). From rebellion to reform in bolivia. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
Webber, J. R. (2015, August 30). Ecuador’s impasse. Jacobin. Retrieved from 
https://www.jacobinmag.com. 
Weisbrot, M. (2011). Venezuela in the Chávez Years: Its economy and influence on the 
region. In J. Eastwood and T. Ponniah, Revolution in Venezuela: social and political 
change under Chávez (pp. 193-223). Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for 
Latin American Studies. 
Weissheimer, M. (2013, July 1) Flavio Koutzii: Esse é o melhor Brasil que temos depois da 
ditadura. Sul 21. Retrieved from http://www.sul21.com.br. 
Weisskoff, R. (1980). The growth and decline of import substitution in Brazil—revisited. World 
Development, 8(9), 647-675. 
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning as a social system. Systems Thinker, 9(5), 
1-9. 
Wenger, E. and Snyder, M. (1999). Communities of practice: The organizational frontier. 
Harvard Business Review, 9(5), 1-10. 
Weyh, C. (2011). Educar pela participação. Santo Angelo: FURI. 
Wiarda, S. (1990). The politics of order and progress? In Wiarda, H. and Kline, H. (Eds.), Latin 
American politics and development (pp. 167-200). Boulder: Westview. 
Williamson, J. (1990). Latin American adjustment: How much has happened? Washington, 
D.C.: Institute of International Economics. 
Wilpert, G. (2007). Changing Venezuela by taking power: The history and policies of the Chávez 
government. London: Verso. 
Wood, E.M. (1995). Democracy against capitalism: Renewing historical materialism. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank. (2013). Chile [Data set]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile. 
  265 
World Bank. (2015). GDP growth (Annual %) [Data set]. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org. 
Wright, O.E. (2010). Envisioning real utopias. London: Verso. 
Wright, T. C., and Zúñiga, R. O. (2007). Chilean political exile. Latin American 
Perspectives, 34(4), 31-49. 
Zibechi, R. (2007). Dispersar el poder. Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala. 
Zibechi, R. (2015, August 6). Hacer balance del progresismo. Rebelion. Retrieved from 
http://www.rebelion.org. 
Zibechi, R. (2016, October 14). Las tormentas que se vienen. La Jornada. Retrieved from 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx. 
Zirin, D. (2014). Brazil's dance with the devil. Chicago: Haymarket. 
  266 
Appendix: Methodology and Data Collection 
The aim of this dissertation was to understand the possibilities and challenges to social 
transformation expressed by Latin American social movements in the context of the pink tide. 
From this general question, three more specific questions arise: i) how did the movements 
studied emerge; ii) what are their specific demands and practices, and iii) how do the pink tide 
governments respond to them? To answer these questions, this dissertation uses a qualitative case 
study approach that involves situating a particular activity or event with its related social, 
historical and economic setting (Creswell, 1998, p. 61). In doing so, I treat the particular or 
‘concrete’ dialectically, with the understanding that, in capitalism, subjectivities and individuals 
are normally dominated by the value form (Ollman, 2003). This means that the study of concrete 
experiences or events cannot be treated as isolated phenomena, but rather as necessarily related 
to the dominant forces and structures associated with the reproduction of capital.  
Conversely, my approach also treats the categories of political economy (i.e. value, 
capital, labor etc.) merely as ‘real abstractions’, meaning that, although dominant, they are 
nevertheless dependent on concrete experience. This approach avoids two potential traps. First it 
avoids romanticizing concrete experience by delinking it from value relations in capitalism. 
Second it does not treat the categories of political economy as ultimately what is ‘real’ in 
capitalism and therefore drifting into economism. Bertell Ollman (2003) refers to this dialectical 
approach to treating the relationship between concrete and abstract as “structured 
interdependence.” Epistemologically, this means combining induction with deduction in order to 
generate new theories and concepts from the empirical material and relevant already-existing 
theory. 
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My research also draws from learning methodologies that understand learning to be a 
social practice that takes place both formally and informally within particular institutions or 
social groups (Hall, 1993; Wenger, 1998; Foley, 1999; Wenger and Snyder, 1999; Quarter and 
Midha, 2001; Eraut, 2004; Schoening, 2006). Following the insights of critical pedagogy, I 
understand learning as praxis in which theory and practice, thought and action, are seen as 
dialectically related.  
This dialectical approach to understanding learning breaks from vanguardist positions 
that assume a “banking” model of education in which political experts simply deposit 
revolutionary knowledge into the oppressed and exploited, an approach that reinforces a dualism 
between knowing and being (Freire, 1970; Motta, 2011). The reason critical pedagogy is an 
important aspect of my methodology is because it is useful for identifying subjective and 
objective changes that might point to the development of social relations that are distinct from 
those of capital. In other words, to identify learning of the kind suggested by critical pedagogy, 
that is, learning that challenges existing structures of oppression, is to identify the new forming 
within the old. 
My research also relies on comparisons. It utilizes both the single and multiple forms of 
‘incorporated comparison’, as outlined by Phillip McMichael (1990). I engage in comparisons at 
four different levels. At the most abstract level, I compare the logic and practices of capital with 
those expressed by the subject matter (social movements). I do this at both the level of the 
individual case studies and the four cases as a whole. The strategy of comparing the logic of 
capital with a distinct logic is not new. As McMichael notes, this was performed by Karl Polanyi 
(1957) in The Great Transformation, which compared the precapitalist logic of "society" with 
the utilitarian logic of the "economy" (394).  
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More recently, debates within political Marxism also rely heavily on comparisons 
between capitalism and precapitalist societies. For example, in his work on the origins of 
capitalism, Brenner (1986) engages in comparisons between the capitalist logic and precapitalist 
feudal society in rural England. Similarly, in her influential book, Democracy Against 
Capitalism, Ellen Wood (1995) compares ancient Greek society to capitalism. Indeed, Marx 
(1976a) himself engaged in a similar move in Capital Volume 1, comparing the "capitalist mode 
of production" to ancient precapitalist societies. 
For the theorists listed above, comparing the logic of capital to a distinct logic was 
essential for establishing the historical specificity of capitalism. My comparison differs in one 
fundamental way, however. While these theorists compared capitalist relations in the present to 
distinct social relations in the past, I compare capitalist social relations in the present with the 
future. It is worth noting that, at times, Marx (1976a) did in fact perform this move in Capital 
Volume 1, making references to an imaginary future communist society.  
However, my approach differs in that my comparison to the future will rely not on an 
imaginary society, but on empirical material from a present in which the future is potentially 
prefigured. Hence, rather than looking to establish the historical specificity of capitalism, as 
comparisons to pre-capitalist societies aim to do, this kind of comparison looks to establish the 
historical possibility and challenges of a post-capitalist society. This approach is in accordance 
with Marx’s philosophy of internal relations in which both the past and the future are understood 
as essential moments in the present (Ollman, 2003, p.121). It is through this approach to 
understanding capitalist development that I developed the concept of ‘post-capitalist struggles’, a 
prefigurative spatio-temporal moment that would remain hidden from view using an empiricist 
methodology. 
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Although the type of comparisons mentioned above are at the center of my research, I 
also make comparisons at a lower level of abstraction. I compare four different movements, each 
with its own history, challenges and contradictions. This revealed key areas of difference 
between my case studies, particularly in terms of social composition, institutional continuity, and 
democratic form. However, in addition to revealing points of difference, comparison between my 
four case studies helped to shed light on two areas of unity in the development of a potential 
post-capitalist future. The first can be found in the concept of participatory democracy, which, 
although varying in specific form from case to case, nevertheless offers a consistent challenge to 
the more rigid forms of leadership and representation of liberal democracy. Second is primitive 
accumulation and the dispossessed as the catalyst and agent for social transformation. 
 Next, I compare the differences and similarities between my case studies along four 
dimensions: production, reproduction, civil society and state. I do this in the context of historical 
analysis of each country’s development trajectory since the ISI period. This comparison helped 
me reveal the specific challenges associated with movements in each sphere, such as the 
development of political coherence. Finally, I compare neoliberalism in Latin America with the 
current changes in the region's political economy under the ‘pink tide’. This involves comparing 
each of the four countries to each other as well as comparing the four countries as a group or 
individually to the history of neoliberalism in the region. This allowed me to develop the concept 
of the ‘neostructuralist bargain’ as a key moment of unity in the politics of the pink tide. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
As is typical with the case study approach (Creswell, 1998; Berg, 2004), my data 
collection tools were varied, included in-depth, semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions, participant observation, textual analysis and a survey instrument. All interviews 
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followed the ethical standards set out by York University's Human Participants Review 
Subcommittee (HPRC). All interviews were conducted in either Spanish or Portuguese. With the 
exception of public figures, pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of research participants. 
In all cases, interviews were acquired by approaching the research sites directly. Selection of 
participants took place through a combination of the ‘snowball method’ (asking the first 
participant to suggest a second and so on), and ‘purposeful selection’ to best acquire 
representation of the social composition at each site (Berg, 2004, p. 36). Overall, 80 interviews 
were conducted for all case studies. 
Textual analysis included relevant government literature, including policy and strategic 
documents, relevant academic research, media coverage as well as any literature developed by 
the participants and organizations in question. Although the ethnographic data collected provides 
a rich account of the specific research sites, these findings are not necessarily generalizable to 
each movement as a whole. In addition, the use of interview data has an inherent weakness, 
namely that this data expresses the research subject’s particular recollection and interpretation of 
events and not necessarily the events themselves. In other words, interviews are an ‘indirect’ 
source of information (Creswell, 2003, p. 186) that is less reliable than first hand observation. 
For this reason, to maximize reliability, events discussed by any single research subject have 
been cross-referenced with other interviews and, where possible, observation and already 
existing published literature on the subject. 
In my workplace studies, interviews were conducted with workers at each organization as 
well as community members and relevant government employees and officials. Each interview 
lasted from approximately 30 minutes to two hours. The survey is based on the work of Josh 
Lerner and Daniel Schugurensky (2007) who use a series of indicators to assess the impact of 
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democratic participation on individuals’ learning. This survey was useful in helping me unlock 
the often-unconscious learning processes behind participants' day-to-day activities.56 
The survey examines learning in four main areas: knowledge, skills, attitudes and values, 
and practices. It does so by asking participants to identify the degree of change (either positive or 
negative) they experienced in relation to a series of indicators, such as collective management, 
knowledge of collective needs and connection to surrounding communities. The use of the 
survey has quantitative and qualitative dimensions. It is quantitative because it asks participants 
to select a number between one and five that corresponds to changes in their learning.  
However, the use of the survey is ultimately qualitative because I use it to initiate an open 
discussion with those participants who indicate a large degree of change since they began 
working at their organization. In other words, the quantitative responses are not used to establish 
statistical patterns but rather to identify areas of learning in which a participant experienced a 
notable degree of subjective change. Once this area of learning was identified, I engaged the 
participant with follow-up questions, probing him or her to identify potential causal factors 
behind this learning.  
In my Brazilian case study, my data collection was somewhat different. Interview 
participants were mostly students, which reflected the composition of the movement itself. 
However, I also interviewed other participants, such as unionized workers and leaders, members 
of various political parties, and politicians. In addition, I did not use a survey instrument. This is 
because engagement with participants occurred as the mobilizations were taking place and 
therefore no ‘before and after’ existed. In addition, interviews often took place in the midst of a 
particular demonstration or action. This makes the implementation of the survey, which requires 
a certain amount of patience, somewhat difficult. To compensate for this problem, my interviews 
                                                
56 See also Pinnington and Schugurensky (2009) and Schugurensky (2006). 
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included a number of questions that focused on learning. Lastly, these interviews took on a less 
structured character in order to accommodate the rapidly changing events.  
Analysis of interview data sought to uncover particular themes in the experiences of 
research participants in relation to specific questions. In other words, the themes that were 
ultimately chosen in each case study can be said to primarily reflect a dialogue between 
theoretical and empirical knowledge acquired in advance, and participants’ own knowledge. This 
process was facilitated by the semi-structured character of the interviews, which guided 
discussion around particular themes, yet was open enough to allow for new themes to emerge, or 
for existing seems to be challenged or fine tuned.  
Although the interviews served as the primary vehicle for theme generation, the interview 
data was triangulated with my own observations and participation, as well as relevant documents 
produced by the organizations in question. In cases where different data sources produced 
contradictory, or at least not wholly coherent findings on a certain theme, rather than arbitrarily 
choosing one interpretation over another, my approach was to generate a theme that would 
encompass the contradictions in the data sources (see Sen, 2012, p. 321).  
My embrace of contradiction in the data sources was perhaps most evident in the case of 
Brazil, in which research revealed contesting experiences with participatory democracy. In this 
case, the outcome was an embrace of the theme of ambiguity in relation to new democratic forms 
being developed by the movement. In other words, rather than arguing that the free transit 
movement represented a fully formed expression of participatory democracy or, conversely, that 
it was the expression of disorganization and vanguardism, I settled for the combination of these 
two interpretations, arguing that the movement found itself “in between” these two poles. 
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Fieldwork in Argentina took place in three cities between January and April, 2013. In 
Buenos Aires I looked at Hotel Bauen, Bruckman and Maderera Córdoba. In Rosario, I looked at 
Lo Mejor del Centro, and Centro Cultural La Toma. Finally, in Neuquén I looked at 
Zanon/FaSinPat. In interviewed workers, government officials and bureaucrats, including 
personnel at the Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social (National Institute of 
Associationism and Social Economy, INAES). In total, I conducted 29 interviews. Pseudonyms 
were not used for the cases of Alejandro López and Raúl Godoy, both elected members in the 
legislature of the province of Neuquén. 
Fieldwork in Venezuela took place in three cities between June and September of 2009 
and again between October and December of 2013. I interviewed 21 participants who belong to 
four SPUs located in the states of Lara, Barinas and Merida: a tomato-processing plant 
(Complejo Agroindustrial Socialista de Quíbor, or CASQ), a coffee-processing plant (Tomás 
Montilla), and an agricultural equipment service centre (Pedro Camejo) and an electricity 
company (Corpoelec). In addition to the 21 SPU participants, I informally interviewed several 
members of the Corporación Venezolana Agraria, the state corporation all three SPUs belong to, 
members of a number of communal councils in Lara and Merida, two employees at 
SUNACOOP, the national organ responsible for supervision of the cooperative sector and Julio 
Chavez, legislator for the state of Lara. 
Fieldwork in Brazil was conducted in the city of Porto Alegre, between April and 
September 2013. In total, 23 interviews were conducted. In addition to interviews, I engaged in 
extensive participant observation at rallies, marches, talks and other events as the movement was 
unfolding in early June. I also attended the City Hall occupation in late June and the 
demonstrations during the general strike, including those organized by the CUT and Bloco de 
  274 
Luta. As these events were unfolding, I also paid close attention to media reports (both print and 
televised) which I used to track the reaction of the government and other relevant political 
groups or parties to the events, including negotiations, proposals and official statements. Lastly, I 
attended PSOL’s annual congress, a political seminar organized by the PSTU, and a roundtable 
discussion on organized by a local NGO, which brought together key transit activists.  
Finally, in the case of Chile, I did not conduct fieldwork. In this case, data was collected 
primarily from media coverage (including social media) and documents produced by various 
organizations involved in the mobilizations (student bodies, unions, political parties etc.). In an 
attempt to compensate for the lack of direct engagement with participants in the student 
movement, I prioritized the use of sources that showcased the practices and views of these 
participants. These included, for example, YouTube videos of assemblies and demonstrations, as 
well as published interviews, manifestoes, blogs or other documents that featured the 
participants’ own voices. In addition, I conducted one interview with Camilo Ballesteros, student 
movement leader and PCCh member/politician, during his visit to Toronto, Canada in 2012.  
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Indicadores de Aprendizaje 
Por favor identifique su nivel en las siguientes áreas, y si experimento cambios como resultado 
de su participación en su empresa desde fue recuperada. 
 
               Antes de la recuperación Hoy 
 
1. Conocimiento de sus necesidades  
y las de su comunidad      1 2 3 4 5                 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Habilidad de organizar y planificar 
Reuniones       1 2 3 4 5        1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. Habilidad de tomar decisiones en 
forma colectiva      1 2 3 4 5        1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Disposición a ayudar a otros    1 2 3 4 5        1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Confianza en su capacidad de 
influir decisiones políticas     1 2 3 4 5        1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Preocupación sobre los problemas 
de su comunidad      1 2 3 4 5                 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Preocupación sobre los problemas 
de la ciudad       1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Interés en participación comunitaria   1 2 3 4 5                 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Me siento conectado a mi comunidad   1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. Me preocupo por el bien común    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. Hablo con mis vecinos sobre los 
problemas de la comunidad     1 2 3 4 5                1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Pienso ideas y soluciones para esos 
problemas       1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. Voy a reuniones de la comunidad    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
14. Procuro información sobre asuntos 
políticos y sociales      1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
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15. Hablar en público con claridad    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
 
16. Escuchar con atención a otras personas   1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
 
17. Trabajo en grupo, cooperación    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. Autoconfianza      1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
 
19. Confianza en los políticos     1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
 
20. Confianza en el gobierno municipal    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. Voto en elecciones municipales    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
  
22. Voto en elecciones nacionales    1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
 
23. Participo en campañas electorales   1 2 3 4 5       1 2 3 4 5  
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Research Participants 
Argentina 
 
Lo Mejor del Centro 
1. Name: Nini Ezequiel 
Position: Cook, Spokesperson 
Date of interview: January 12, 2013 
 
2. Name: Sonia Villamonte 
Position: Purchasing, Treasurer 
Date of interview: January 12, 2013 
 
3. Name: Guado Dario Gaspar 
Position: Waiter 
Date of interview: January 15, 2013 
 
4. Name: Sampi Denis Zorro 
Position: Waiter, President 
Date of interview: January 15, 2013 
 
5. Name: Pablo Noruega 
Position: Waiter, Spokesperson 
Date of interview: January 17, 2013 
 
6. Name: Rico Amigo Paredes 
Position: Waiter, Treasurer 
Date of interview: January 17, 2013 
 
Centro Cultural La Toma 
 
7. Name: Sincero Fernandez 
Position: Customer Service 
Date of interview: February 1, 2013 
 
8. Name: Arian Aguero 
Position: Administration, Union Liaison 
Date of interview: February 1, 2013 
 
9. Name: Serena Antigo 
Position: Cashier 
Date of interview: February 3, 2013 
 
 
 
  278 
Zanon/FaSinPat 
 
10. Name: Hector Calessi 
Position: Operator 
Date of interview: March 5, 2013 
 
11. Name: Eliana Carbajal 
Position: Press, Spokesperson 
Date of interview: March 5, 2013 
 
12. Name: Ronaldo Tapia 
Position: Washing 
Date of interview: March 5, 2013 
 
13. Name: Cabo Melo 
Position: Production 
Date of interview: March 6, 2013 
 
14. Name: Paulo Rico 
Position: Production 
Date of interview: March 9, 2013 
 
15. Name: Chaco Aspas Gallo 
Position: Operator 
Date of interview: March 9, 2013  
 
16. Name: Chichi Emilio Ramos 
Position: Mill Operator 
Date of interview: March 13, 2013 
 
17. Name: Augusto Iris 
Position: Ceramics 
Date of interview: March 14, 2013 
 
18. Name: Juancho Sepi 
Position: Operator 
Date of interview: March 14, 2013 
 
19. Name: Belinda Espinoza 
Position: Cook 
Date of interview: March 16, 2013 
 
20. Name: Raúl Godoy  
Position: Operator/Legislative Representative 
Date of interview: March 16, 2013 
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21. Name: Alejandro López  
Position: Press/Legislative Representative 
Date of interview: March 12, 2013 
 
Hotel Bauen 
 
22. Focus Group 1 
Names: Alicia Palomino, Milagro Aguero and Maria Fornari  
Position: Dry Cleaning 
Date of interview: March 21, 2013 
 
23. Name: Dario Rosales 
Position: Press 
Date of interview: March 22, 2013 
 
24. Name: Miguel Rojas 
Position: Press 
Date of interview: March 24, 2013 
 
Maderera Cordoba 
 
25. Name: Claudio Salinas 
Position: Woodworker, President 
Date of interview: March 23, 2013 
 
26. Name: Magali Súarez 
Position: Shipping 
Date of interview: March 23, 2013 
 
27. Name: Mateo Pérez 
Position: Sales 
Date of interview: March 26, 2013 
 
Brukman 
 
28. Name: Marucha Andali 
Position: President 
Date of interview: March 22, 2013 
 
Other 
 
29. Name: Marta Firelli 
Organization: INAES 
Date of interview: March 27, 2013 
 
Venezuela 
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Pedro Camejo 
 
30. Name: Jaime Batistuta 
Position: Mechanic 
Date of interview: July 29, 2009 
 
31. Name: Marisa Magas 
Position: Administration 
Date of interview: July 27, 2009 
 
32. Name: Albert Suñiga 
Position: Administration 
Date of interview: July 22, 2009 
 
33. Name: Yolanda Acosta 
Position: Health and Safety 
Date of interview: July 22, 2009 
 
34. Name: Humilde Cachaco 
Position: Field Technician 
Date of interview: July 22, 2009 
 
CASQ 
 
35. Name: Enrique Machado 
Position: Social Activator 
Date of interview: August 10, 2009 
 
36. Name: Juan Cortéz 
Position: Field Analyst 
Date of interview: August 10, 2009 
 
37. Name: Alegre Ávila 
Position: Social Activator 
Date of interview: August 12, 2009 
 
38. Name: Jorge Montiel 
Position: Warehouse 
Date of interview: August 13, 2009 
 
39. Name: Eduardo Escamilla 
Position: Production Supervisor 
Date of interview: August 13, 2009 
 
40. Name: Gerardo Marino 
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Position: Operator 
Date of interview: August 13, 2009 
 
Tomas Montilla 
41. Name: Lucho Gallego 
Position: Coordinator 
Date of interview: August 25, 2009 
 
42. Name: Ina Pérez 
Position: Supervisor 
Date of interview: August 27, 2009 
 
43. Name: Arilio Migas 
Position: Purchasing 
Date of interview: August 25, 2009 
 
44. Name: Mara Tata 
Position: Community Development 
Date of interview: August 28, 2009 
 
45. Name: Anibal Astro 
Position: Maintenance 
Date of interview: August 25, 2009 
 
46. Name: Cantero Luz 
Position: Warehouse 
Date of interview: August 27, 2009 
Corpoelec 
47. Name: Javier Lara 
Position: Technician 
Date of interview: November 18, 2013 
 
48. Name: Lusto Fabian 
Position: Administration 
Date of interview: November 4, 2013 
 
49. Name: Mabel Sacarias 
Position: Coordinator 
Date of interview: November 4, 2013 
 
50. Name: Ollanta Bastas 
Position: Coordinator 
Date of interview: October 31, 2013 
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Other 
 
51. Name: Julio Ronero 
Occupation: Teacher 
Organization: Communal Council Los Olivos 
Date of interview: July 29, 2009 
 
52. Name: Julio Chávez  
Occupation: Former mayor of Carora and legislator for the state of Lara 
Organization: PSUV 
Date of interview: August 20, 2009 
 
53. Name: Zarina Duke 
Organization: Ministerio de Comunas 
Position: Lawyer 
December 12, 2013 
 
54. Name: Mariela Ochoa 
Organization: Communal Council La Milagrosa (Parte Baja 2)/Comuna Simon Bolivar 
Date of interview: November 2, 2013 
 
55. Name: Juevez Danilo 
Organization: Consejo Comunal 
Position: Vocero de Turismo 
Date of Interview: November 4, 2013 
 
Chile 
 
56. Name: Camilo Ballesteros  
Organization: PCCh, Chilean student movemet 
Date of interview: October 11, 2012 
 
Brazil 
 
57. Name: Valerie Butragueño 
Date of interview: July 15, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: None 
 
58. Name: Danilo Campos 
Date of interview: June 20, 2013 
Occupation: Engineer 
Organization: MPL 
 
59. Name: Carisa Filha 
Date of interview: July 13, 2013 
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Occupation: Student 
Organization: MPL 
 
60. Name: Vera Mechado 
Date of interview: July 30, 2013 
Occupation: Student/Journalist 
Organization: Jornal Tabare 
 
61. Name: Kara Buen dia 
Date of interview: July 30, 2013 
Occupation: Student/Journalist 
Organization: Jornal Tabare 
 
62. Name: Paulo Ferreira 
Date of interview: July 28, 2013 
Occupation: Student/Journalist 
Organization: Jornal Tabaré 
 
63. Name: Manolo Rosalda 
Date of interview: July 11, 2013 
Occupation: Union Rep. 
Organization: CUT 
 
64. Name: Lalo Mendez 
Date of interview: June 20, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: PSOL 
 
65. Name: Gaba Gonzales Amarro 
Date of interview: August 9, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: Passe Livre/Bloco de Luta 
 
66. Name: Roberto Henriques 
Date of interview: July 17, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: PCB/Bloco de Luta 
 
67. Name: Cristobal Ortega 
Date of interview: July 17, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: Bloco de Luta 
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68. Name: Gabriela Guzman 
Date of interview: July 20, 2013 
Occupation: Administrator 
Organization: Cidade 
 
69. Name: Maria Tardado 
Date of interview: July 20, 2013 
Occupation: Administrator 
Organization: Cidade 
 
70. Name: Lugo Carbajal 
Date of interview: August 6, 2013 
Occupation: none 
Organization: Passe Livre 
 
71. Name: Miguel Gameiro 
Date of interview: July 17, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: PSTU 
 
72. Name: Bruno Cabral 
Date of interview: August 1, 2013 
Occupation: Student 
Organization: PSOL 
 
73. Name: Nero Costa 
Date of interview: Augut 10, 2013 
Occupation: Unknown 
Organization: PSOL 
 
74. Name: Pacheco Muñoz 
Date of interview: June 13, 2013 
Occupation: Public Servant 
Organization: PT 
 
75. Name: Jorge Alvarado 
Date of interview: August 7, 2013 
Occupation: Union Rep. 
Organization: SIMPA 
 
76. Name: Daria Palacios 
Date of interview: August 2, 2013 
Occupation: Unknown 
Organization: MST 
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77. Name: Romulo Texeira 
Date of interview: August 2, 2013 
Occupation: Unknown 
Organization: MST 
 
78. Name: Marcelo Da Costa 
Date of interview: August 10, 2013 
Occupation: Union Representative 
Organization: CUT 
 
79. Name: Justo Domingo 
Date of interview: August 11, 2013 
Occupation: Union Representative 
Organization: SIMPA 
 
80. Name: Juanpi Erez 
Date of interview: August 11, 2013 
Occupation: Union Rep. 
Organization: SIMPA/PSOL 
 
 
